Jackie Chan fights Lei Feng?: An anthropological consideration of the televisual representation of heroes in contemporary urban China. by Taniguchi, Makiko
Jackie Chan Fights Lei Feng?
An anthropological consideration of the televisual 
representation of heroes in contemporary urban China
Makiko T aniguchi
A dissertation submitted to the University of London, in accordance with 
the requirements of the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.
Department of Anthropology and Sociology,
School of Oriental and African Studies
Word Count: 98,284
ProQuest Number: 10672977
All rights reserved
INFORMATION TO ALL USERS 
The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted.
In the unlikely event that the author did not send a com p le te  manuscript 
and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed,
a note will indicate the deletion.
uest
ProQuest 10672977
Published by ProQuest LLC(2017). Copyright of the Dissertation is held by the Author.
All rights reserved.
This work is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States C ode
Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC.
ProQuest LLC.
789 East Eisenhower Parkway 
P.O. Box 1346 
Ann Arbor, Ml 48106- 1346
Abstract of thesis
This thesis examines the discourse of heroes, and, particularly, articulatory 
practices involved in the televisual representation of heroes, in the changing context 
of contemporary urban China.
Historically, the Chinese Communist Party has -  like earlier Chinese regimes 
-  actively promoted ‘heroes’ as exemplars of sanctioned politico-moral action. 
Especially during the 60s, the CCP sought to define and generate heroes as ideal 
‘socialist’ subjects (e.g. Lei Feng). In the post-Mao era, massive social changes have 
resulted from the economic reforms, China’s opening to the West, and the seemingly 
inexorable rise of commercialisation and consumerism. There is disenchantment with 
China’s utopian socialist vision. We might suppose that communist heroes promoted 
by the state have been withdrawn from the spotlight, and replaced by popular figures 
who “represent the will of the people”, sports or film stars (e.g. Jackie Chan). 
Television seems to have shifted from ‘mouthpiece of the party’ to competitor in the 
entertainment market, shaped by audience share and profitability. I problematise this 
narrative as overly simplistic in presupposing rupture between the pre- and post­
reform China.
I also seek to provide an anthropologically-informed critique of approaches 
employed in media studies -  how warranted are these approaches for a non-Western 
context like China? My thesis involves more than a mechanical application of media 
studies to what I observed in more than two years fieldwork. Anthropological 
attention to television is innovative and, perhaps, ‘trendy’. But television is an 
increasingly significant phenomenon in China. Watching television is the most 
popular leisure activity, and television continues to assume heightened importance in 
people’s everyday lives. My research does not just concern how people watch and 
discuss television, for I participated in a television production course at the Beijing 
Broadcasting Institute, and subsequently had direct experience of working in 
television production.
Through positioning my research on television and heroes I have spoken to 
debates on the efficacy and partiality of ethnography. Thus, my apparently narrow 
focus has had as its ambition an anthropological (re-)consideration of: social changes
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in contemporary PRC; some approaches prevalent in media studies; and the aspects of 
fieldwork endeavour itself.
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Chapter One 
Looking for Heroes: Introduction
(Tongtong talking to his friend, Jingjing)
Jingjing: “My dad is a hero (yingxiong H$|£) . Do you know what a hero 
is?”
Tongtong: “No, I don’t.”
Jingjing: “My mum said a hero is a person who does good things for other 
people. He is not afraid to suffer, to grow tired, or to die, and he catches bad 
people (huai ren if  A). My dad is a People’s Policeman (renmin jingcha A 
(frWM)- Every year he receives a medal for catching bad people.”
Tongtong: “Your dad is great!”
Jingjing: “There is a downside. He often does not come home.”
Tongtong: “If your dad were to stay home all the time how could he become a 
hero?”
Jingjing: “Is your dad a hero (yingxiong ) ?”
Tongtong: “Of course, my dad is a hero, too. He is a doctor. He heats and 
cures patients with a scalpel. But, my dad does not want my mum...”
(Tongtong talking to his mother)
Tongtong: “Do you know what a hero is?”
Mother: “A hero is a person who is very capable (tebie nenggan de ren 
MAl'itl A) -  for instance, a famous scientist like Edison. He was an 
exceptionally capable man. If it weren’t for him, we wouldn’t have had the 
life we have now.”
Tongtong: “That is not what Jingjing said. But I think both you and Jingjing 
are correct about a hero. She said her father is a hero,”
Mother: “That’s right. He is a hero.”
Tongtong: “My father is also a hero. He saves people.”
Mother: “How could he possibly be a hero...”
(TongTong talking to his grandmother)
Tongtong: “Grandma, do you know what a hero is?”
Grandmother: “A hero is a person who is not afraid of pain.”
(Extracts from “Days of Looking for Heroes” <Ximzhao Yingxiong de 
Rizi #  0  fr>. This drama was broadcast on Beijing TV 2 on
May 20, 1998. Translation is mine.)
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The above conversations were extracted from a television drama Days o f 
Looking for Heroes {Xunzhao Yingxiong de Rizi 0 ~P), an episode of the
TV series Us Ordinary People (Zan Laobaixing M:). The drama is the story of
a little boy called Tongtong and his search for a hero. Tongtong is four or five years 
old. His father has left him and his mother not so long ago and is set to break up the 
marriage with Tongtong’s mother. Tongtong lives with his mother and grandmother 
in one block of an old courtyard house shared with another family. Little Tongtong’s 
search for a hero starts when his friend Jingjing, who is about the same age, who lives 
across the courtyard, boasts to him that her father is a hero. As much as Tongtong 
wants to believe his own father is a hero like Jingjing’s father, he is not quite certain 
what a hero is. As shown in the above conversations, Tongtong learns from his friend 
that a hero is one who is ‘brave and does good things for other people’. His 
grandmother also says that a hero is a brave person. From his mother he leams that a 
hero is a very capable person, implying the importance of knowledge and intelligence, 
though she denies that Tongtong’s father is a hero. In other words, there are aspects 
of social goodness, bravery, and possession of knowledge in the idea of heroes. In the 
end, Tongtong comes to the conclusion that even though these are all different ideas 
about what constitute a hero, each is in some way about a correct definition of what a 
hero is.
Heroes have played an important role in communist China (Burch 1979, 
Chiang 1984, Farquhar 1996, Rofel 1994). Historically, the Chinese Communist 
Party (CCP) has actively promoted heroes as exemplars of sanctioned politico-moral 
action. They were the embodiment of the socialist spirit. Especially during the 
1960s, the CCP sought to define and generate heroes as ideal socialist subjects. 
Previously, dining the Maoist period, the idea of heroes was monotonously defined by
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the party. This television drama, however, through Tongtong’s search for heroes 
suggests multiple, though limited, ideas of what constitutes a hero, and thus illustrates 
the changing idea of heroes in contemporary China.
After his conversations, Tongtong starts his search for a hero. One day, he 
finds him -  a young, tall, strong, and handsome garbage man, who takes Tongtong for 
a ride with him on his job. During this short journey, Tongtong witnesses the garbage 
man heroically helping other people in various ways, from collecting garbage to 
repairing a broken car on the street. At the end of the ride, he tells him that he is a 
hero. Hoping to have a heroic father, Tongtong secretly hopes that this young man 
will get married to his mother, while still wishing his father would come home. A 
few weeks later, the garbage man disappears and is replaced by another man. 
Tongtong does not even know the name of his heroic garbage man, where he has 
gone, or how to find him. There is a hint of comparison with Tongtong’s father and 
the garbage man, both of whom disappear in the end. This ending suggests the 
anonymity of heroism and commitment to the greater social good rather than 
individual happiness. Considering this garbage man in the above story, I am 
reminded of scenes with many nameless heroes of the communist period like Lei 
Feng (to be discussed later). It involves locating heroes in everyday life, doing 
ordinary work, and keeping their anonymity. After watching this television drama, I 
found myself asking whether the media representation of heroes in contemporary 
China is changing, and, if so, how?
My interest in representations of the ‘hero’ was triggered by a contrast. I saw 
a picture of Lei Feng on a signpost in Dong Da Qiao the main street in
Eastern district of Beijing, and, next to it a big poster of Jackie Chan, advertising 
VCD machines. It was a cold winter’s day during a short visit I made to Beijing in
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early 1997. Dong Da Qiao A t#  is a main shopping area with a few big stores, and
a number of signposts with different pictures of communist heroes lined the street.
This juxtaposition of the images of Lei Feng and Jackie Chan appeared not only to 
stand for the changing nature of hero representation, but also struck me as symbolic of 
the socio-political condition of post-reform China, where two contradictory systems 
o f ‘socialism' and the ‘market’ co-exist. (Ci 1994, Croll 1994, Ikels 1996. Smith 
1993, Tang 2000).
Figure 1.01
Poster im age o f  Lei Feng in his army 
uniform (From the author’s personal 
co llection )
Figure 1.02
Poster im age o f  Lei Feng studying
M ao's writing
(From the author's personal
co llection)
Lei Feng is probably the best known of all the state-promoted heroes. Born to 
a poor peasant family. Lei Feng became an orphan. Lei Feng had experienced a very
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hard life due to the evil deeds of capitalists and the Nationalists prior to the 
establishment of the People’s Republic of China in 1949. He went to work in a steel 
mill at the age of 18 before joining the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and later the 
Communist Party in 1960. He was portrayed in various media, ranging from 
newspapers and books, to school texts, as always selflessly helping others and as a 
tireless servant of the people. It is worth noting that these were some of criteria 
identified by Jingjing in her idea of heroes, in the conversations cited at the beginning 
of this thesis. In 1962, Lei Feng died in an accident at the age of 22. He had ardently 
studied the works of Chairman Mao, and left a diary which confirmed his devotion to 
the Communist Party, Socialism, and to Chairman Mao.
In his diary, Lei Feng famously wrote that he was willing to be a ‘screw’ in 
the machinery of the state wherever the Party wanted to bolt him in. Following Lei 
Feng’s death, Chairman Mao launched the “Leam from Comrade Lei Feng,” (xiang 
lei feng tongzhi xuexi [n] | 0'^  [ffj ,r^  ^  >J) campaign in 1963, and since then, his “screw
spirit” (luosiding jingshen has been repeatedly invoked by the state in a
series of campaigns against spiritual pollution (jingshen wenmingjianshe RfIM:
&) in 1977, 1983 and again in 1990.1
1 In autumn o f  1997, there was an exhibition on Lei Feng held at the National History Museum, which 
also stirred up the spirit o f  ‘Learn From Lei F eng’ (xiang lei feng xue xi [rJ Uf <J) again at the 
beginning o f  my fieldwork.
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Figure 1.03
Image o f  Jackie Chan
(Taken from a prom otional material for the docum entary film  
‘Jackie Chan: M y Story’, from the author’s personal co llection )
In contrast, Jackie Chan emerges from a capitalist world. He is a Hong Kong 
film star, known as a martial arts expert. In Mainland China he is, and has long been, 
probably one of the most popular contemporary non-Mainland stars. Among the 
many films in which he has starred are Drunken Master (1978), Police Story (1985), 
Project A (1983), and Who Am I (1998). He also had success in Hollywood with the 
film Rush Hour (1998). It is undeniable that Jackie Chan is fostered by the cmmercial 
industry which has blessed him with a sizeable fortune. In this sense, Jackie Chan 
represents the post-reform China ideology of ‘To Get Rich Is Glorious’ (zhifu 
guangrong a  7*6 v£). It is worth mentioning that Tongtong and Jingjing were 
having the first conversation quoted above in front of a McDonald’s -  we see a statue
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of Ronald McDonald. This is important in the sense that it marks the change of 
ideology and locates this conversation on heroes in contemporary time.
These two images represent quite different subjects. Lei Feng as Chairman 
Mao’s good soldier led an ascetic life and died young in an accident, while Jackie 
Chan seems to enjoy his fame and wealth. The contrast between the bigger and more 
vibrant image of Jackie Chan and the relatively small image of Lei Feng in his green 
army uniform against a red background illustrates the more prominent status of Jackie 
Chan over that of the communist hero. Am I alone in thinking that Jackie Chan 
seems to have led a far more attractive life than Lei Feng? According to research by 
the Beijing Municipal Youth Research Centre among approximately 10,000 primary 
school students, film star came in as the second most popular career choice for the 
students, with 20.5% of them claiming that to be their future job choice for their 
future. The most popular was a managerial position, the preference of 21.6% of the 
students. Yu Yiqun, an assistant researcher at the centre, expressed disappointment 
that students seemed to only be concerned with high incomes and fame.2 It appears 
that what Jackie Chan represents is closer to the hearts of children in the current 
society than what Lei Feng offers. Then, can we say that Jackie Chan, who possesses 
both fame and wealth, is a new type of hero of China?3
Moreover, the juxtaposition of these two representations of heroes provides a 
vivid illustration of the observation that “China’s utopian project, which had begun as 
ideologically sweetened asceticism, ended as disenchanted hedonism” (Ci 1994:167). 
In the post-Mao era, massive social changes resulted from economic reforms, China’s 
opening to the West, and the seemingly inexorable rise of commercialisation and 
consumerism. This increasing importance of commercial values looked particularly
2 From Asahi Shinbun (Asahi Daily) 12/8/97. Translation is mine.
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suggestive in Jackie Chan advertising for VCD machines, which implies ‘personal’ 
viewing, leisure time, and new and expensive technological equipment, whereas Lei 
Feng offered nothing but himself. Under the current social circumstances some China 
scholars (Luo 2000, Yue 2000, Zhang 1996) have noted that state-promoted 
communist heroes have been withdrawn from the spotlight, and are being replaced by 
popular figures ranging from sports, film and television stars, to entrepreneurs, who 
‘represent the will of the people.’ Jackie Chan’s popularity at the time I did my 
fieldwork could be located in this wider framework of the blooming of commercially 
generated popular culture in post-reform China.
The Continuing Presence of Lei Feng in Contemporary China
The socio-political changes which have taken place in the post-reform period 
have undeniably affected the aspirations, desires, ideas, and lives of Chinese people. 
Yet Lei Feng keeps being revived, particularly every March, in a variety of media.
On March 5, 1963, Mao launched the first ‘Learn from Lei Feng’ campaign, and even 
today a variety of activities serve to remind people of Lei Feng around this time of the 
year. The major newspapers cany articles about him and his spirit. Television 
broadcasts films of communist heroes, schools and universities mobilise students in 
Lei Feng- inspired activities, ranging from picking up rubbish, cleaning up the streets 
to offering free haircuts. Moreover, large numbers of Lei Feng- type workers and 
models are promoted in the media (See Figure 1.04). These displays of heroes cannot
3 The term ‘hero’ is used loosely in this chapter, and w ill be defined more precisely in Chapter 2.
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simply be dismissed and there is a clear intention by the Party to define and generate 
heroes even to this day.
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Figure 1.04
N ew spaper clipping o f  m odel worker (From B eijing M orning Neva’s , 1999 /9 /17 . p.9 .)
—  - -
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We cannot simply dismiss Lei Feng as anachronistic. There are occasions 
when Lei Feng, a supposedly outdated communist hero, assumes different kinds and 
degrees of significance in the everyday lives of people. As my fieldwork went on, I 
met people who genuinely regard Lei Feng as a good person who did good deeds, 
regardless of whether the person was actually interested in following Lei Feng’s path.
Tang Zhifang, a tailor in the Beijing apartment compound where I lived while 
doing my fieldwork,4 genuinely aspired to following Lei Feng’s path. Tang Zhifang, 
in his early 30’s, came to Beijing from Changzhou in Zhejiang province when he was 
eighteen. He lived on his own in a single-room brick shack. I noticed that he always 
had people at his place, asking him to do this and that chore, many of which were not 
necessarily related to his tailoring job, but he appeared to be happy to help others 
without asking for much, if anything, in return. He never even accepted money for 
altering my clothes despite my insisting many times. Instead, he asked me to give 
him the used foreign stamps from my letters from abroad, as his hobby was stamp 
collecting. Tang Zhifang commented that he never expected to earn any money from 
individual customers. To earn a living, he would take orders from a factory making 
uniforms -  even though the amount he earned was still very little. He said that a 
person did not need much once they had a place to live and some food. I told him, 
half jokingly, that he was like Lei Feng. He shyly responded that even though he fell 
far short of Lei Feng's standards, he aspired to be like him.
Several weeks later, I saw Tang Zhifang watching a popular television drama 
so I dropped by. He had a small black and white television set and I used to drop by
4 Many Chinese apartment blocks have their own electricians, kiosks and tailors. The electricians are 
usually paid by the work unit owning the apartment blocks, since the residents pay an annual 
maintenance fee, but as a tailor Tang Zhifang was not given any money.
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his place to watch the television with him.5 As our conversation on television heroes 
went along, he shyly showed me several notebooks of his diary dating back several 
years. He showed me his comments on a few television programmes and a page 
where he had written out his life plan. He had written about what he hoped to achieve 
each year till he reached the age of fifty. He then pulled out boxes hidden in the 
comer of his small room. Inside, were many books on literature, politics, 
international relations, agriculture and English. Tang Zhifang told me that he studied 
on his own in his free time, and even showed me his timetable. It reminded me so 
much of Lei Feng’s diary and his devotion for learning, whether Mao Zedong’s 
teachings or English and Science.
How do we make sense of Tang Zhifang’s Lei Feng inspired behaviours, 
particularly in late 1990s urban China? Tan Zhifang was intentionally following Lei 
Feng’s path, as he mentioned in passing that he wanted to be like Lei Feng. He grew 
up after the Cultural Revolution, at a time when the emulation of communist heroes 
was no longer imposed upon people, and he experienced China’s economic reform 
from an early age. Then, what was the motivation for his Lei Feng- style behaviour? 
He was not even a model worker who got a medal for such behaviour; nor did his 
good deeds appear to generate any money. Tang Zhifang identified himself as a 
pingmin ( T‘ K;) , ping T' meaning flat or on the same level, and min as people, in 
other words, of the common people, and he led a relatively humble life. Perhaps, Lei
5 Ms Gao, one o f  my teachers at the Beijing Broadcasting Institute (BBI), claims that nowadays, most 
households in Beijing have television sets, the majority o f  which are colour sets. She said it is quite 
hard to find a black and white set in Beijing, except in veiy poor households or in the outskirts o f 
Beijing. However, I noticed that there are many people like Tang Zhifang in the heart o f  the city. I 
believe it is important not to forget that while on one hand there are people who have two big colour 
television sets at home and who are cited as representative o f  Chinese urban dwellers, many others still 
watch black and white television sets. Perhaps, this growing gap in wealth and lifestyle is a distinctive 
character o f  Chinese urban areas in the post-reform period.
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Feng style deeds allowed him to be someone special in his common ordinary life 
without any recognition of success or acquisition of wealth.
The above story, as well as a series of attempts by the Party to produce heroes 
demonstrates that we camiot simply brush aside the continuing presence of 
communist heroes who embody personhood, fame, good fortune or the market. The 
representation of heroes has not made a clear-cut transformation from communism to 
consumerism. Rather, I argue, the representation of heroes in contemporary China is 
extremely complex, as it involves multiple practices and perspectives of how to live 
as a subject of post-reform China. ‘Subject’ here is used in two senses: one as 
subjugation to someone else by dependence and loss of control, and the other as 
people’s conception of themselves (Foucault 1982:212). Therefore, by looking at the 
different ideas about heroes that exist in contemporary China, this thesis attempts to 
explore a variety of subjectivities experienced by people in particular circumstances.
I will expand on this point later in this chapter.
Television and Media Studies
In this thesis, then, departing from Jackie Chan, I will be looking particularly 
at the televisual representation of heroes. Jackie Chan as a Hong Kong film hero has 
been a jumping off point for initially evoking a debate on the changing idea of heroes 
in contemporary China. At the same time, it is worth noting that the field of 
representation in popular culture is not so clearly divided between television, 
magazines, newspapers, films and DVDs as well as music and so on. There is a lot of 
cross-referencing between particular subjects across different media, which mutually
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construct the representation of a hero as a whole. At the time of my fieldwork, 
however, because of the limited financial investment available, television stations 
could hardly cast popular film and mustic stars from Hong Kong, Taiwan or any other 
foreign country. Yet, a popular star like Jackie Chan is an absence presence in some 
televisual representations of heroes. Jackie Chan does not necessarily have to 
physically appear on the television. It is the awareness of the heroic discourse which 
Jackie Chan represents which inspires and constructs some of the televisual 
representations of heroes in contemporary China.
Why Television?
It might be asked why I have chosen the representation of heroes on television 
in particular as the main focus of this thesis. Certainly heroes appear in different 
media, from newspapers, magazines, films, operas, and school texts to a vast amount 
of literature, as examples of sanctioned politico-moral action for modern citizens. The 
Communist Party, particularly during the 1960s and 1970s, has utilised all lands of 
media to promote communist heroes, and has claimed that the mission of arts and 
literature is primarily to be a tool for politico-moral education. It was well known that 
Jiang Qing, a former actress and Mao’s wife, for several years during the Cultural 
Revolution terrorised the entertainment industry, replacing all the remnants of 
traditional Chinese and Western culture with revolutionary music, plays, films, and 
'model' operas. Television, on the other hand, is a new medium for representing 
heroes which developed in the 1980s. In present-day China, all these forms of 
entertainment are cultural products that, to a varying degree, combine commercial
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forms with Party ideology.6 As Liu Kang notes,
It seems that the contemporary Chinese culture of the everyday has 
increasingly become the site of dialogical contention of a variety of forces, 
among which the culture industry, or the commercial popular culture, and 
China’s local and national forms and styles, including the revolutionary legacy 
of the culture of the masses, intersects and interpenetrate.
(1997:121)
China has a long and rich literary tradition. During the Communist period, 
particularly in the 1960s & 1970s, however, the publication of literature was tightly 
controlled by the Party, and many of them bore the theme of serving the people 
(Huang 1977, King 1991). In examining the literature of the Communist period, 
Huang notes that “as early as July 1949, Zhou Yang, representing the party in his 
address to the conference of writers and artists, contended that the single most 
important feature of socialist literature was the creation of worker-peasant-soldier 
heroes and heroines who were not just born, but selected in the forge of battle 
(1977:37). Link (1989), on the other hand, assumes that considerable numbers of 
hand-copied entertainment fiction with the theme of detective stories, spy thrillers, 
romances, knight errant fiction, triangular love stories, and pornography, that would 
hardly be thought to embrace any revolutionary value, circulated among urban youths 
during the Cultural Revolution. Link’s account is significant in imagining a much 
fuller picture of the thoughts and tastes of the popular readership in China -  even 
during the most suppressed period of the Cultural Revolution. Yet, though this might 
have been the case, it still appears that the predominant form of literature available for 
ordinary people during the 1960s and 1970s was the literature of the politico-moral 
education kind.
6 School texts are an exception, as they are tools for education rather than entertainment, so have much 
stronger ideological tones.
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In the reform period, the publication of a variety of literature, newspapers and 
magazines flourished, and reading became one of the most popular leisure activities, 
despite persistent illiteracy. A wide range of reading material catering to the 
different readers’ needs, tastes, and levels of readers led to the development of 
specific readerships (Liu 1998).7 With this devide into a range of high and low 
litertature, Chiense Herature cannot be unprolematically thought of as a mass medium 
for the representation of heroes. Which of these works should be the defining ones? 
Whose accounts and representations of heroes do we privilege? To further complicate 
the situation, there were substantial numbers of pirated, as well as illegally imported, 
magazines and books from Taiwan and Hong Kong which had a popular readership. 
Such complex dynamics will influence the ways in which readers engage with 
particular literary heroes and how we can understand their articulations, which 
therefore will require further research and profound understanding of Chiense 
literature in its own right. Significant as they are, the representation of heroe in 
Chinese literary works is not my primay focus. School texts, on the other hand, 
remain a more or less ideological form for educational purposes. One can still find a 
lot of stories about the exemplars of politico-moral actions in children’s school texts.
Another medium for promoting heroes is film. Films produced during the 
1960s and late 1970s were predominantly of the socialist realism genre, typically 
propagandists pedagogical, and produced by the state (Chu and Pan 1997, Berry 
2004, Pickowicz 1989), During this period, films were enjoyed en masse. A major 
theatre construction programme was mobilized at both city and countryside levels; 
while mobile projection teams brought films to the villages (Berry 2004: 32). Post­
7 One respected Chinese academic pointed out to me that even radical foreign magazines, such as New  
Left Review, are translated into Chinese and sold to the public. He argued that the state does not worry 
about their having bad effects on the populace, knowing that those magazines would only be read by 
academics, a veiy  limited portion o f China’s population.
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reform, films became a popular entertainment which people enjoyed very cheaply, 
with tickets costing only a few mao However, with technological changes such
as the introduction of television, and then, more recently at the time of my fieldwork 
(1997-1999), of VCDs followed by DVDs, and rising prices at the cinema,9 cinema 
attendance has dropped.10
Films are still popular but their mode of consumption has altered since the 
time right after the reform. Firstly, they are consumed at home in a more 
individualized environment, often with a remote control. This is assumed to have had 
a significant influence on film viewing practices. Secondly, there are many more 
foreign films now available. This brings in the issue of globalization and its impact 
on Chinese film production and distribution. On the ground, this goes beyond the 
problems presented by the global and local flows of cultural productions and 
investments. There are issues of translation and piracy, for example. Pirated DVDs 
of foreign films, in particular, Hollywood’s, are often made from a screened copy.
So, even if the visual and audio quality were good, pirated copies often have 
ridiculous subtitles (Pang 2006:79-76). This again contributes greatly in terms of how 
viewers engage with films -  they may be watching a completely different film from 
the “original” version. Such complexities are reasons enough to suggest that the 
cinematic representation of heroes deserves a study in its own right.
As for the theatre, Judd (1991) has examined the eight model operas (yangban 
xi #!&$<;) of the Cultural Revolution such as The East Is Red, Taking Tiger 
Mountain, and The White- Haired GirL Prior to reform, theatre enjoyed a wide range
8 Money unit. 1/10 o f  oneyj/an |i| (=RMB 1) equals about eight English pence.
9 For instance in 1998, the price for a cinema ticket was about twenty to thirty renminbi (RMB), 
and the average price for VCD was ten renminbi therefore one could buy two to three VCDs for the 
price o f  going to the cinema once.
10 People commented that they visit the cinema only when on a date. You often find two- people sofa
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of audiences, particularly since the work unit often distributed theatre tickets to then 
employees {fen piaoffM)^ Theatres during the reform period, however, seem to have 
shifted to providing entertainment for the newly emerging middle-class, and not many 
people I knew visited the theatre regularly.
Relatively speaking, television is a new mass medium which developed in the 
1980s. I have chosen television as my focus for the way in which heroes are 
promoted mainly because, since the 1980s and certainly at the time of my fieldwork, 
television seems to be increasingly taking over as the key focus of public 
conversation, from daily chats to a variety of debates in other media. In study of 
leisure patterns Wang Shaoguang writes,
Before 1980, the dominant free-time activities were probably reading, 
listening to radio, movie going, socializing with friends (gossiping, and simply 
doing nothing). ... A 1987 nationwide survey showed that on average, every 
urban resident spent 1.5 to 1.0 hours in front of the television each day, which 
accounted for almost half the time available for leisure.
(1995:159)
Television is the most popular leisure activity in China, involving 91.59 percent of the 
population by the end of 1999 (Zhongguo Gnangbo Dianshi Nianjian 'f1 dlfi-"EiTTSl 
2000:18). It was this ubiquitous presence of television in the everyday life of
the people, and its distribution to a wide range of people from intellectuals to factory 
workers that interested me in television as my focus in the first place. Most of the 
people I came across during my fieldwork watched television regularly, although 
some, particularly intellectuals, may have claimed to despise television as low-culture 
and vulgar.11 In doing research, it was important for me to find a topic which
sections in Chinese cinemas.
11 I often found that even though they might claim to despise television, if  asked about particular to 
programmes, they admitted they to watching. This admission was often followed by a variety o f  
excuses, such as the children or spouse wanted to watch. I w ill discuss the example o f  Cui Zhen and
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everyone could feel comfortable discussing. Television was certainly one of the few 
such topics in an increasingly differentiated contemporary urban China. Moreover, 
there were lots of public debates about television programmes and their contents in 
major newspapers and magazines.
I was particularly interested in the complex set of situations in which 
television operates. On one hand, television has served for a long time as a houshe 
(mouthpiece, literally hou U(^- meaning throat and sheflf meaning tongue) of the
Party. On the other hand, it has become an increasingly commercial medium which 
plays a crucial role in popular culture, even though at the time of my fieldwork, the 
limited financial investments available to television stations meant that they could 
hardly cast the likes of celebrities from Hong Kong, Taiwan or any other foreign 
country. Rofel notes:
In China, where official methods of ideological dissemination such as political 
study sessions and “thought work” (sixictng gongzuo) lie bankrupt, 
consumption of television and other forms of popular culture has increasingly 
become the process through which people are interpellated (Althusser 1971) as 
subjects of the nation.
(1994:702)
Rofel (1994), following Althusser, notes here that television serves the political 
function of producing subjects of a nation. Althusser (1971) assumes that ideology 
operates by interpellating individuals as subjects of the state, and that media is a 
means for disseminating dominant ideology on behalf of the ruling class. Hence, 
television is what Althusser calls an Ideological State Apparatus. Assuming this role 
in constructing subjects of nation, television is thus a crucial site for producing and 
projecting particular representations of heroes. Moreover, changing power relations
her husband in Chapter 5.
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in the realm of television produce different kinds and forms of heroes. These 
representations of heroes then enter into the everyday lives of the people through their 
television viewing. Television, therefore, works for the production of modem 
subjects at two levels; on the level of political representation, and on the level of 
individual bodies (Anagonost 1997:98-116). It is at the level of the individual body 
where political representations intersect with the people's ideas of themselves. I will 
expand on this point further later in this chapter. For now, I suggest that the study of 
the televisual representation of heroes is extremely useful and informative for 
understanding the construction of subjects and the various workings of power in 
contemporary Chiense society.
Television as the Object o f Anthropological Enquiry
Within the discipline of anthropology, Miller (1992) was a pioneering figure 
for studying television and did research on the American soap opera The Young and 
the Restless in the context of Trinidad. His work points to a crucial fact about 
contemporary society: that American soap opera plays an important role in “the wise 
adages and saws of folk knowledge” (1992:177). Several anthropologists have 
similarly highlighted the salience of the media in the study of anthropology, (e.g. 
Abu-Lughod 1997, Spitulnik 1993, Hirsch 1998, Rofel 1994). In the contemporary 
study of society, whether urban or rural, small or large scale, television is bound to be 
a key feature of the contemporary cultural landscape and everyday lives, so an 
anthropologist who studies the society cannot afford to ignore its presence and 
significance in the daily lives of the people. Engaging with television is a key 
mechanism through which our knowledge is formed in contemporary society. In this
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respect, the anthropologist needs to take the study of the media very seriously. Then, 
below, I will look at some main approaches to the study of media, in particular 
television, so as to contextualise the relevance of this thesis.
Television, though a relatively new object of anthropological enquiry, has long 
been studied in the fields of communication, media, and cultural studies. The study of 
media developed as Mass Communication Studies in the US in the 1930s. Lazerfeld 
and Merton (1955) were pioneering figures in this approach, and offered linear effects 
models of television based on the model of ‘source-message- receiver’, which 
assumes a passive audience of the media messages projected on to them. In contrast 
to this view, scholars have argued that there were only limited effects of media (e.g. 
Katz and Lazarfeld 1955, Klapper 1960). This approach to media was reinforced by 
the development of the so-called uses and gratifications approach (eg. McQuail 1969, 
Blumer et aL 1982), which supported the view that audiences are active rather than 
passive and use media in various ways to satisfy their needs. Mass Communication 
Studies continues to maintain an influential position in the study of the media, 
particularly in the USA, but also in many other parts of the world, even today.
In Britain, the Cultural Studies branch became predominant in the study of the 
media during the 1960s, and has become the most significant current in the academic 
study of the media there since the 1970s. This branch of media study emerged as a 
reaction against the textualist approach to media which was very influential at the 
time. Scholars of Cultural Studies had criticised the textualist approach to media for 
neglecting the socio-cultural backgrounds of the audience (Williams 1977, Hall 
1974). Cultural Studies under Stuart Hall, based in the Centre for Contemporary 
Cultural Studies at Birmingham University, defines the audience in a much more 
active way.
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This view of the audience was distinguished from the earlier use and 
gratification model, which also assumes an active audience, but one without any room 
for the power of media texts. In his influential work “Encoding/decoding,” Hall 
(1974) takes into consideration ideological controls and powers in, as well as active 
audiences engaging with, media messages. The “Encoding/decoding” model is, 
therefore, a way of analysing the “circuit of culture” (Hall & du Gay 1996) in the 
realm of media, whereby meanings are produced at several different sites and 
circulated through several different processes. Twenty years after Hall first proposed 
the Encoding/decoding model, he still takes fundamentally the same position about 
the relationship between the power of the producer in encoding and the power of the 
audience in decoding the message. In an interview reconsidering this model, Hall 
states,
I don’t think audiences are in the same positions of power with those who 
signify the world to them. And preferred reading is simply a way of saying if 
you have the control of media, you own it, you write the texts - to some extent 
it has a determining shape. Your decodings are going to take place 
somewhere within the universe of encoding.
(1994:261)
Here, we could suggest that Hall was dealing with structure, the operation of power 
and human activity in the realm of the media, which are quite familiar issues for 
anthropologists. The important point to highlight in this approach is that Cultural 
Studies stands opposed to the view of culture as given and reflected in the media, and 
assumes it to be interwoven with all social practices. Such a conceptualisation of the 
media has opened up new possibilities for its analysis.
Although the viability of the practical applications of Hall’s 
“Encoding/decoding” model is open to question, this approach has formed the 
theoretical basis for analysing the operation of different powers existing in
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contemporary Chinese media. One of the pioneering works in this approach to 
Chinese media is China Turned On (1991) by James Lull, which looks at the 
audience, their viewing practices and ‘decodings’ at the micro-level. Due to China’s 
particular political situation, Chinese media studies tend to focus on the power of, and 
ideological control by, the state (Chin-Chuan Lee 2000, Ma 2000, Liu 1998, Lynch 
1999, Keane 1999, Pei 1994). I will further discuss how different scholars have 
approached the study of television audiences in the context of China in Chapter 5.
What, then, can an anthropologist contribute to the study of the media? 
Probably, her most widely recognised input is the ethnographic approach. How we 
actually go about doing an ethnography of media related practices is much debated in 
Media and Cultural Studies as well as in media anthropology. Within Cultural/Media 
Studies, calls for ethnography have been persistent, and a considerable number of 
works based on an ethnographic approach to television has been produced (Ang 1996; 
Silverstone 1994; Morley 1980; Morleyl992; Radway 1984). They represented a 
significant leap in the study of media. A particularly influential approach to the early 
media ethnography is the work of Geertz, a prominent figure in anthropology writing 
on the ethnography at the time. Geertz’s attention to the use of ethnography to 
demonstrate meanings of ordinary people’s lives, in particular his approach to culture 
as the “thick description” (Geertz 1973) -  a homogenized entity to be interpreted by 
the ethnographer -- had a great impact on early media ethnographic works.
One of the often heard debates in media ethnography has to do with the 
boundaries of media related practices. The ubiquity of mass media in people’s social 
lives has proved to be a challenge for media scholars trying to delineate the 
boundaries for their ethnography (Ang 1996, Couldry 2003, Abu-Lughod 2005). As
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Couldry asks: “Where exactly is the entry-point for ethnography in studying ‘the 
significance of television’s existence as a ubiquitous presence in [people’s] lives and 
imaginaries?”’ (2003:45). The cultural forms and representations transmitted by 
television are always only a part of people’s complex lives. The study of everyday 
life is therefore central to the study of media. The question then is how to study 
audience’s experience and engagement with the media within the context of their 
everyday life, and to do so in ways that illuminate how individual narratives relating 
to the media may also be thought of as social responses to the macro-structures of 
society (Ang 1990, Algan 2003, Abu-Lughod 2005). Even though television is a key 
medium by which the televisual representation intersects and engages with people’s 
conception of themselves and their world -  it is only a part of everyday life. In other 
words, media consumption practices need to be located within everyday worlds; while 
discussions and commentaries on programmes cannot be understood without some 
reference outside the immediate viewing times.
In doing fieldwork on rituals or kinship, for examples, anthropologists cannot 
assume prior knowledge of the boundaries either. Instead, the fieldwork is framed in 
relation to the questions which the ethnographer is asking. This brings us to the issue 
of context. Dilley (1999) examines how the concept of ‘context’ has been 
conceptualised within the discipline of social anthropology. Through examining the 
ways in which different anthropologists have used different theoretical frames as 
contexts against which our interpretation is based, Dilly argues that context does not 
exist as something tangible. In this respect, the drawing of ethnographic boundaries is 
the result of academic knowledge production as an outcome of the ethnographic 
encounter.
Another main debate centers on how to understand the relationship between
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television and everyday lives in media ethnography. Abu-Lughod critically remarks 
of ethnographic works in media studies that:
Many of the studies of popular culture, and especially television, that I have 
come across are disappointing. They do not seem to be trying to offer 
profound insights into the human condition, or even into the social, cultural, 
and political dynamics of particular communities...
(1997:111)
Similar sentiments have been expressed by Mmphy and Kraidy commenting on media 
ethnography in general as “theoretically sophisticated, ethnographically thin”
(2003:3). Couldry (2003), on the other hand, criticises Abu-Lughod’s comment for 
basing her views on a very partial account of media sociology and failing to consider 
the methodological debates within the field. Furthermore, Morley (1997) argues that 
adding more context does not yield more insight if the scholar does not analyse the 
political, social, economic and ideological dimensions of media consumption. Such a 
view is shared also by media scholars with a political economy bent. They often 
highlight what they see as a tendency in ethnographic accounts to make the audience 
appear more comfortable and proactive than warranted in the ethnographic encouter 
(Curran 1990, Gray 1999).
While I hold great respect for the achievement and significance made by early 
media ethnographies, I share the sentiments of Abu-Lughod and Murphy and Kraidy. 
It is not that Media Studies scholars fail to understand what ethnography is, but their 
concerns are very different from the anthropologist’s. Media Studies scholars are 
concerned with different issues. Media Studies scholars are interested in the uses of 
media, so the media themselves are central. On the other hand, anthropologists are 
primarily interested in the lives of people, and therefore, as Abu-Lughod puts it, 
“television is just one aspect of late twentieth-century lives,” and “working on
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television is a way into these lives” (1997:129). Moreover, methodologically Media 
Studies scholars and anthropologists seem to take different approaches. Murphy and 
Kraidy (2003) note that the difference between the qualitative audience research and 
ethnography lies in the anthropologists’ sustained engagement in the field that will 
generate details, events and observations that anthropologists are trained to record and 
interpret, while media scholars tend to engage in letters and interviews. Yet, I assume 
these two approaches are not totally unrelated; as the prominent Media Studies 
scholar Silverstone (1990) pointed out, people are not simply ‘audience’ nor 
‘producers,’ but live in complex webs of a variety of cultural forms and social 
relations. In order to understand people’s relationship with the meanings and 
imaginations of television, therefore, we must seek to understand the multiple social, 
cultural, and political frameworks they inhabit.
In reality, as a result of complex methodological issues for media 
ethnography, Media Studies scholars have been caught up in debating the theoretical 
ground for empirical research rather than actually carrying it out. On the later 
development of critical theory, Hall writes that it expands our understanding of “how 
complex meaning really is, and how many different sites of determination are 
involved in it” (1994: 273), but it actually lacks empirical contexts for research.
There are many sophisticated theories about the audience, the uses of media, the 
domestic space, and so on; however, we seem to know little about the audience and 
the uses of media in their everyday lives. In many ways, we are back to the situation 
that prompted the early pioneers (Hall 1974, Williams 1977) to make their call for 
Cultural Studies, objecting to the serious undermining of the voices of the other in the 
textual determinism of the 1970s. The whole debate in critical theory has led to a
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position opposed to that which Cultural Studies was initially trying to achieve.
The question is can we simply turn away from empirical research? This is not 
a new question in anthropology. We can consider it by drawing on the debate on the 
crisis on representation. As anthropologists deal with post-modern conditions, 
Geertz’s sense of culture as a homogenised entity becomes increasingly problematic. 
Geertz has been much criticised among anthropologists, particularly for his 
interpretive approach being the ‘confusion of tongues’ in accoimting for meanings. 
Several post-modem anthropologists (cf. Marcus and Fischer 1986, Clifford and 
Marcus 1986), though inspired by Greertz’s literary approach to anthropology, have 
started to question ethnographic authority. They argue that the other was a 
construction of self that occurred in the process of making ethnographies. Clifford 
(1986), for example, famously informs us that ethnographies are ‘fictions’ fabricated 
by anthropologists. Through these debates, self-reflexive anthropology emerged as 
the dominant trend, particularly in America, and the validity of the ethnographic 
enterprise was highly questioned. In this respect, despite a difference in concerns, 
there is a certain parallel between media scholars moving away from the empirical 
research to the literary critique, and anthropologists moving away from a classical 
sense of ethnography as cultural representation to turn to ethnography as a “fiction” 
(Clifford 1986).
The point I want to make by bringing in this much- repeated debate is that the 
tendency to move away from ethnography has led to the undermining of the capacity 
of the other to be heard, and I find this rather worrying. We need to reconsider 
Clifford’s claim about the other as the construction of self in the process of making 
ethnographies. Ortner, for instance, has some serious objections: “ .. .it seems to me 
grotesque to insist on the notion that the text is shaped by everything but the lived
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reality of the people who the text claims to represent” (Ortner 1996:188). Similarly, 
Wolf (1992) claims that anthropologists do research, and the experience of fieldwork 
does not produce mysterious empowerment. While recognising the relevance of 
reflecting on the process of producing ethnography, both Ortner and Wolf stand for 
enhancing the capacity of the other to be heard,12 Moreover, it is questionable how 
much control anthropologists have over the situation, and often the lack of it seems to 
argue against the vast claims made about ethnography as an anthropological fiction, I 
will come back to this point later in the chapter by reflecting on my own fieldwork 
experience.
Certainly, there is a question of how far the use of personal narratives in media 
studies and their interpretation can go beyond a celebratory display of the polysemy 
of the audience. While such questions continue to exist, scholars have demonstrated 
the power of ethnography to illuminate how the consumption of television 
programmes is embedded in the everyday lives of people and within broader social 
discourses (Abu-Lughod 2005, Rofel 1994, Mankekar 1999). These works have 
demonstrated, however it may be limited in scope, the discussions and commentaries 
of people, when linked to the rich socio-cultural context in which they occure, can be 
a way into people’s lives.
Since then, some anthropologists have moved on to continue doing fieldwork 
while being aware, and addressing the issue, of power in ‘representation’ (Abu- 
Lughod 1997, Ortner 1996, Ginsburg et al. 2002). This is awareness that doing 
fieldwork does not resolve the critical political problem of power relationships
12 It is worth pointing out that both o f  them — Ortner, and Wolf, are famous feminist scholars. It 
appears to me that this turn towards self-reflexive writing tends to further undermine the experiences o f  
‘Others’ such as feminists or the voices o f  non-Westem scholars within anthropology, under the 
shadow o f  the classical image o f  the powerful anthropologist who is a white middle-class man.
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between those who represent and those who are represented (Said 1978, Asad 1986).13 
Drawing on the debates I have highlighted, this thesis hopes to make a contribution 
towards media ethnography in a contemporary urban society. It demonstrates the 
micro practices of the reception of particular televisual representation of heroes in 
relation to the everyday worlds in which people live their lives and locates it in the 
wider socio-cultural and political context. Through such endeavour, this thesis 
attempts to consider and make a link between the structure and agency.
My research is not just concerned with how people watch and discuss 
television. I also participated in a television production course at one of the leading 
broadcasting institutes in China, and also worked in television production. From the 
point of view of television as the mouthpiece of the Party, mentioned earlier, I present 
the set ways of representing heroes which are being taught during the production 
training course, alongside a survey of the academic literature on televisual 
representations of heroes. There are public debates in China on how contemporary 
heroes are to be represented in widely available newspapers, as well as in more 
academically oriented magazines. In the actual process of the production of television 
programmes, the representation of a hero is not some pre-set given, but something 
that is to a large extent produced by a team of professionals performing their various 
roles. These professionals vary greatly in their interests, skills, jobs, and how they go 
about producing their programmes. They also work in an industry which is facing 
growing commercial and financial pressures.
13 There are now increasing numbers o f  scholars who have found a ground from which to challenge the 
representation o f  powerful anthropologists in the classic sense. Some examples are the disputes 
between Sahlins (1995) and Obeyesekere (1992), and the growing voices o f  Subaltern studies, though 
being aware that academic discourses still remain under the control o f powerful Euro-American 
intelligencia, much debated in post- colonial literature.
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Television is a site where audiences, producers, and academics shape a variety 
of conflicting ideas, and is therefore a contradictory cultural site where domination, 
opposition, and cultural creation coexist. In this sense, television resembles this 
description Hall gives popular culture:
Popular culture is one of the sites where this struggle for and against a culture 
of the powerful is engaged ...it is the arena of consent and resistance. It is 
partly where hegemony arises, and where it is secured. It is not a sphere 
where socialism, a socialist culture - already fully formed - might be simply 
‘expressed’.
(1981:239)
The topic of the televisual representation of heroes is limited in scope, but I take the 
hero as a leverage point for a wider examination of social settings and issues in 
contemporary Chinese society. This thesis, broadly speaking, is an effort to grapple 
with an increasingly complex and fluid contemporary urban society and its changing 
operations of power.
Fieldwork
My fieldwork took place in Beijing, the capital of the People’s Republic of 
China, in the period 1997 to 1999 and again for a few months in late 2000. By the 
late 1990s Beijing was already highly modernised and cosmopolitan, attracting 
international businesses and many tourists. New high-rise office buildings and 
shopping malls were burgeoning all over the city. The first Golden Arches in China’s 
history, a rhetorical symbol of China’s economic reform (Watson 1997), were 
demolished to be replaced by the country’s biggest shopping mall and a number of 
other McDonald’s in the area. When I was doing my fieldwork in the post-
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McDonald’s era, Starbucks was mushrooming. Social changes taking place in China 
are indeed drastic, and as I write this thesis, China has entered the WTO. This newly 
opened market has led to a rush of foreign cultural imports, from Hollywood films to 
Japanese pop stars and cars, and mean radical changes in people’s life-styles. Yet 
since Beijing is the national capital and headquarters of the Communist Party, the 
state still exercises tight control over social space.
When I started my fieldwork in September 1997, Beijing was about to hold the 
Fifteenth Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, the key meeting for guiding 
China into the twenty-first century. Around this time, Spiritual Civilization (jingshen 
wenming $3) was frequently promoted in the media, and it appeared to be a
politically less relaxed time. One crucial decision made at the Fifteenth Congress 
meeting was the policy to cut back state sectors on a wide scale. This caused a variety 
of changes in the daily lives of ordinary people in Beijing — from the privatization of 
housing previously owned by work units, to an enormous increase in unemployment, 
and the rapid growth of a ‘floating population’ {Ihtdong renkou l ^ A P ) , a
phenomena that had been emerging since the 1990s, but both now unavoidable and 
ubiquitous aspects of Beijing life.14
Moreover, by the time I started my fieldwork, the Chinese economy had 
already stagnated from the vigorous growth of the earlier reform era, despite the 
official claim of maintaining growth at somewhere around seven percent per year. It 
was suffering particularly due to the major recession following the Asian economic 
crisis. Many people were expressing unhappiness and dissatisfaction with life. 
Inflation caused a real strain on people’s everyday lives. The most common topic on
14 It is important to bear in mind that there were many people who could not resolve the issue o f  losing 
a variety o f  individual or family securities previously provided by the state, and many o f  those I met 
expressed anger and discontent towards the circumstances in which they found themselves. Whyte
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the street, on the bus, or oil the tube was accommodation. I often heard people saying, 
“I cannot afford to buy a house” (mei you fangzi, mai buqi
At the start of my fieldwork, I was already quite familiar with both Beijing 
and the Mandarin language.15 I lived in a small flat in Jianguomen, in the heart of the 
city throughout my fieldwork, till September 1999. Behind the busy street of 
Jianguomen, with its department stores and office buildings, many occupied by 
foreign and joint-venture companies, are small housing areas for ordinary Chinese 
people, in one of which I lived for two years. I had worked with people in different 
parts of Beijing, and most of them led very busy lives, which made it difficult for an 
anthropologist to ‘live among the people’ in a conventional anthropological sense. 
Fieldwork in a contemporary urban society assumes quite a different nature than in a 
restricted community, in the sense that the physical boundaries of the locale do not 
necessarily correspond to the actual community in which people live, Chinese office 
hours are normally from eight-thirty or nine a.m. till five or five-thirty p.m. After 
work, people went home, and occasionally went out for dinner and a drink with 
friends, then came home and slept to be ready for the next day. To adapt my research 
to this busy lifestyle, my fieldwork sites were dispersed throughout Beijing -  
sometimes my apartment, sometimes someone else’s house, sometimes at a 
restaurant, or people’s offices. It was not regular, either -  we met whenever possible 
when the people I have worked with had time.
In the beginning, my research depended largely on people I knew from my 
previous visits to Beijing. These were friends from my early days in China as a BA 
student learning Chinese. These people provided information and contacts. This was 
not an unusual practice for them, as people do depend on their friends and
(2000) explores different sources o f social tensions which may lead to destabilizing China.
41
acquaintances for getting things done, this is commonly known as guanxi la
gimanxi fe ^ IrL 16 Interviews, even informal ones, with these old friends, however,
presented somewhat of a problem, probably because I was always too close to them.
It was very difficult to transform our friendship into a relationship between 
anthropologist and ‘informants’. In fact at the time, I did not realise that is what I was 
doing. It was even a stretch for my friends to accept me as a PhD student doing 
fieldwork. Most people seemed to see a PhD as something distant from their own 
lives, but also had the image that it was something very intelligent and prestigious.
All my friends knew what I was doing, but many of them seemed to have decided to 
dismiss my new status.
The relationship became somewhat tense and awkward each time I crossed the 
boundary of friendship, put on my anthropologist’s hat and asked them very specific 
questions of anthropological interest. The big difference between a conversation 
between friends and one between an anthropologist and an informant is that friendship 
is a relationship based on equality and mutual interest in spending time in each other’s 
company. There is no obligation or responsibility for my friends to provide me with 
information for my study. The relationship between an anthropologist and an 
informant is different; for an anthropologist the informant is an ‘object’ of study and 
there is a certain sense of obligation on the part of an informant. Of course, reactions 
differed with different people, for different topics, and with different timings. What 
came as a big surprise to me at the time was to have friends explicitly refuse to be 
informants, for I had imagined that an informant is a vulnerable subject in relation to 
an anthropologist.
15 Since 1994 I had spent a few months o f every summer holiday in Beijing to learn the language.
16 Guanxi is a network o f friends and acquaintances. Many scholars have written on the topic, 
and often portrayed it as a characteristic o f  social relations in Chinese society, (see Yang 1998)
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In writing about the fundamental incompatibility of the roles of ‘friend’ and 
‘informant’ Hendry (1992) discusses similar kinds of difficulties she experienced in 
her fieldwork. In her case, she managed to transform her friend into an informant, 
however, their friendship deteriorated as a result. In my case, I went along with the 
‘friendship’ -  though perhaps it was not a ‘pure’ friendship as one would call it, as 
there were anthropological interests invested in this relationship on my part. My 
interviews under most circumstances were informal, unless otherwise indicated, 
although for each meeting, I had thought through in advance the things I wanted to 
ask, and attempted to drop the topics into the conversation. My interview technique 
was not necessarily always successful, and the conversation often shifted into 
completely different topics.
On the other hand, there were occasions my friends talked about my research 
topics in depth among themselves without me initiating the conversation. These 
occasions were rather spontaneous, and what became problematic for me was 
recording the conversation. I was told by my supervisor to record the conversations I 
had with people. This was an immensely unsuccessful struggle. I used to wonder 
how all anthropologists nowadays seem to manage to have tape recorders ready at just 
the right moment when people talk about something useful to them. For one thing, 
what seemed to be relevant or useful topics emerged in a quite arbitrary fashion, 
which I could not anticipate (Wolf 1992).
Another issue was ethics. I asked a few people whether I could record our 
conversation, but those I asked refused without giving any particular reason. Again at 
the time this came as a shock to me, however, there was little I could negotiate on this 
point. Hendry (1992) writes about similar incidents where she asked her friend/ 
informant to record a kindergarten parents’ meeting in order to analyse of the type of
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language used. The tape was returned hardly used. Her friend/informant told her that 
the other parents had not liked the idea, however, when Hendry listened to the tape 
she discovered that it was this friend/ informant who had expressed the reservation. It 
seems that recording is a ritual which marks a friend as an ‘object of study’. It makes 
them vulnerable as they have no control over the interpretation of recorded material. 
And our friends/informants took the control over the situation by rejecting the 
recording altogether. Aside from this, in a counfry like China, where people had gone 
through a period of political upheaval like the Cultural Revolution, a time when 
people could be in trouble for whatever they said, I recognized recording to be a 
sensitive issue, even though I know that people are no longer arrested just for talking 
to foreigners. So if I was meeting a person for the first time, I did not take a tape 
recorder.
As a result, the conversations used in this thesis were not recorded, but are 
based 011 my written up fieldwork notes. I stuck to principle of not bullying 
friends/informants into something they didn’t want to do. Only one person agreed to 
record our conversation -  though he interpreted it as an opportunity to tell me his life 
history. Despite my lack of success in recording, I believe that because I respected 
their answers, I succeeded in establishing long-term close relationships and gained the 
trust of the people I worked with during my fieldwork, and to me that compensates for 
the lack of recordings.
Over several months, I invited people over to my Beijing flat for lunch 01* 
dimier to watch television and/or a VCD together at the weekend. When I was invited 
to my friends’ places, dinner was often eaten in front of the television, so even though 
we talked over dinner, quite often the television was on, so I assumed that this 
arrangement was not too unfamiliar for my Chinese guests. Sometimes people even
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requested particular programmes, especially when they were following a particular 
TV series. I also asked people about the TV series they were following and followed 
them myself. In this way, even when people were too busy to meet, I could still keep 
up with the programme in order to talk aout it the next time we met. Furthermore, 
the exchange of VCDs among friends was quite common. This provided other 
occasions in which I could talk to people about the films and television drama series 
they watched.
In all, I worked with about two dozen of individuals and families consisting of 
different social backgrounds which I will describe more in detail in Chapter 5. I 
worked very closely on the viewing research with about half of them throughout the 
period of two years, and less intimately with the rest. Apart from them, I also 
interviewed about forty people, consisting of people found through various social 
contacts, academics, critics, television professionals, and government officials, in the 
course of my fieldwork. The people I worked with do not represent a microcosm of 
Chinese televisions viewers. Because of the circumstances through which I found my 
informants, most of them were in their early twenties to late thirties; with only some 
in their forties and beyond. Some were more articulate than others. Older 
respondents often displayed some discomforts in discussing television programmes or 
the televisual representsiton of heroes.
In September 1998,1 started auditing a television production course at the 
Beijing Broadcasting Institute (BBI), which is now called the Communication 
University of China.17 My reason for undertaking this course was to learn how the 
representation of different kinds of subject was dealt with and constructed for 
television. I had suspected this was where I could be exposed to state discursive
17 Because I studied there for only a year, this auditing student status has allowed me to attend
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practices for television. BBI comes under the State Administration for Radio, Film 
and Television (SARFT) and is the key tertiary institution in northern China for those 
who want to work in the field of television. This kind of close link between a 
television station and a production training institution may be unique to China, or 
perhaps to the former Socialist countries.
My course consisted of a range of classes: Planning Programmes (jiemn cihua 
V  kl Documentary Programmes (jilupian ); Hosting Shows (jiemu
zhuchi jj fl i t # ) ;  News (xinwen I f f i )  and Programme Scheduling {lanmu bianpai 
fd The classes were taught regularly in a fairly fixed manner -  held from
eight to eleven-thirty am Monday through Friday, though there were occasional 
afternoon classes. The classes were taught by a teacher talking to us for three or four 
hours in the morning, while we mostly sat there quietly and took notes. We also 
watched a variety of programmes in most classes -  ranging from documentary and 
current affairs programmes from Europe or America, to Chinese classic TV drama.
Like other students, I adopted a very passive role in the class. As far as I was 
aware there were not many discussions going on in or outside the class. Teachers 
used to complain that when they were students they used to have debates till the early 
hours in the morning, whereas nowadays students are concerned only about their 
careers. This could simply be rhetorical. At the same time, students’ concerns for 
their own careers have arisen in part because of the dismantling of the job allocation 
system in the early 1990s. Under these new socio-economic circumstances, students 
were forced to secure their own employment. Many of my classmates worked part­
different classes bridging different courses. For instance, I took some classes from the 1998 core 
course for television production, and some courses from the 1997 special students training course.
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time during the afternoon or evening and were quite busy securing and planning their 
future careers.
My position at the BBI was slightly awkward. First, despite my attempt to 
explain that I was interested in Chinese television in a socio-cultural sense rather than 
for technological reasons, it was difficult for my classmates to understand that I, a 
Japanese person from a country considered to have much more advanced media 
technology, would want to study Chinese television, which many of them considered 
very inferior.18 Secondly, as I was brought up outside Japan, even though I am 
Japanese I did not know much about recent Japanese television programmes and 
popular culture which they were interested in and wanted to hear about.19 Moreover, 
in order to mingle with students, I tried to dress to fit my image of how ordinary 
Chinese students dressed and tried to project the image that I lived like they did. One 
day I was confronted by a group of female classmates who said I should take care of 
myself and make an effort to look nice, because I did not look like the Japanese 
people they saw on television. It seemed that no one cared that as an anthropology 
student I had learned in one of my BA courses ‘to manipulate’ my identity by 
dressing differently. Nevertheless, I managed to develop friendships with some of 
my classmates who helped me to understand the content of the classes. I actually was 
closer to some of my teachers at BBI, probably because I was closer to them in age 
and interests. I used to meet them outside of class to discuss Chinese television.
Even though in this thesis, I will not discuss the television production work, 
which I undertook on a separate visit to Beijing from October 2000 to January 2001.
I had the opportunity to work as an intern at the company which produced
18 Many o f  my classmates were eager to go to Japan to study media, as Japanese media technology was 
highly regarded. They were quite critical o f  the technological backwardness o f  the Chinese television 
industry. People often asked me why I did not study in Japan.
191 had been in the UK since 1990. So I was not familiar with the then current Japanese popular
47
programmes for a provincial television channel in Beijing for two months.20 This 
experience has furthered my understanding of the articulation of televisual 
representation, in particular the politics of producing televisual images. Due to the 
company’s management structure, I was only allowed to stay with the shooting team 
which produced reports for news and entertainment programmes. It would have been 
ideal to have worked on the production one of Jackie Chan’s films or a TV drama 
about a model worker or something along those ideal lines, but the strict regulation on 
foreigners’ involvement in Chinese media production at the time meant I did not have 
much choice but to go along with whatever opportunity came my way.
As an intern, I was supposed to try out different kinds of television production 
jobs, ranging from interviewing and collecting materials, to setting up interviews, in 
order to leam from ‘practical’ experience. This expectation is depicted in the Chinese 
term for intern ‘shixi ‘3< <J ’, shi meaning reality or fact, and xi >] meaning to 
practice and exercise. I felt very uncomfortable about taking the initiative to try 
things out, because my idea of the task of an anthropologist was to be there to 
observe, despite our claims of ‘participant’ observation, which involve taking a part in 
the social lives of people. Being aware that anthropologists are not neutral subjects, I 
was confronted by the consideration of my own impact on the situation and was very 
hesitant to take an active part in the television production. At the same time, not 
acting as an intern, which was the very basis on which I was accepted, changed the 
dynamics of the situation. I had explained my research to the people with whom I 
worked. Even though people occasionally asked me about my research, we often
cultural scene, about which I had to leam a lot during my fieldwork.
20 A very kind Chinese scholar had introduced me to the general manager o f a big television production 
company. Expecting my request to be refused, I told him my plan to become an intern at his company. 
To my surprise, he accepted me for a two-month internship and assigned me to the production 
department. To protect the people involved in helping me to get this enormously valuable experience, I 
cannot give any more detailed information.
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ended up joking about it. People often used jokes as a way to hide their discomfort at 
being drawn into the academic discourse.
I want to consider my positionality in the field, as I strongly feel it was a 
crucial element in deciding the nature of my fieldwork. A young unmarried Japanese 
woman was not a common nor an acceptable image of a ‘researcher’ to many Chinese 
people. It was even more puzzling that I was studying at London University and had 
been brought up outside of Japan. For whatever reason, many people dismissed the 
fact that I was a PhD student from a British university -  although, I felt they were 
important elements of my identity in the field at the time. Instead, all of sudden I 
faced being categorized as a ‘young Japanese woman’, an image with which I have 
never been comfortable.21 In China, Japanese women are often described as wenrou 
Viol5$=, literally meaning warm (wen ifm.) and soft (rou Jpi). Perhaps, these common
adjectives are meant to describe a gentle, kind, passive/submissive person, and they 
are often associated with the image of an ideal wife or an object of sexual fantasy.22 
In this respect, I suddenly became a vulnerable subject.
This position contrasted with the image of the ‘powerful’ anthropologist I had 
expected to experience. I was prepared to be in a position of power, and yet I often 
found myself excluded from the privileged world of Anglo-Saxon academia. I was 
often put into a vulnerable position by the people with whom I did my fieldwork, 
although I fully accept that I am still in the position to “speak about” those people as I 
write this thesis (Clifford &Marcus 1986).
21 I spent well over half o f my life outside o f Japan, so it is never comfortable to be treated as a 
Japanese stereotype, though I suppose most people are uncomfortable with being stereotyped.
22 I gather from what quite a few people have told me about Japanese women when they discovered I 
am Japanese stems from their favorite Japanese television dramas. I suspect some Japanese television 
dramas from the 1970s which are broadcast on Chinese television in the 1980s have contributed greatly 
to shaping the image o f Japanese women for many people,
Historically the Japanese have not been perceived as eing so vulnerabile. 
Japanese are the demons {riben guizi 0  of the war which caused so much
pain and anger to many Chinese people - even today. Being Japanese, I had 
anticipated such positionality. Fortunately during my fieldwork, this issue of war and 
me being Japanese did not come up in any significant way. The only time I felt quite 
conscious about it was when I was at BBI, one of the teachers showed a documentary 
film 011 the Nanjing massacre. I could see my classmates looking at me out of the 
comer of their eyes — but that was all there was to it. No one came to me to even talk 
about it after the class. I felt that there were a few factors that helped to resolve this 
issue at personal level. Firstly, being a young female reduced much potential 
hostility. Based on my experience, it was often males who got drawn into taking 
responsibility for the war. Second, in many ways my ‘vulnerability’ has helped me to 
keep away from people confronting me on such topics. Third, my upbringing abroad 
also helped as a cushion for people to deal with my Japaneseness in a less emotional 
charged maimer.
In addition, I had an identity as an ‘Asian’ -  especially in contrast with Euro- 
Americans who are considered by many Chinese people to not share many socio­
cultural practices. There were occasions when people would simply say to me, “You 
are an Eastern person (Dongfcing ren A A A ), so you must know/understand this.”
This was a dilemma. As an anthropologist I felt I had the task of clarifying, not 
assuming, ideas expressed by the informants, even the ones which seemed obvious to 
us. On the other hand, there were occasions when I could more or less guess what the 
person meant from my personal experience of being raised in a Japanese family, for 
Japanese and Chinese societies share many socio-cultural practices.23 When I pursued
23 While talking o f Japanese or Chinese society in generalized terms it is inevitable that a variety o f
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my questioning, some people took it badly if I asked something which he or she 
considered to be obvious, because it seemed I was pretending I did not know or 
understand, just to be difficult.
Be it for the reasons of age, gender, race, or the way in which I presented 
myself, in most of my engagements with people I was not necessarily in a position of 
authority, and this did not change much over the course of my fieldwork. Perhaps it 
was because there was constant reinforcement about Japanese women in the media, or 
because my personal circumstances did not change. My positionality only started to 
change more recently when I started working in China after my fieldwork. I will 
write about this change in the conclusion of this thesis. My positionality and the 
conditions of fieldwork lead me back to reconsider the post-modernist turn on the 
crisis of representation. I find the self-reflexive approach a very useful tool in regards 
to my own fieldwork experience; however, I question the amount of authority 
assumed for the ethnographer in relation to ‘Others’ (see Clifford and Marcus 1986), 
although I am quite aware of Asad’s discussion on the ‘strong’ language of Western 
academia (1986). My fieldwork experiences illustrate that working with others means
ideas and practices exisiting within each society are essentialised, especially with respect to rural and 
urban, it appears that two societies share many sociocultural practices. For instance, Japanese and 
Chinese families share practices o f  patrilinage, patrilocal marriage, and the Confucian principle o f  filial 
piety. Traditionally, in both societies the individual is subordinated to the family. Yet there are some 
differences as well. For example, Nakane (1967) points out that the moral ethics o f  the precedence o f  
elder over younger has a different practical application in Japan and China. She notes that Chinese are 
not necessarily always as conscious o f  order (seniority and rank) as are the Japanese. According to 
Nakane, although Chinese always appreciate manners which show respect towards those in a senior 
position, senior and junior might stand on an equal footing in certain circumstances. In contrast to 
other societies, she writes, in Japan, the provisions for recognition o f  merit are weak and 
institutionalization o f  the social order has been largely by means o f  seniority. Another example could 
be the expected role o f  women in the domestic realm. In modem Japan women largely adopt the role 
o f raising families and managing homes (Allison 2000). While in China such responsibilities tend to 
be shared between the husband and w ife and women are generally expcted to contribute to the hosehold 
income. Certainly in both societies, with modernization, some o f traditional practices have been 
modified; however, there were enough similarities between the two societies I could guess what my 
respondents are saying based on my own family upbringing. (For detail on Chinese family, see Baker 
1979, Davis &Harrell 1993, Whyte &Parish 1989. For detail on Japanese family, see Bahnik 1983, 
Nakane 1967)
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anthropologists cannot always assume control and decide everything in ways which 
suit their research.
The point I want to raise is the dialogic nature of fieldwork, rather than the 
conventional relationship between anthropologists and their subjects of analysis as 
being a subject -  object dualism. I use the term ‘dialogic’, which is often a very 
confusing concept, to mean the particular ‘open’ exchanges between two parties in an 
attempt to stress the specificity and uniqueness of each exchange. My analyses are 
determined by my personal circumstances, the grounds on which people accepted me, 
their lives, interests and concerns, the kind of relationship I had with particular 
people, and particular situations. What results from that, and I recognize in my own 
work, is an inevitable partiality implied in the information anthropologists have 
collected. Hence, I argue, fieldwork is not a discovery of ‘truth’ or the ‘essence’, and 
it does not create closure for the potential for alternative answers in the future 
engagements. This is the stance I take in writing this thesis.
Clarification of Terms and Central Discussions of the Thesis
This thesis attempts to understand complex social-political circumstances 
surrounding the televisual representation of heroes in contemporary urban China 
through a variety of articulatory practices, including audience reception. Admitting 
that ‘televisual representation of heroes,’ which I have been using up to this point, is a 
clumsy term, some words of clarification are needed here. Goodman (1986) claims 
that representation is never representation 011 its own, but implies the practice of 
articulation. Therefore, the televisual representation of heroes implies the practice of
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representing someone or something as heroes. Hall similarly discusses representation 
as a signifying practice. As he notes, representation
implies the active work of selecting and presenting, of structuring and shaping: 
not merely the transmitting of an already-existing meaning, but the more 
active labour of making things mean. It was a practice, a production, of 
meaning: what subsequently came to be defined as a ‘signifying practice.’
(1982:64)
This is to say that representation is constructed by someone for certain interests under 
particular circumstances. Representation is not a mere reflection of a given reality, it 
is a discursive practice. Then, what I am looking at in this thesis is the practice of 
representing heroes, not the hero as something given or set. hi the process of 
constructing a televisual representation, there are people in different positions, often 
the Party, journalists and critics, making claims about the televisual representations of 
heroes. I call these ‘articulatory practices.’ Articulation is the “form of the 
connection that can make a unity between two different elements, under certain 
conditions. It is a linkage which is not necessary, determined, absolute and essential 
for all time” (Hall 1996:141). In using this term, I want to emphasise two meanings, 
one as to voice; and the other as to make temporal suturing among different elements. 
Therefore, the different ideas about heroes in contemporary China, about which I have 
been talking, are only made available to us through articulatory practices. Each 
chapter looks at different articulatory practices for the televisual representation of 
heroes.
As one might expect, there are many different practices going on at the same 
time, and these are “not non-contradictory, uniform process .. .but are complex 
systems of regulated differences that are indicate in ongoing struggles involving 
power and social relations” (Henrique et al. 1984b: 113). This approach to
53
representation as an articulatory practice brings two important points to our attention. 
First, it highlights the issue of power. Articulatory practices are not any old practice, 
but are related to power. The production of a televisual representation is closely 
related to the operation of power, particularly since it stakes a claim about ‘the order 
of things’ in relation to reality.’ This point has been much discussed in relation to 
ideology as a particular representation of social reality (Althusser 1971, Grossberg et 
al 1998, Hall 1982, Henrique etal. 1984a, 1984b, 1984c).
This point about power then leads me to my second point about hegemony.
My discussion o f  the changing nature of the representation of heroes suggests the 
operation of power as an ongoing process of shifting power relations. Such a concept 
of power is often characterised in Gramsci’s (1971) notion of hegemony as a temporal 
conquest of ongoing contestations. In this thesis, therefore, through examining 
articulatory practices of televisual representation of heroes, I will consider the 
changing nature of power relations in contemporary urban China.
The televisual representation of heroes further articulates possible subjects in 
contemporary China. The production of subjects deals with two sets of practices; one 
as the enactment of subject making, and the other as political subjection within an 
ideological system that aims to structure people’s lived reality (Althusser 1971, 
Foucault 197, 1982, Ortner 1996). Hence, the topic of heroes also touches on the key 
issue of subjects and power. The main criticism of this Foucaldian approach, which 
focuses on the operation of the dominant power, is that it leaves little room for 
accounting for the other alternative forces which take part in the process of “ongoing 
struggles involving power and social relations” (e.g. Henriques et al. 1984b: 108, 
Ortner 1997, Sawicki 1991). Although Foucault recognises the existence of such 
alternative forces as resistance, his main focus always remains on how the dominant
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power succeeds in producing and maintaining its effects.24 In this respect, even 
though I still do consider this analysis to be extremely useful for considering the 
televisual representation of heroes in my thesis when considering the technology of 
the state, Foucault’s power-centred theories appear to be problematic.
To illuminate alternative forces, then, I will also focus on how a televisual 
representation is produced at the micro-level, and further question how particular 
subjects are engaged and articulated by people in different positions. In this respect, I 
will pay particular attention to how people operate within a variety of forms of power 
which attempt to define their lived reality by taking certain positions, while retaining 
some room for individual agency. ‘Agency’ is used as the capacity of a social being 
to interpret a situation and act by attending to its intentions (Ortner 1996:19&20). In 
other words, I attempt to examine, to borrow from Rofel, “the contingent way in 
which all social categories emerge” (1994:703) and are produced through everyday 
practice. Television is one of key sites for this process.
Although the televisual texts are crucial in understanding media consumption, 
as an anthropologist, my approach is not literary but ethnographic and social. For the 
focus of this thesis, as mentioned above, I am interested in various articulations of 
televisual representation rather than my literary or visual analysis of them (Abu- 
Lughod 2005). What anthropologists are interested in is to explore how the local 
agents discuss and make sense of particular events or practices. From this point of 
view, my examination will focus on public debates on the televisual representation of 
heroes, as well as its various articulations by different viewers.
241 find the term ‘resistance’ problematic, because it depicts a particular binary relationship o f  
domination and resistance. I feel this particularly because what is and what is not resistance is often 
unclear, especially without a rich and detailed context which reveals “ambivalences and ambiguities o f  
resistance” (Ortner 1995:190). In many o f  the recent works on Chinese popular culture, I find an 
overuse o f  Scott‘s Weapons o f  the Weak (1995) -inspired ‘resistance’ (I w ill discuss on this point in 
Chapter 5). This tends to present a picture o f ‘the state’ versus ’the people’, when the real operations
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This thesis further aims to critically consider the articulation of new market 
forces, which is undoubtedly an important aspect of contemporary urban society. To 
what extent, then, has this market economy contributed to marking the limits of “the 
reach of the state” (Shue 1988)? In particular, how has a new ability to purchase 
commodities obtained in the market economy altered the dynamics of the 
embodiment of new subjects? How has economic mobility in the post reform period 
contributed to making growing room possible for an individual agency?
Many scholars studying contemporary China (Wang 1995, Li 1998, Liu 1997, 
Zhao 1999) characterise post -reform China, particularly urban China, as having 
cultural pluralism. If post- reform subjects are multiple as they claim, then what kinds 
of subjects have emerged in the post -reform period? Ortner writes, “The breaks and 
splits and incoherencies of consciousness, no less than the integrations and 
coherencies, are equally products of cultural and historical formation” (1995:186).
My point in drawing on this comment is to argue that the multiple subjects of the post 
-reform period are also culturally and historically, as well as socially and politically, 
constructed. What is needed is then is to show the different kinds of subjects 
constituting these multiplicities, and the relationships among them -  rather than 
merely making the claim that they are plural. In this respect, my examination of the 
televisual representation of heroes further attempts to make sense of what it means to 
be pluralistic or multiple in post -reform China.
and negotiations o f  power are much more complex.
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Thesis Plan
In Chapter 2 ,1 deal with the question of the idea of heroes in China. So far, I 
have yet to clarify my definition of this category. In order to do so I shall use the 
following chapter to examine in depth the idea of heroes in China. I start by looking 
at the actual ways in which people articulated the ideas of heroes in my fieldwork, 
which has led me to the problems in defining the idea of heroes. I will argue that such 
problems lie in fact that the category of ‘heroes’ is neither unified nor fixed, or even a 
single set of ideas. Yet, despite variations at the grassroots level, I will argue that the 
cultural construction of the idea of heroes within the communist discourse sets up the 
frame for understanding the idea of heroes in contemporary China. The idea of 
heroes is further complicated by the use of the term ‘heroes’ in the academic 
discourse. In the light of this discussion, I will then delineate my own take on the 
subject of hero at the end of the chapter.
In Chapter 3 ,1 examine the televisual representation of heroes in 
contemporary China. With the growing commercialisation since the 1980s, the need 
for winning popular support has become an important agenda for Chinese television. 
The new socio-political conditions demand new kinds of heroes to whom viewers can 
relate. In this chapter, I will discuss the circumstances under which the televisual 
representation of heroes has been transformed from an embodiment of the previous 
selfless communist ideals to the use of ordinary people who are like the viewers 
themselves. Through the examination of this new televisual representation of heroes, 
I will further argue that it not only appeals to the audience, but also reifies the new 
ideology of post- reform China.
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In Chapter 4 ,1 will analyse the kinds of subjects assumed in the televisual 
representation of ordinary people. The point I want to discuss in this chapter is that 
this representation of ordinary people serves the operation of the state power. These 
are not just any common people with ordinary lives, but particular subjects. Even 
though ordinary people are represented as multiple subjects, they are multiple in a 
particular way. In this chapter, then, I will examine the different subjects that are 
articulated in variety of programmes. I will also discuss these subjects in relation to 
the changing operation of the power of the state in contemporary Chinese society.
Chapter 5 examines how viewers engage with the televisual representation of 
heroes. The central aim of this chapter is to situate the television audience within 
everyday life as a way of understanding their viewing practices. I start by critically 
examining some literature on audience research in the context of contemporary China, 
and discuss how a Chinese audience has been framed in these works. I shall then 
explore the process of how television heroes intersect with people’s conception of 
themselves and their world, but in ways that are contingent and unpredictable. For this 
purpose, I will look at how viewers engage with particular televisual representations 
of heroes through the close -up study of conversations I had with them about two 
different hero-types. On this basis, I will discuss the implication of articulatory 
practices of viewers in relation to the wider operation of power.
In my final chapter, Chapter 6, as a way of concluding this thesis, I will 
discuss the way in which this study explaines how human beings are framed into 
subjects by different forms and plays of power. At the same time, this study of the 
televisual representation of heroes also informs us of how people negotiate their 
subjectivities at the level of individual bodies, and enact and embody their interests 
and concerns within the structures of power in contemporary urban society. Unlike
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other chapters, I will write this up from my contemporary point of view after having 
worked in the Chinese TV industry for a year. In this sense, this chapter is an attempt 
to make a connection with, and frame the study in the bigger picture of, the television 
industry, and updates its findings. This change in my own position has led me to 
reconsider anthropological knowledge, particularly on the efficacy and partiality of 
ethnography. From this point of view, I will consider the relevance of this thesis in 
the study of Chinese media and society.
59
Chapter Two
Problems of Heroes: Defining the contested concept
At the beginning of my fieldwork, I asked many people the question of what 
their idea of heroes was, in an attempt to clarify the idea of heroes in contemporary 
China. I assumed that since heroes had long been used by the Communist Party for 
political purposes, that there must be an explicit definition available, even though 
there might be some variation. However this enquiry led me to realise the inherent 
problem of defining the idea of heroes. This problem became rather clear to me when 
I was having a conversation with Lei Ming on one hot summer day in July 1997. I 
met Lei Ming at my friends’ dinner party. Lei Ming was a firm and sincere character 
in his late twenties and worked as a chef in the local Chinese restaurant. I was 
introduced to him by a mutual friend. As I was talking about my research to him, I 
asked him about his idea of heroes. He paused for a while thinking, then said there 
are different ideas of heroes for different people, and there are also different kinds of 
heroes, so it is hard to talk about heroes unless I specify what kind of heroes I want 
him to talk about, I soon realised, as Lei Ming pointed out, that not only are there 
different ideas of heroes existing contemporary China, but each person may have 
different ideas of heroes for different types of hero.
Starting from exploring the problem of defining heroes in contemporary 
China, this chapter attempts to understand the idea of heroes and to develop my use of 
the term heroes in this thesis. I started my examination of heroes in contemporary 
China by looking at the way scholars have used and portrayed heroes. As partly 
mentioned in Chapter 1,1 have noted that there is a general transformation in
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scholars’ portrayal of the concept of heroes in contemporary China from previous Lei 
Feng type communist heroes to outstanding individuals who have a capacity to act 
upon one’s interest. At the same time, the uses and ideas of heroes assumed by 
scholars in their works were often incongruent with each other. While the notion of 
heroes in contemporary China seems to be plural, these ideas are scholarly 
articulations of heroes in China. My question, then, was how has the notion of heroes 
been used by people at the grassroots level? This examination has led to the problem 
of defining heroes as noted above, for the concept is neither a fixed nor an unified 
idea and is open to debate at different contexts. Yet, despite variations at the 
grassroots level, the state has been consistently promoting heroes since 1960s at the 
national scale. The discourse about communist heroes from the 1960s has remained 
relatively unchanged and still is relevant in understanding the idea of heroes in 
contemporary China. By examining such discourses, I will further my understanding 
of the idea of heroes in contemporary China.
On this basis, I will define how I will use the concept of heroes in this thesis. 
As a way of elucidating broad and divergent idea of heroes, I will draw on the concept 
of articulation. This should offer a critique of approaches which presuppose an 
essentialised meaning of heroes and will allow me to argue instead that the term be 
understood as a function of certain discourses existing, circulating, and operating 
within contemporary urban society. I will go on to discuss that, despite the plurality 
in ideas of heroes, they all seem to share an emphasis on heroes’ behavioural 
importance — what heroes do, rather than who they are.
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The Representation of Heroes in the Academic Discourse
There are numerous studies on the topic of heroes in China. From this work, it 
appears that there have been interests among scholars in discussing heroes of China. 
How, then, do these scholars use the term ‘heroes’ and whom do they claim to be the 
heroes of China?
In earlier studies of heroes in China, in most cases the term ‘hero’ was simply
25used to refer to communist heroes. Sheridan (1968) examines the nationwide 
practice of the emulation of heroes during the Maoist period. Sheridan takes heroes to 
be a means of social engineering, and for transforming the character of the people. In 
her view, the Party used heroes to personify the national character of “good men and 
good deeds” and to illustrate methods of attaining such character, hence to serve as 
examples to be emulated. Similarly, Burch (1979) looked at emulation models and 
claimed that they are vehicles for social change created through the process of 
socialisation. For her use of the term heroes, Burch writes:
those Chinese models who have been so designated by a formal or official 
process of selection. This will exclude mythical or historical hero/models, 
individuals who are simply admired by those around them, and even widely 
revered leaders - including Mao Zedong himself - who have not been formally 
selected as models by their peers.
(1979:123)
Such comment indicates her awareness of the vast category of heroes, though in her 
study Burch has limited her focus only to what I call ‘communist heroes.’ In reality,
25 This is within the discipline o f social sciences. In the study o f  Chinese literature, for instance, 
varieties o f  studies on heroes o f different kinds from pre-communist novels have been produced.
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however, it was not so easy to distinguish who belonged to which category, and to 
determine who was officially or formally selected or not, as Burch claims here.
A more contemporary study of heroes in this vein is that of Chiang Chen- 
Ch’ang (1984). Chiang looks at the new Lei Feng campaigns of the 1980s, and 
analyses the changing representation of what had come to be labeled under the single 
category of communist heroes. His point is that personal values are not only present 
in the newly emerging commercial culture, but also are noticeable in the 
representation of new Communist heroes. Chiang assumes that the hero (or heroine in 
this case) of the 1980s, Zhang Haidi26 lacks some elements which used to be 
considered vital for a selfless Lei Feng -type hero, and instead seems to enjoy her life 
by pursuing activities of her interests. Zhang Haidi is a paraplegic. Because of her 
disability she has never been to the school, but through diligent self-study she learnt 
to read books on politics literature and medical sciences. She even learnt to speak 
English, Japanese and German. Chiang writes:
Chang Hai-Ti’s (Zhang Haidi’s) diary, for example, carried quotations of 
poets and musicians of the Capitalist world, such as Shakespeare, Shelley, and 
Beethoven, but not those of Mao Tse-tung, Teng Hsiao-p’ing or other Chinese 
leaders. (1984:37)
Chiang accounts for the shift in values embodied by these heroes as the change from 
the orientation of communist values to the orientation of personal ones with the 
emergence of individualism. In all these works, the term ‘heroes’ is used to refer to 
communist heroes, and there is no disagreement with the idea assumed by the Party.
In this respect, heroes were examined and discussed in line with the official viewpoint 
of the Party.
26 Chiang using Wade-Giles Romanizing method writes Zhang Haidi as Chang Hai-Ti. They refer to 
the same character, the same person, only with different ways o f Romanization. In order to avoid the 
confusion o f who it may be, I have used pinyin  to write her name -  that is a standard way o f spelling
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In discussing the growing concern of personal values in the medical practices 
of post-reform China, Farquhar (1996), an American scholar, depicts the shift in the 
representation of heroes from Lei Feng- type communist heroes to getihu (private 
entrepreneurs). She describes Lei Feng as the “representation” that is “a state directed 
technology encouraging mass emulation,” while she cites as getihu those doctors who 
are held up as providing the intensification of personhood and the recognition for 
individuality as the “embodiment [that is] a magical condensation of local powers” 
(1996:240). The shift from the ‘representation’ to ‘embodiment’ has taken place, 
Farquhar argues, due to the growing orientation of personal values in the reform 
period. She notes that Lei Feng wore everybody out, even though such communist 
heroes continue to exist in the reform period. Farquhar assumes that previous 
communist heroes have been replaced by new ‘unheroic’ heroes, getihu, who embody 
good fortune and good health in contemporary China,
Similarly, by looking at the ideology of post-socialist popular culture, Lydia 
Liu notes, “The Chinese official media treat such qive iia as folk heroes of the 1990s 
who regularly appear on the TV screen” (1998:13, emphasis is original). Like getihu, 
“qiye jia” here is a Chinese term for entrepreneurs. Though both refer to private 
entrepreneurs, the difference between getihu and qiye jia  is that the former stands for 
private entrepreneurs who set up small shops and stalls selling things like vegetables, 
fruits, and knickknacks, whereas the latter implies “a successful Chinese businessman 
(sometimes a business woman) wearing a Western suit and tie and polished leather 
shoes” (Liu 1998:13).27 Despite the difference between the two images, what could 
be suggested from both Farquhar’s and Liu’s analyses is that capitalist values are not
her name in Mainland China.
27 When I was doing fieldwork in Beijing in 1997 —1999, the term getihu did not have good 
connotations and was often used as a derogatory term. Those who owned businesses preferred to be 
called qiye jia , regardless o f their level o f  success.
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only the approved ideology of the post-reform period, but are also the embodiment of 
the desire of the common folk.
Both authors claim that the heroes of post-Maoist China are entrepreneurs; 
however, each concept of the term, ‘hero’ assumes somewhat different ideas of heroes, 
though they are not entirely unrelated. In Farquhar’s view, the hero is conceptualised 
as an embodiment of desire of the people. Liu takes the emergence of new heroes as 
an indication of ideological change, hence, in her view, the hero is taken to be the 
embodiment of the social-political condition of society.
As for more variation, the term hero often appears in the literature on the 
28Tianamnen Incident. In this type of literature, different kinds of subjects are cast as 
heroes, depending on the author’s point of view. Some portrayals of heroes need to 
be considered carefully in relation to the role which Western democratic media has 
played. For instance, the very same student demonstrators were portrayed as May 
Fourth heroes, anti-communist heroes, and Maoist heroes in different accounts.29 
While in the CCTV coverage and Chinese official newspapers, PLA soldiers, who 
carried out the martial law ordered by the government, have been portrayed as heroic 
martyrs. The horrifying images of soldiers being tortured by demonstrators, and their 
charred bodies trapped inside burnt vehicles were shown on the screen (Lull 
1991:193-201).
Wasserstrom (1994) looks at different types of heroes in various narratives, 
and comes up with different criteria which make up the heroes of the Tiananmen 
incident. Wasserstrom notes, from the point of view of some student protesters, one
28 The student protesters occupied Tiananmen Square in the spring o f  1989. On the eve o f June the 4th 
the government used military forces to end this protest against the government. This event was heavily 
covered by both Chinese and foreign media, and the implementation o f  martial law was a great shock 
to both Chinese and foreign audiences. In Chinese this incident is referred to as “June Fourth” {Liu Si 
A  0 ) ,  though in this thesis I w ill refer to it as the Tiananmen incident.
29 The May Fourth Movement was a protest against the government o f  the time, carried out by students
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of the criteria for heroes was to take part in a life or death scenario of the dramatic 
action in the historical moment. For other student protesters, it was to continue the 
tradition of the May Fourth movement, or to fulfil the task of carrying Maoist 
ideology into practice. From the point of view of many scholars, politicians, and 
journalists in Taiwan, Hong Kong, and the West, he writes, one of the key criteria was 
to undertake the task of anti-Communism, such as to participate in the struggle for 
freeing their country from the hold of repressive ideology and party.
While from the point of view of the Chinese government, Wasserstrom (1994) 
writes, the positions of heroes and villains are inverted. Here, protesters are portrayed 
as the counterrevolutionary rioters inspired by anti-communist forces seeking to 
overthrow the CCP and turn China into a capitalist country. The demonstration had 
been claimed officially as acts of duaii'(chaos) or 'dong / m a t h ’(turmoil) which 
threatened the stability and security of the whole community. In this narrative, 
soldiers are portrayed as heroes, and one of the criteria for heroes was to fulfil the task 
of restoring order in the society and ensuring a stable political environment, which 
might have involved self-sacrifice. Thus, Wasserstrom shows that there is no single 
criterion for heroes of the Tiananmen incident, and the criteria for what constitute a 
hero vary depending on which view of the event an author takes. Wasserstrom further 
argues that heroes are often “invented” by various authors, and it does not necessarily 
mean that local people identify heroes in the same way as these authors do.30
For instance, MacCartney (1990) believes that this student demonstration was 
in no way a ‘democracy’ movement, a ‘resistance’ to the oppressive government, or 
an epic battle between heroic students and monstrous hard-liners, as it was portrayed
and intellectuals in Tiananmen Square in 1919.
30 Perhaps, one could also argue that there are variations in the understanding o f  heroes o f  the 
Tiananmen incident among local people.
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by foreign journalists. She argues that students were caught up in a 'cult of hero’.
She writes, “The hero was important to students because they needed someone to look 
up to but also because they each wanted a share of the limelight, the glory of action” 
(ibid: 7). It was “the yearning for heroism”. MacCartney assumes that legitimacy 
was basically all the students wanted, since they felt that they were the class that had 
benefited least from the Economic Reforms of the 1980s, and were left out of the 
masses. Thus, students needed to carry out the protest for the sake of their own 
recognition. In this view, unlike the common image of students as heroes 
representing popular consensus, the protest was rooted in the bitter position of 
students and intellectuals. Calhoun (1994) argues that MacCartney had neglected the 
temporal dimension in the production of heroes and martyrs among the students 
during the movement. He assumes that “students were trying on the idea of being a 
hero among other things, such as living in the fear and excitement, as they went 
along” (ibid: 117). In this sense, Calhoun adds the elements of time and movement in 
analysing heroes of the Tiananmen incident. These views further suggest that 
different ideas of heroes were used among student protesters during this movement.
Another type of hero appeared in the literature of the post-Tiananmen era. In 
these writings, a wide variety of ‘popular heroes’ have emerged, ranging from pop- or 
rock singers to television soap opera heroines and heroes. Much literature of the post- 
Tiananmen era is concerned with the popular culture which puts emphasis on urban, 
particularly urban youth, culture. And some heroes are depicted as rebellious or 
resistive. Cui Jiang is probably the best-known popular hero who has often been 
discussed in the various literature during the time around the Tiananmen incident.
Cui Jiang is a rock musician, whose song Yiwu Suoyou {Nothing to My Name) has 
been used as the public expression of political and cultural dissent and was often
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played in Tiananmen Square during the protest (Jones 1994). Since the late 1980s, he 
had established a large following among college students, intellectuals, private 
entrepreneurs, and foreign expatriates, especially in Beijing. In much literature and 
reports on contemporary Chinese culture, Cui Jiang has been portrayed as a youth 
cultural icon with emphasis on his political commitment to rebel against the state 
‘oppression’. In this sense, one could see a kind of continuation in the narrative of 
student protesters representing the popular will to struggle against the oppressive 
government. In this sense, Cui Jiang is cast as more than just a rock musician, but 
also as a popular hero who carries the burden of the West’s China to be converted to 
Western ideas.
On a different note, Barme (1992) examines popular culture through the image
•D -I
of urban youth. He depicts the emergence of ‘liumang' (Hooligan- type 
characters who use quick-witted repartee and caustic cynicism instead of the tones of 
overt dissent) in the cultural scene of the late 1980s and 1990s -  particularly in the 
works of the popular novelist Wang Shuo. They are neither part of the intellectual 
or political elite, nor soldiers and workers of socialist realist literature. Instead,
Barme claims, liumang heroes are rooted in the knight-errant who appears in pre- 
Modem martial-arts literature. He argues that liumang are apolitical or rather anti­
political, and change political values into humour and irony by making sarcastic 
jokes. Barme notes “Chinese literature has seen a trend to displace the inhumanely 
perfect protagonist of the pre-1978 era with normal, if sometimes ill-adjusted, law- 
abiding people” (1992:32). Thus, Barme assumes that liumang heroes are replacing
31 Liumang could refer to rapists, whores, black-marketeers, unemployed youths, alienated intellectuals, 
frustrated artists, poets, and so on. In colloquial language, liumang could be used to refer to someone 
with indecent or immoral behavior.
32 Wang Shuo is a popular cultural Figure and a writer known for mocking bombast o f  the intelligentsia 
and a tongue-in-cheek self-criticism style. His literary works became popular in the late 80s, and 
enjoyed the nationwide celebrity till the early 1990s. He was also one o f  the writers who wrote the
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the perfect communist heroes or student protesters of the Tiananmen incident, and 
accounts for the alternative representation of popular heroes, who do not necessarily 
resist or oppose the state and state promoted cultural values.
As for popular television heroes, Rofel examines characters of the television 
soap opera Kewang (Aspirations). She argues that the heroine of this soap opera, Liu 
Huifang, is a contemporary version of Lei Feng and is an embodiment of the nation.
In this analysis, one could identify Rofel’s two different uses of the term hero/heroine. 
In one sense, as we commonly do, Rofel uses the term to mean the main protagonist 
of the television drama. In another sense, Rofel takes heroes as the embodiment of 
national identity. She notes that Huifang’s crippling experiences at the end of the TV 
series signified China’s ill fate as a wounded nation. Rofel then assumes that the 
ultimate hero of the drama is Luo Gang, who embodies China’s intellectuals, for 
rescuing Huifang, he is symbolically rescuing China. She writes, “China/Huifang 
must therefore be rescued by the intellectual hero, Luo Gang ... He embodies the hope 
that China will move forward out of suffering and will succeed to survive” 
(1994:713). In her view, China’s new hero is the intellectual rather than previous Lei 
Feng type hero.
Similarly, Wang Yi argues that in the 1980s intellectuals were represented as 
heroes in much of the literature and art produced in China during this period. Dang 
Xiaoping made a speech to promote ‘young, educated and professional’ people as 
cadres, and later claimed that the intellectuals’ position should be raised from ninth to 
first, meaning working class. Wang Yi notes;
In literature and art in this period intellectuals were positively represented and
glorified as superheroes in China’s goal to achieve the four modernizations of
script o f  Aspirations.
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China’s industry, agriculture, national defence and science, and technology.
(1999:231)
Wang claims that such pro-intellectual sentiments were not limited to the realm of 
literature, but were apparent in drama, film and television as well. Unlike Rofel, 
however, Wang Yi argues that the positive model of intellectuals in the literature of 
the 1980s had changed in the 1990s, as they have become villains in the popular 
television drama Aspirations. She traces this decline of intellectuals first to their 
failure to put forward any alternative value system despite their severe criticism of the 
existing society, mainstream culture, the general public, traditional culture, and the 
official line -  basically everything but themselves— by placing themselves above the 
rest of society. Secondly, she argues, since the disastrous ending of the Tiananmen 
incident in 1989, intellectuals have been accused of undermining the stability of the 
nation. Ordinary people now yearned for a more peaceful and predictable life instead 
of domestic unrest and violence. In this respect, therefore, Rofel and Wang Yi appear 
to disagree on the representation of intellectuals as heroes of post-reform China. It is 
interesting to point out that they have developed completely opposite views on 
intellectuals, based on the same drama, Aspirations. In this respect, it could be said 
that heroes are constructed by the author according to his or her interpretation of the 
drama and view of Chinese society.
There are different views among scholars about the idea of hero and who that 
may be in China. They started with the idea of the hero as a means of social 
engineering, but more recently, scholars have portrayed outstanding figures 
representing particular values or interests as the new heroes of China. Such analyses 
coincide with the scholars’ wider perception of Chinese society. The above
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examination of literature demonstrates that scholars see heroes as the embodiment of 
social values and sentiments; therefore different heroes are portrayed as 
representations of Chinese society in different aspects and phases. Fardon (1985) has 
pointed out that our sense of relevance is linked to our theoretical stance towards the 
world. Thus, paradigm shifts in the discipline present the definition of what 
comprises relevant contexts. As Dilly notes,
Over the history of social anthropology, different features or characteristics 
have been conceived to be relevant or to surround (and be connected with) a 
phenomenon. These differences are referred to as theoretical shifts... each 
movement appeals to a new sense or definition of context... and how it is 
relevant to it.
(1999:3)
Although the studies of heroes presented here are necessarily simplified, one 
could observe a similar kind of paradigm shift through the representation of different 
types of subjects as heroes. Links (1989) argues that different kinds of heroes have 
always existed, even in the time of the Cultural Revolution when the state’s monopoly 
of literature was assumed to be thorough. As mentioned in the previous chapter, he 
notes that along with the officially published literature of 1966-1976, there also 
existed widely circulated entertainment fiction in the form of hand-copied volumes 
(shouchaoberi) which portrayed different kinds of heroes other than those exemplary 
heroes -  be it Lei Feng, Ouyang Hai or Gao Daquan. Whether or not the availability 
of such hand-copied volumes was strictly limited to a few urban youths, then, this 
analysis suggests the possibility for alternative ideas of heroes existing in China at a 
time beyond the scholarly paradigm. So, the idea of heroes has always been multi­
faceted, though the degree and kind of multiplicity may not have always been the 
same compared to the pre- and post- economic reform. Thus, the shift in the idea of
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heroes from the communist Lei Feng type to multiple subjects often depicted in the 
literature is a scholarly articulatory practice.
The Problem with Heroes
How do ordinary people articulate their idea of heroes in contemporary China? 
In order to look at this issue, I will first present a conversation I had with Cai Weifeng 
and Wang Lei. I have chosen this particular conversation because it highlights the 
very complex circumstance for the idea of hero in the most elaborated and explicit 
way. Cai Weifeng, a native of Beijing, was in her mid-twenties when I was doing my 
fieldwork.33 She was a university graduate, and had just started working for a small 
foreign trading company owned by a foreign friend of mine. Her colleague Wang 
Lei, also a native of Beijing, was in his late twenties at the time of my fieldwork. 
When I fust met him in 1997 he was working for the state Import and Export 
Company but had moved to his current company in 1998. Both of them were very 
close friends of mine and we met quite frequently during my fieldwork, particularly 
Wang Lei.34 As the company was owned by a friend of mine, I used to drop in their 
office everyday either during the lunch time or after work. This long conversation 
took place on the evening of August the thirteenth 1998 when I had invited Cai 
Weifeng and Wang Lei for dinner at my place in Beijing.35 As we were talking about 
the strange sleeping habits of a mutual acquaintance who sleeps like Mao Zedong -
33 Cai Weifeng is a fictional name.
34 More details on the background o f Cai Weifeng and Wang Lei w ill be given in Chapter 5.
35 Their boss, a French/German male in his mid-twenties was present at tire dinner as well. I assume 
because he was aware that this conversation had turned to my thesis topic, he carefully avoided taking 
part in the conversation. He made minimal contribution to the conversation taking place, although I do 
recognize the possible effect o f  his presence to how this conversation turned out.
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who was known to rest at odd hours of the day—our conversation unexpectedly 
turned to the topic of heroes.36
Wang Lei: “So he (referring to Mao Zedong) is a hero (jnngxiong 5 ^ 1 )”
Makiko: “Why?” (I had asked him this question before)
Wang Lei: He can change himself as well as others, so he is a hero
(yingxiong i^//^).”
Makiko: (to Cai Weifeng) “What do you think?”
Cai Weifeng: “Mao Zedong is considered a great person (wei ren fl5 A, weida 
de renwu not a hero (yingxiong /^fifi-)”
Wang Lei: "Phew...”
Makiko: “Then what kind of person is considered to be a hero?”
Cai Weifeng: “Those who are devoted to helping others in any condition” 
Makiko: “Lei Feng?”
Cai Weifeng: “No, Lei Feng is a very good person (tebie haoren ^Nf^JWA). 
He is not considered a hero (yingxiong renwu
Makiko: “I cannot think of anyone in particular. What kind of person would a 
hero (ynngxiong 5life|£) be?”
Cai Weifeng: “For example soldiers who went to the South to save people 
from the flood”
Wang Lei: “That’s something Makiko is interested in.”37
36 Mao is known for sleeping at odd times o f  the day, and often called for meetings in the very early 
hours o f  the morning or very late in the evening. We were joking about a friend who had a similar 
habit o f  calling to us at very odd times o f  the day. Then the conversation unexpectedly turned to the 
topic o f  heroes.
37 A few days prior to this conversation, I was telling Wang Lei that I needed a newspaper from the 
first o f August. He responded that it would be filled with stories o f soldiers who went to the South to
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Wang Lei: (to Cai Weifeng) “Who is it in particular that you are thinking of?” 
Cai Weifeng: “I cannot name anyone in particular at the moment, but a hero 
(yingxiong is not necessarily a well-known or famous person.”
Wang Lei: “They (referring to the soldiers) are just fulfilling their duty 
{renwu £ t^ ) .  So they are just doing their job {gongzuo ZCfh) well.”
Cai Weifeng: “You cannot say that they are helping other people simply 
because that is their duty {renwu They have their own work in other
places, but went to the South to help people there.”
Wang Lei: “Then, I am a hero myself! Because I am doing my duty {renwu 
well, such as phoning to the factory, making samples etc. We are all 
heroes!”
Makiko: “Can you call yourself a hero? Because I thought that the hero 
(yingxiong renwu A ^ )  needs others to recognize him or her as a hero.”
Wang Lei: “Who told you?! I can say that I am a hero {yingxiong and I 
don’t need others to tell me that I am a hero to become a hero”
Cai Weifeng: “You don’t do things because others say that you are a hero and 
therefore you should do this or that. A hero recognizes that this is his own 
duty, but you cannot say that this person is only doing his own duty.”
Wang Lei: “It should be that way”...
Cai Weifeng: (to Makiko) “He (referring to Wang Lei) is very smart, and 
thinks that I am stupid!”
save people suffering from a disastrous flood, so it would not be very interesting. I told him that that 
was exactly what I was interested in. Wang Lei often ridiculed my interests in these stories o f national 
heroes or model workers which he found boring. This conversation is re-constructed on the basis o f  
my notes.
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Wang Lei: “Even if I get beaten to death, I wouldn’t say such a thing!”
Cai Weifeng: “Of course you wouldn’t dare say that I am stupid in my 
presence.”
Wang Lei: “But you (to Cai Weifeng) are very cute (kecii of A) and innocent 
{tianzhen A Jt).”
Cai Weifeng: “You talk about Li Yue (who was chosen as an advanced 
worker, xianjin gongzuozhe, in his company at least five times between 1988 
to 1994) as a ‘clean angel’ (,ganjing de tianshi T 7I1 ^  Ali^.) and innocent 
(itianzhen A-Jf)! So it’s the same thing!”
At the end of our long conversation, I had a question for Wang Lei and Cai 
Weifeng:
Makiko: “So tell me the differences between a great person (weida de renwu 
ffj Afrtf A ^ ) ,  a very good person (tebie haoren a historical figure
(I is hi shangde renwu fbAAlfj A'-®), a hero (yingxiong renwu A^A^), an 
advanced worker (xianjing gongzuozhe A itLLf^^f) etc.”
Wang Lei: “Makiko, (in English) who cares!”
Despite Wang Lei’s last remark, at the beginning of my fieldwork I was 
concerned about the different terminology for heroes and ideas associated with each 
of those terms in an attempt to define the idea of heroes. The actual usages of the 
hero are more muddled than the discursive practice of promoting heroes by the Party. 
I was confused by the number of terms that were used to refer to what could be 
translated as heroes in English. I was even more perplexed by encountering
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discrepancies in the understanding of each term among different people, as 
demonstrated here by Cai Weifeng and Wang Lei. Before I go on to sort out some 
terminology mentioned in this conversation, I will look at the ideas expressed in this 
conversation.
From the above conversation, one could establish some dimensions for the 
idea of heroes, despite the discrepancies in the ideas of heroes between Wang Lei and 
Cai Weifeng. Wang Lei’s idea of a hero is the person who has the ability to change.
In previous conversations I had with Wang Lei, he persistently maintained this 
definition, and by ‘change’ he referred to something at the historical and communal 
level. For Wang Lei, Mao is a hero because he had changed the history of China and 
united the country. On the other hand, Cai Weifeng does not agree with the idea of 
Mao Zedong as a hero, and claims a hero is someone who is devoted to helping others 
in any condition. There are at least three dimensions to their concern in discussing the 
topic of heroes. These dimensions may cause some disputes with the idea of heroes 
assumed by the Communist Party.
There is first of all a moral dimension to consider. In Cai Weifeng’s view, 
heroes possess moral goodness that drives them to help others. So, heroes are morally 
good, but not all morally good people are heroes. She claims Lei Feng is a “very 
good person {tebie haoren A)” but not a hero. Whereas Wang Lei claims that
moral goodness is irrelevant to being a hero. On another occasion, Wang Lei gave the 
example of a village head in Liu Zhengyun’s novel, who had organised some kind of 
enterprise and improved the villagers’ lives, bringing them out of poverty. Wang Lei 
argued that even though this village head was a nasty character and was not popular at 
all among the villagers, he should still be considered a hero. Wang Lei’s idea of
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heroes here is reminiscent of what Feuchtwang and Wang Mingming (2001) call 
‘grassroots Charisma’, which they define as the man who can get things done for the 
public good and posses the grassroots of innovation and political judgment, though 
Wang Lei’s idea of heroes includes not just grassroots figures, but also great leaders 
like Mao. I will discuss in more detail Wang Lei’s idea of heroes in relation to the 
notion of charisma in Chapter 5.
Wang Lei’s dismissal of moral goodness is further reflected in his attitude 
towards Li Yue, the person who had five times received awards for being an advanced 
worker, xianjin gongzuozhe To be awarded the “xianjin gongzuozhe
if tX ff  for being an emulation model, Li Yue had not only to achieve great work
results, but also had to possess good moral consciousness and conduct. Wang Lei 
made fun of Li Yue for being clean and innocent. The sarcastic tone of voice 
suggested, as Cai Weifeng pointed out, Wang’s L e i‘s view of Li Yue being stupid. 
Such a comment on Li Yue as an advanced worker undermines the approved ethical 
conduct of Maoist era communist heroes. Wang Lei’s approach to the moral 
dimension in the idea of heroes suggests a further departure from the Confucian 
model of the person who is assumed to be the embodiment of moral goodness.
Cunning heroes, like Caocao from The Romance of Three Kingdoms, who 
could hardly be taken as morally good, are widely admired by people for being very 
cunning and skilled at planning strategies.38 Anagnost (1997) discusses the story of 
the exploits of a young man who became “a cause celebre” in Shanghai. This man 
had impersonated the son of Li Da, the deputy of chief of staff of the People’s
38 This assumption is made on the basis o f  impressions I got in my conversations with different people 
during my fieldwork. What I thought interesting was that no one had brought him up when I asked 
who they considered to be their heroes, but when I asked them about their ideas about heroes these 
names came up as examples. In fact, it was hard to get names or even much response when I asked 
people who they thought o f  as their own heroes. It suggested to me that people had difficulty
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Liberation Army, an old and revered revolutionary cadre, in order to appropriate for 
himself the special privileges accorded to the children of high-ranking cadres. 
Anagnost notes, “In popular discussion of this young man’s exploits, he was much 
admired for his skilful use of ji  i f  (stratagem). The concept of j i  i f  pertains to a 
whole literature of cunning intelligence from the historical and literary past” 
(1997:65). Such a sense of respect and admiration for stratagem brings us to consider 
anti-heroes. During the communist period, however, the representation of anti-heroes 
had been very limited. In general there had been a tendency to portray positive 
heroes. As Huang notes,
.. .the essence of socialist literature has remained the portrayal of the bright 
side of society and of heroes as the motivating force in socialist 
transformation. The behaviour patterns of heroes and cadres can only be 
viewed as deliberately idealised for the purpose of emulation by the masses.
(1977:37)
As in the case for the socialist realist literature, there was still a clear distinction 
between positive models for emulation and the negative ones for reproach in 
representation of heroes in Chinese media even in the post-reform period.39 Yet, as 
Link (1989) argues, heroes from classical novels with the spirit of xia {% meaning 
chivalrous spirit, with a sense of justice to help the weak; or as in the story of The 
Water Margin, which portrays the falling of honourable men and women into social 
banditry against an oppressive government, have continued to be popular among 
ordinary people throughout the time.
responding to the way in which the question was phrased. I will come back to this point in my 
conclusion.
39 Such distinctions may assume local variation and be subject to change with time. At least in Beijing, 
where I did my fieldwork, in 1997-1999, the distinction between positive and negative models was 
very clear for most o f  the official media.
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Then, there is an issue of duty. The central debate here is whether heroic 
deeds can simply be regarded as the fulfilment of duties or something beyond 
expected acts. For Wang Lei, heroic deeds entail historically significant changes that 
are something beyond the level of daily lives. Cai Weifeng argues that heroes 
recognise and enact their own duties. In her view, the hero’s fulfilment of duty is 
distinguished from performing one’s job well, and is led by a sense of altruistic 
implication. Her view reminds us of Lei Feng’s spirit of selflessly serving the people. 
So even she claims that heroes recognise and enact their own duties, heroic deeds are 
not the fulfilment of any duty, but selfless accomplishments. Contrasting with this 
view, Dr Zhang, mentioned earlier, claimed that some entrepreneurs could be 
considered as heroes in contemporary China as they can achieve things which others 
cannot do, and they can do what they set out to do. For Dr Zhang, heroic deeds are 
grounded in the ability {nengli fi&jj) to cany out and achieve what you set out as your 
goal, hence, credited for the meritorious capability. Although these views present 
different ideas, everyone argued that heroic deeds exceed the capacity of duties.
Finally there is a dimension of recognition and fame. The key question to 
consider here is who determines whether the person is a hero? How are heroes 
recognised as heroes? Here, both Cai Weifeng and Wang Lei agree that heroes do not 
have to be recognised by others in order to become heroes. Wang Lei argued that 
there is no need for the voice of authority to authenticate heroes for people to become 
heroes. Cai Weifeng further added that heroes should not perform heroic deeds just in 
order to be recognised by others. These comments suggest that people can choose 
and determine whether or not person is a hero, if so, the idea of hero is not a unified 
concept in the contemporary urban China.
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Similarly, Dr Zhang commented that the heroic criteria (biaozhun are
different for each type. He points out those classical heroes are often popular, but in 
general, popularity should not affect those who become heroes. Dr Zhang also 
pointed out that there are some heroes who are determined by the Party and hence one 
has no say in determining whether a person is a hero or not. He gave me the example 
of Li Suli (see Figure 2.01), a new heroine of Beijing. Li Suli is a bus ticket seller. 
Unlike many other tickets seller who can be rough and impolite, Li Suli is always 
very polite and kind to the passengers. She dresses simply but nicely and has a smile 
on her face. He commented that he didn’t like her in the beginning, when she 
emerged in the media as a new heroine in 1996, and wondered how many people even 
actually accepted her as a heroine. According to Dr Zhang, for a certain period when 
Li Suli had just been elected as the model worker representing Beijing, she appeared 
all over the media - on TV, radio, and in the newspapers, and when he turned on the 
TV he saw her face on the screen all the time. At the time Dr Zhang discussed with 
others the choice of Li Suli as a model figure. Yet, as the government pushed her 
further to be the model worker (mofan renwu 4fll£A4^0 of Beijing, he could do
nothing other than accept her as a new heroine (yingxiong renwu A ^A 4^J). This
example is a different take on the idea of hero than the views presented by Wang Lei 
and Cai Weifeng. Dr Zhang’s point is that people have no say in the matter of 
determining whether the person is a hero, since such decisions are made by the Party 
as the voice of authority, and therefore recognition by the people is irrelevant.
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F ig u re  2.01
Image of a model 
worker, Li Suli 
(From Beijing Qingnian 
Bao, 1999/4/27. p.l)
Cai Weifeng and Wang Lei seem to have quite different views about the idea 
of heroes. Such variations are common among all the people to whom I spoke.
Despite these different ideas of heroes at the grassroots level, however, at another 
level, they may be said to be well within the communist discourse. In the above 
conversation, Cai Weifeng and Wang Lei have engaged with the communist discourse 
about heroes and expressed their views based on their own interests. Some of their 
views do not necessarily support such state discourse. Yet, sometimes, as Dr Zhang 
has pointed out, there is nothing they can do but accept whoever the state promoted to 
be a hero. Below, I want to look at the communist discourse about heroes in detail in 
order to further understand the framework against which the conversation at the 
individual level can be located.
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The Ideas of Heroes: From Confucius to Mao
As discussed in the previous chapter, throughout the communist period, the 
Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has actively promoted ‘heroes’ as exemplars of 
sanctioned politico-moral action and the embodiment of the socialist spirit. After 
more than 40 years since they first started such practice, a large number of communist 
heroes, ranging from the classic figure Lei Feng, mentioned in Chapter 1, to Jiao 
Yulu, another selfless hard-working individual promoted in more recent campaigns of 
the early 1990s, are still being promoted on various media even today.
The communist discourse about heroes has its origin in the Soviet practice and 
Confucianism.
Soviet Practice
The mass scale construction of heroes and models in 1960’s was 
characteristically a communist practice which had been widely utilised in the former 
Soviet Union and also can be observed in other communist countries. Considering 
that Mao had adopted much of Marxism and Leninism, and that close friendships and 
exchanges existed between China and the Soviet Union, 40it is not surprising to see 
striking similarities between the use of models to create a new type of human subject 
along the Soviet model in the practices of the Chinese.
In the Soviet Union, Lenin aimed for the creation of a new type of human 
being through social engineering in order to accomplish a communist utopia, and this 
idea was further developed by Stalin. It was an attempt to establish socialism
40 There was a well-known Communist brotherhood between China and Soviet Union during the early 
Communist time which came to an end in the 1962 under the clash between Mao and Stalin in terms o f  
the national interest and the role each nation state played in the Communist International, the alliance 
among Communist courtiers. For the further information on this topic, see Schram 1989.
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regardless of economical and educational backwardness. Russian revolutionary 
leaders believed that the formation of new citizen who shared fundamental 
characteristics - such as devotion to one’s homeland, commitment to communist 
ideals and the party, and of being ‘a piece of cog in the state machine,’ was a priori 
for achieving the new world of socialism.
In writing about this project, Kelly (1998) draws a link between this process of 
producing a ‘new man’ in former Soviet Union and Fordism, which was also a 
booming and innovative capitalist technology at the time in the early twentieth 
century. In particular she cites the image of the rational factory production process 
applied by Ford. She portrays “Ford’s key image of rational factory labour, the 
conveyer belt, as a metaphor for the transformation of nature and human nature under 
socialism” (1998:256). In this sense, the whole project of transforming everyone into 
a ‘new man,’ Homo Sovieticus, followed the model of mass production where human 
bodies were perceived as materials to work on, and thereby, room for any human 
agency appears to be absent. Such a way of conceptualising human bodies brings to 
mind the idea of ‘objectified and muted bodies’ of the modem individual (Foucault 
1975). Foucault argues that the bodies of individuals are the objects of discipline, to 
be made ready to work in industry most efficiently, and discipline is a mechanism for 
creating more obedient and useftil bodies. Considering these points, the Soviet 
project of the creation of a new type of socialist subject seems to have had the 
prospect of economic development.
In 1929, Lenin first promoted the ‘socialist competition,’ which was used to 
urge large sections of workers to improve and raise the rate of socialist construction. 
Heller (1988) notes that the Central Committee of the Party at the time saw this as a 
great opportunity for the masses to demonstrate their enthusiasm and eagerness to
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work, so they launched a series of competitions. Following this Soviet path, labour 
competition campaigns involving emulation models were first held throughout China 
on a large scale in 1956.41 Munro assumes that informal model selection had been 
practised locally in the 1950s, prior to the nationwide campaign. He notes that during 
that time newspapers throughout the border region carried accounts of heroes, and 
exemplary teachers were chosen for people to leam from them. Subsequently, large 
numbers of socialist competitions of varying scales were launched in communist 
China. However, although the socialist competition practised in the Soviet Union and 
the practice of model emulation in Maoist China share the same goal of achieving the 
connnunist utopia, they had quite different views on and ways in which the project 
was earned out. In the Soviet case, the emphasis was on economic development and 
models were praised and awarded, often materially.42 In the case of China, there was 
an orientation towards the moral and spiritual accomplishments of the models, and 
therefore rewards for good work, particularly material ones, were considered to be 
wrong. This was the case because one was not supposed to produce good work for 
the sake of material reward since the good deeds are an exteriorisation of moral and 
spiritual goodness.
41 According to Munro (1977:150), in China, during the period 1953 to 1958, model campaigns were 
used primarily to raise the quantitative output or to improve the technical qualifications o f  industrial, 
commercial, or agricultural workers, as was done in the Soviet Union. After 1958, models were used 
as an incentive to raise output or increase skills, and also as a vehicle for facilitating mental 
transformation o f  all workers. It was first integrated with nationwide mass movements in 1963, 
consummating the marriage o f  elements from Soviet socialist emulation with the indigenous 
methodology.
42 This can be seen in the case o f the Shakhanov movement, for example. In 1935, the Party launched 
a campaign called the Shakhanov movement named for Aleksei Shakhanov, a young miner who 
managed to extract 14 times more coal than demanded by the Plan. So, the Shakhanov worker 
(Shakhanovets) emerged as the hero o f the time. According to Heller, decisions selecting Shakhanovets 
were made by the people in charge o f  production. These Shakhanovs were rewarded with money, 
medals and decorations, so it became a social status with privileges. This can be regarded as a fairly 
straightforward attempt to develop economic accomplishment, and, Heller notes, there were many 
other similar kinds o f campaigns in the Soviet Union during this period (1988:148&149).
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Aside from socialist competitions, in the Soviet Union, various techniques 
were used to remould human beings into the ‘new man’ concept, ranging from 
schooling and the rationing of necessity goods, to the organisation of work. In China, 
similar techniques were adopted by the Party to reinforce the creation of the new man. 
One distinctive feature of the Maoist period was the politicisation of everyday life to a 
greater extent, with the enforcement of participation in various political activities such 
as meetings and study groups.43 Self-criticism and criticism sessions were mobilized 
to monitor and examine one’s everyday practices. During this period, as in the image 
of Maoist policy of ‘Eating from one big pot’ {chi da guo fan people
lived, worked and ate together -  so much of people’s lives were commimalised.
Under such conditions, one was constantly exposed to the gaze of others, hence there 
was a greater possibility of being monitored, examined, and the correctness of one’s 
behaviour measured against those of approved models at any moment. Perhaps one 
could further suggest that the life-size heroes and their diaries44 promoted by the Party 
in its campaigns for model emulation served a useful means to both guide and 
examine people’s everyday practice to the smallest detail.
Confucian Practice
Despite sharing the mass scale use of heroes and models in creating ideal 
‘socialist’ subjects, Chinese and Soviet practices differ in terms of the fundamental
43 Cadres or some chosen workers held the responsibility for disseminating propaganda and policies, 
arranging work operations, work quality, accounting, workers’ welfare, and daily living conditions - 
such as rationing and distribution o f  daily goods to even the extent o f  sexual reproduction (White 
1977). In this novel Gu Hua (1983) offers some insight into village life during the Maoist period.
44 Communist heroes often kept the diaries which were often made accessible to the public. The most 
famous example is Lei Feng’s diary. More recent example is Zhang Haidi’s diary which 
communicated her inner feelings to the public.
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conceptualisation of model emulation. Such difference seems to lie in the fact that 
China had used heroes for governing prior to adopting Soviet practices. The use of 
heroes as models for others to follow could be traced all the way back to Confucius 
(Anagnost 1997, Chang 1984, Munro 1969, Munro 1977). Anagnost (1997), for 
instance, notes that Confucianists viewed government as a guiding principle for 
establishing the moral foundation of the masses through the means of setting up 
models. In her view the Communist Party simply replaced and made use of the role 
played by the gentry of the imperial period as the responsible agents for sanctioning 
new models and guiding their emulation.
In Confucianism, there is an assumption that people leam primarily through 
the imitation of models. Munro (1969) explains that the basic thought behind such an 
assumption is that models manifest the link between moral principles and proper 
conduct, and help to make the moral principles accessible to the learner. Thus, 
models are assumed to embody moral principles. Then, why did Confucianists use 
models as a way of mediating moral principles and proper conducts? Tu answers that, 
since the dimension of Confucian learning is not reducible to any particular virtue, nor 
is it an aggregate of those that are distinctively Confucian (1985:52), Confucian ideas 
are put into practice, and demonstrated through exemplary teaching. As Tu notes, the 
Confucian Golden Rule:
is a standard of inspiration and an experienced ideal made meaningful to the 
students through the exemplary teaching of their master. Self-cultivation may 
mean different things to different people at different stages of moral 
development, and its realisation may also assume many different forms
(1985:56-7)
Thus, Confucian moral principles are neither fixed nor unified sets of knowledge that 
can be taught through writings. Such a view of moral principles probably results from
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the idea in Confucianism that is to learn to be fully human. In Confucianism, the 
primary purpose of learning centres on harmonising human relations that are context 
dependent. In this sense, moral principles and proper conduct require mediation by 
the living reality of models. As Tu writes, “One leams to be benevolent, truthful, 
courageous and firm not by following a set of abstract moral values but by a 
continuous encounter with the multiplicity of existential situations exemplified in the 
life of teachers” (1985:68).
Moreover, as Munro notes, although the behaviour of a negative model may 
also be leamt and emulated, it was presupposed that most people are positively 
attracted and consciously seek to imitate virtuous models. In Munro’s (1969:71) 
view, the ideal virtue of jen , human-heartedness or goodness, is an innate affection 
possessed by men, which manifests itself in acts of kindness. This presupposition of 
jen  as the human disposition explains the natural tendency of human beings to 
emulate proper conduct assumed in the Confucian thought, although full attainment of 
jen remains an inaccessible ideal and the goal of self-cultivation. What is more, since 
Confucianism insists that “learning is for the sake of self, and an end in itself rather 
than a means to an end” (Tu 1985:52), it does not further question or require any goal 
or purpose for emulating virtuous models. What is important here is the actualising of 
moral goodness that is assumed to be human nature.
During my fieldwork, a similar point was made by Wang Lei, a Chinese friend 
of mine, in response to my question of why there are so many programmes on 
Chinese television about people doing good deeds.45 Wang Lei told me of a saying in 
Chinese, “People are by nature good, so if they are exposed to something good their
45 This comment was made in one o f our casual conversations about the television programme The Son, 
which was broadcast in December 1998 on Beijing Television. I w ill elaborate on this conversation in 
Chapter 5. I w ill also write about Wang Lei and the kind o f relationship I had with him in the later part
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nature will naturally appear” (ren zhi chu, xing ben shan a xing xiang j in , xi xiang 
ynano ), which is actually a saying of
Mencius who was a Confucius philosopher. Wang Lei argued that it is expected that 
as a result of exposure to something extraordinarily good, the good nature of the 
person will surface naturally. Hence, he claimed, ‘good5 is pushed to the extreme and 
revealed to the audience on Chinese television. In this conversation, Wang Lei did 
not make any particular reference to Confucianism, yet his idea of human nature 
echoes what Munro notes about the Confucian idea of jen. It presupposes a natural 
attraction to something good and the human capacity to actualise moral goodness.
In the Confucian idea of knowledge, it is worth noting that the emphasis is on 
behaviour rather than a set of beliefs. Munro writes that Confucianism presupposes 
that each human being has an ‘evaluative mind’ (hsin) which assesses the 
requirements of a situation and guides the proper action in accordance with the norms. 
This ‘evaluative mind’ is a distinctive character of the heart of the human body.46 In 
other words, the concept is that there is no knowing that does not entail actions which 
articulate the mental attitude behind them. Tu notes, “In moral education, knowing 
manifests itself in acting, and through action one authenticates one’s knowledge” 
(1985:100). So knowing can only exist and be attained through the means of action. 
Thus, understanding Confucian ideals entails living them, and in this sense, Confucian 
learning assumes concrete practicality rather than “a programme of making oneself 
empirically knowledgeable” (Tu 1985:68). Furthermore, Tu notes “The reality that 
the perfect sage symbolizes is not a superhuman reality but genuine human reality”
o f this chapter. Wang Lei is a fictional name. As the precaution against any problem, I have invented 
a name.
46 Mencius, a branch o f  schools in Confucianism, asserts that without sustained effort o f  cultivation, the 
heart cannot know and be preserved. So it emphasizes the importance on self-cultivation, rather than 
assuming the capacity to properly evaluate the situation and conducts as given.
(1985:64). Confucian learning is not only practical and concrete, but also adjusted to 
the ordinary world -  the here and now. So the important point about model emulation 
in Confucianism is its emphasis on behaviour in everyday circumstances.
It seems that such a Confucian ideals were quite useful guiding principles for 
the Communist Party, particularly the emphasis of behaviour in the Confucian idea of 
knowledge. In examining literature about communist heroes from the late 1950s and 
1960’s, I have noticed that there is a strong emphasis on how to practise model 
behaviour as exemplified by the communist heroes in one’s own lived reality, and 
there was no justification for why these behaviours should be emulated. Readers 
were expected to simply emulate models, rather than to understand the idea these 
models represented. Some examples of magazine article titles allow one to speculate 
about what was expected from the promotion of communist heroes. For instance, a 
magazine called China Youth, Zhongguo Qingnian M (1963), ran a series of
articles called, “How to Look Upon the Issue of the Effect of Models?” {Zenyang 
Kandaiqi Mofan Zuoyoung de Wentil ( f r i ^ ^ A j f j  [fj [rIM? ). I also found 
an article entitled “Examine and Discuss Some Problems through Studying Lei Feng” 
(Shitan Xiiexi Lei Feng de Jige Wenti U fu 0 fillAMIrII!) in the same
magazine. Another magazine called Chinese Workers, Zhongguo Gongren 4 1 fflX A  
(1959), runs a series titled “We Discuss How We Should Study Heroes” (Dajia Tan 
Yinggai Zenyang Xiang Yingxiong Renwu Xuexi A  A  ^  A1 IpI A'Al X' -<J).
In a magazine called Red Flag, Hongqi ,4]JjK: (1969), I found an article titled “Firmly 
Grasp Stereotypes” {Zhua Hao Dianxing -M#? AM). As all these titles indicate, 
communist heroes were promoted for ordinary people to learn from.
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They were models for people to follow as guides in their own, often harsh, 
reality. The emphasis is explicitly on how to emulate heroes, instead of how great 
and extraordinary the hero is as an individual. These articles indicate that, like 
Confucianism, to understand the communist ideals one was only required to live as a 
communist person, rather than to comprehend its complicated ideas. The role of 
magazine articles like these is to close off alternative interpretations of models. They 
attempt to guide the way in which people engage with models so as to be in line with 
the goals favoured by the Party that sanctioned the models in the first place.
Moreover, during the emulation campaigns, many organizations had promoted their 
own local models who were described as proficient in emulating the national models. 
Thus, though the national model served as a heroic ideal but was still beyond the 
reach of most ordinary people to emulate, the local model was an example more 
familiar to the people.
Model emulation during the late 1950s and 1960’s served as a means of social 
engineering. Mao commented on the role of the model as, “You are the bridge 
between the leader and the masses. The opinions of the masses go through you and to 
the top, and the opinions of the top go through you to the masses”.47 In this sense, 
Mao appears to be quite clear about models’ mediatory role between ideology and 
practice. Thus Confucianism not only shares the use of emulation models as 
exemplars of sanctioned politico-moral action, it also allows the Party to assume its 
role as guiding principle without any justification.
It seems that the explanation for why heroes in particular were utilised by the 
CCP lies in the Confucian view, with its emphasis on learning correct behaviour
47 Quoted in Munro (1977:142).
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through emulating models rather than following sets of ideas. And this basis has been 
further reinforced by the adoption of heroes as emulation models in the Soviet 
practice of producing a new communist man. From this point of view, the discourse 
of heroes is closely tied up with the operation of power of the Communist Party. The 
examination of the socio-political condition of China at the time the discourse was 
first deployed in the 1960s will further explicate this point.
The Era of Heroes
The discourses about communist heroes in contemporary China have their 
roots in the political legacy of the 1960’s. The 1960’s are commonly known and 
regarded as ‘the era of heroes’ by Chinese people. It is when the CCP started to 
institutionally define and promote heroes as ideal ‘socialist’ subjects on a national 
scale. In fact, the use of heroes by CCP is nothing new. Earlier examples included 
heroes from the revolutionary war period prior to the establishment of communist 
China, with figures like Liu Hulan who fought against and were killed by 
Guomindcing HI the Nationalist party; and Dong Cunrui who sacrificed his life
on the liberation war front. During the 1950s, when the Communist Party came into 
power, there were war heroes like Huang Jiguang and Qiu Xiaoyun who were both 
martyrs of the Korean War. All this time, the CCP promoted and still continues to 
promote political martyrs as heroic. Yet, only in the 1960’s, there was a significant 
turn towards creation of heroes as ideal ‘socialist’ subjects on a national scale. Within 
this framework, a large number of model workers and heroes, such as Lei Feng and 
Wang Jie, were promoted. The heroes from the 1960’s differed from previous heroes
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in their settings -  the previous heroes died in battles and sacrificed their lives for 
communism, while heroes of the 1960’s existed in an ordinary reality doing ordinary 
work and dedicated their selfless labour to the party.
The 1960’s was the era of construction which marked a transition from the 
previous period of fighting for the communist victory, first in the revolutionary war 
and then in the Korean War. Once the Communist Party came into power in 1949 and 
secured its position, its next task was state building and development. It was a time 
for the Party to deliver the communist utopia which had been promised at the time of 
the revolutionary war in exchange for the people’s commitment and sacrifice. Ci 
Jiwei says of the vision of utopia during the Maoist period,
Now that someone with the power to command, and the charisma to convince, 
held out the prospect of an infinitely better future, the numbness of 
consciousness in which they had drowned their present misery was replaced 
by a heightened consciousness that eagerly, even impatiently sought future 
happiness. In return for that future happiness, they were prepared as a people 
to believe, to obey, to strive, to sacrifice, and to expect...
(1994:4)
It was this “prospect of an infinitely better future”, in other words the utopian vision 
of China that induced people to commitment and sacrifice themselves for the Party 
and the realisation of communist China. Yet, one of the main issues the Party was 
facing in the 1960’s was that, despite 10 years of commitment and self-sacrifice by 
the people, China in the late 1950s and early 1960’s still remained poor, although 
there were improvements in some aspects of life. In particular, the industrial 
expansion was not rapid enough to meet the basic material demands of the new China 
(Bachman 1991). The persistent poverty alone was enough to exhaust the people and 
to cause disenchantment with the vision of a communist utopia.
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To confront this problem, Mao launched the ambitious project of the Great 
Leap Forward {dayitejin ) in the late 1950s. Under this project, in order to
achieve material abundance and well-being within a short period of time, people were 
put under even greater workloads and demands of sacrifice.48 The Great Leap 
Forward, however, ended up as a great disaster, causing wide-scale famine and 
leaving people with even greater hardships than ever. The failure of the Great Leap 
Forward was not only in a material sense. Its failure also meant the failure to deliver 
what Mao had promised in his utopian vision (Bachman 1991, Ci 1994). Since this 
promise was the sole basis on which the Party could demand commitment and 
sacrifice from the people, the failure of the Great Leap Forward in the early 1960’s 
became an issue which shook the people’s trust in the Party’s ability to achieve a 
communist utopia. If the Party could not deliver future happiness, it left the people no 
reason to believe, obey, or sacrifice themselves. Consequently, disenchantment and 
doubts about future happiness posed a critical threat to the power of the Party.
Under such conditions, the Party needed to inspire people and to revive their 
belief in the communist utopia and in the Party’s ability to make the miracle happen, 
so as to mobilise commitment again. In this respect, then, calling the 1960’s the ‘era 
of construction’ was a means of transcending the current suffering and focusing on 
the bigger picture of great undertakings in order to bring about the communist utopia. 
Tang Xiaobing notes, “With ideology and political identity as its sole content or 
depth, everyday life is organised, rendered meaningful and effectively reduced from 
it” (2000:278). Through this transcendence, the Party needed to give meaning to the 
immediate sufferings and hardships in everyday lives with the hope of a bright future. 
Thus, heroes in the 1960’s were specifically generated and promoted for the purpose
48 It is worth mentioning that the whole event o f the Great Leap Forward was complex and I could
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of restoring people’s commitment to the Party, while previous heroes had been 
promoted to inspire and encourage people to be brave for the communism as an 
ideology.
This point becomes more explicit in the subjectivity of communist heroes. 
Here, I will take the example of Lei Feng. Among all communist heroes, Lei Feng is 
the only one who is still commemorated annually, from the 60’s, after his death, until 
today. In this respect, Lei Feng epitomizes all the communist heroes. Below is an 
excerpt from an article on the “Learn from the Lei Feng” campaign of 1963:
Why do we say Lei Feng is ordinary (pingfan ^FJT)? Lei Feng is ordinary 
because he is just like any other o f the countless common (putong 
youths doing common works. He has neither an invention of his own nor any 
great achievement. All the things he did can also be done by other ordinary 
young people.
Why do we say he is great? It is because he showed an extraordinary spirit in 
ordinary work (hupingfan de jingshen ^  W). He devoted the
whole of his short life to the cause of the revolutionary work.
It is only through learning from Lei Feng’s ordinary and yet great communist 
spirit, that one can become a good fighter for Chairman Mao (hao zhanshi jfcf 
r^db). Ordinariness {pingfan ^PjT) and greatness (weida fj?^) are linked 
with one another. Lenin taught us that the task of accomplishing economic 
construction “cannot be achieved by temporally expressed heroic and lofty 
quality (yingxiong qigai but demands the most enduring, the most
determined, and the rarest heroic spirit expressed in daily (richang 0  'rl') 
work”.49
In this article, published in 1963, the idea of the communist hero as an ordinary 
person is quite explicitly manifested. Lei Feng is presented here as a rather plain
only present the simplified version by depicting the point which is relevant to my argument.
49 From Qingnian de Wuchcin Jieji Juewu Tidao Xin de Gaodu IF W'T-ifJ A I f t lliltu 3 \ ffr ffj
inhS;, in Zhongguo Qingnian 4 1 1963, issue no. 9, pp.5. Translation and emphasis are mine.
Here, I made a conscious effort to translate different terms used for describing ‘ordinary’, and put 
original Chinese terms in parenthesis, however, in everyday usage, these terms are often used 
interchangeably.
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subject, portrayed as any ordinary youth doing common work, without any innovation 
or great accomplishment, but with a great communist spirit. It is surprising that that is 
all which we seem to know about Lei Feng’s subjectivity. Even though there are 
many articles repeatedly written on him, or other communist heroes during the 
1960’s, we seem to know very little about them. What this article does by 
representing Lei Feng as a simple and common subject, is to attempt to make the 
‘extraordinary’ communist spirit and prominence of Lei Feng accessible to any 
ordinary person in any ordinary environment. As a result, it puts communist heroes 
within the reach of ordinary people. Moreover, in this description of Lei Feng, it is 
quite explicit that his heroic character was not innate. The point to note here is that 
Lei Feng is regarded as a hero because he fulfils all the aspects required for a model 
‘communist man,’ rather than possessing any innate greatness.
What he was credited for was his sheer effort for cultivating his consciousness 
in any ordinary circumstances.50 The emphasis on ‘ordinary’ time and space is a key 
factor for communist heroes emerged since 1960s. Previous revolutionary heroes 
were seen to have risen in very extreme social circumstances -the life and death 
struggle of revolutionary war, whereas Lei Feng made his appearance in a time of 
relative peace. In contrast to the dramatic and grand language used in describing the 
cause of socialism, much of the work for establishing and accomplishing socialism 
was deeply rooted in daily practices -  quite often repetitive hard work. The CCP had 
emerged under the dramatic and extraordinary circumstances of the long battle against 
the Japanese occupation (1937-45) and against the Nationalist Party, (1945-49) by 
upholding the grand vision of a Communist utopia. Thus, one could imagine that
50 Furthermore, one could argue that even if  the status o f  heroes can be considered as being superior to 
the rest o f ordinary people, this superiority has been earned through the hard work o f  a hero, so 
fundamentally they still remain ordinary people. In this sense, it does not contradict the socialist 
egalitarian principle.
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daily hard work probably appeared dull and meaningless compared to the grandness 
of an utopian vision and the romanticism of revolutionary war.
The importance of Lei Feng, then, could be said to transcend daily ordinary 
hard work to the revolutionary undertakings towards the communist utopia. As in the 
above quoted passage, he never forgot the revolution nor the existing enemies even in 
the course of ordinary work, and managed to implement such a revolutionary spirit on 
day-to-day basis. In this sense, the representation of Lei Feng rendered significance 
to the everyday life of ordinary people, and thereby was assumed to inspire people. 
The creation of the ordinary person as a hero, thus, further attempts to bridge the gap 
between ‘extraordinary’ and ‘ordinary’ circumstances within the communist period, 
and to overcome the lack of romantic sensation and revolutionary passion by making 
something ordinary, extraordinary.
Furthermore, heroes promoted a new social status. They served as a way of 
improving the social and economic conditions of the working class which had been 
long time mistreated and suffered greatly prior to the Revolution. In the 1960’s, a 
commentator, Liu Zijiu, in an article in the magazine Chinese Workers, argued that 
the promotion of heroes was not simply an attempt to improve the political and 
economical conditions of the exploited class, but was also a means to transform the 
idea of ‘labour’. 51 In the past, Liu says, workers were exploited and made to 
undertake strenuous labour and were forced to work and live in very poor conditions. 
In order for workers to willingly take up work positively, there was a need to 
transform the notion of labour in the new society. Liu assumes that the promotion of 
communist heroes had, indeed, accomplished this transformation. In the past, labour
51 Taken from “ Women Guojia Wei Shenma Yongxiong Beichu If I A  A  f  I ‘ A  A ®  3p- Hi ”, in
Zhongguo Gongren T U I  I  A ,  1959. Issue no. 20. p.37&38. Translation is mine.
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was something to look down on as a strenuous burden, but now it was cast in a 
glorious and heroic matter. In this way, the Party liberated the work force to be 
devoted to the undertakings of socialism, and heroes played a role of moral incentive.
Heroes as the Guiding Principle
All this was not simply a political strategy to produce particular subjects in 
communist China. Lei Feng embodies the guiding principles of the Party. It was 
expected that people would simply follow his example, rather than needing the Party 
to come up with sets of rules and principles to guide people. What is implied in such 
principles is that, as in Confucianism, people are assumed to be malleable, and 
therefore can be changed when the fosterage is carried out properly. Mao commented 
that “We are like sheets of blank paper, since our cultural and scientific level is not 
high ... A blank sheet of paper is good for writing on.”52 Because people are 
assumed to be malleable, the Party constructs people as needing the Party for proper 
guidance. In this presupposed subjectivity of the people, the idea of agency is absent.
This point could be further demonstrated by the Chinese term ‘comrade.’ It 
means co-worker in English, but the Chinese concept of comrade (tongzhi Ini
consists of the character tong IeJ meaning common, and zhi M meaning ‘will,’
‘aspiration,’ or ‘ambition’, thus the Chinese idea of comrade is that of shared ‘will’ or 
‘aspiration’, and implies the ability of the people to know what the common 
aspirations are. These common aspirations are defined and represented by the Party. 
As a Marxist-Leninist vanguard party, the Communist Party claims an inherent right
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to represent the will of the masses, though the term the CCP uses is yuanwang MM,
meaning ‘aspiration’ or ‘desire.’53 This probably suggests a stronger sense of longing 
than the Marxist concept of ‘will,’ that could be defined as man’s true nature which is 
dissociated from the mode of production. Anagnost further suggests that by 
reproducing the model through their intense labour of emulation, people develop a 
living relationship with the nation and take part in nation building (1997:132). Lei 
Feng and all the other communist heroes embody the socialist ideal.
More crucially, the other side of the argument is that the Party needs people to 
dedicate themselves and have faith in the Party in order to achieve socialism. Such an 
assumption is probably quite contrary to the Party’s self-promoted image of being a 
vanguard party representing the will, or aspiration, of the people. The Party has 
simply taken its role as guiding principle for granted. Anagnost (1997) assumes that 
models are the construction of self-referential reality by the Party. She notes, “The 
Party continually sees its own reflection mirrored in these models, and it 
misrecognises itself as the other, in that the models are identified with the category of 
people” (1997:106). In other words, the Party constitutes models, and these models 
are the embodiment of values and ideas of the Party, but the Party takes such 
representations of models as the embodiment of the popular will. Such practice 
allows the Party to see a continuous coherence between its aspirations and the will of 
the people. Moreover it also acts as a justification of the Party’s claim for its role in 
guiding people in the correct direction.
Thus the discourse of heroes sanctions the power and role of the Party. Times 
have changed since then. The socio-political condition has changed and the power of 
the Party has become less powerful due to various competing forces in the reform
52 Schram (1974:83)
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period. How heroes are now been articulated may have change somewhat, but they 
still assume importance for being tied up with the veiy existence and power of the 
Communist Party. In the next two chapters, I will discuss in details how much of 
these practices extend to the televisual representation of heroes in contemporary 
China in the next two chapters.
The Terminology for Heroes in Contemporary China
Having looked at different ideas of heroes in contemporary China, I will look 
at some different terminology used for heroes in Chinese. There is a wide range of 
terms which refer to different kinds of subjects that could be translated as heroes in 
English. This is not to say that English ideas of heroes are simpler than Chinese ones. 
What I would like to do here is to use English term hero as a point of reference for 
understanding a variety of subjectivities that connote different qualities of hero in 
Chinese. In the contemporary usage, the word ‘hero’ in English refers to: 1. “a person 
noted or admired for coinage, outstanding achievements, nobility etc.”; 2. “a great 
warrior”; 3. “the chief male character in a poem, play, story etc.”; 4. “a man of 
superhuman qualities, favoured by the gods” (OED). These qualities are depicted in 
Chinese terms for different kinds of subjects. The above conversation alone indicated 
five different terms namely: great person (weida de renwu 445 A 4$?), very good
person (tebie haoren A), historical figure {I is hi shcrng de renwu A
4^ 1), hero 0 ungxiong renwu A/A A 4^ ), and advanced worker {xianjin gongzuozhe A
There are certainly similarities between English and Chinese uses of the
53 Han Ying Cidian iX Ain] $%1978
99
term ‘hero’, especially with regard to the first meaning of the word hero in English. 
The above Chinese words all connote subjects that are admired for their courage, 
outstanding achievements or nobility, however, they also depict other qualities that 
are not differentiated in the above definitions of the word hero in English, particularly 
for moral and political dimensions.
‘Hero’ is usually translated in Mandarin as yingxiong the character 
components of which mean a “hero; outstanding person” (ying $£) and a “male”, 
“grand; imposing” or “powerful; mighty” {xiong //iff;) (Hanying cidian 1993).
One could point out that there is a gender dimension almost at the heart of the term 
yingxiong since it implies maleness, even though the Party underplays the 
gender dimension in their representations of heroes. Heroines are called mi yingxiong 
{nu X , meaning female), although quite often the term yingxiong is also
used to refer to heroines. Revolutionary heroes are called geming yingxiong
/4t: (,geming meaning revolutionary). There are varieties of yingxiong
ranging from heroes like Zhuge Liang, Guang Gong, and Liu Bei in the classical as 
well as martial arts novels, to well-known emperors from the past.54
In the communist discursive practice, ‘heroes’ and ‘model figures’ are not 
distinguished and are often used interchangeably. For instance, Lei Feng could be 
regarded as an outstanding hero (jiechu yingxiong fti ^ //ijli),55 or a fighter for
communism {gongchanzhuyi zhanshi X X ^T lX i^b) as well as a model worker 
{laodong mofcin or shorter version laomo ^IH ). Furthermore, there are
terms that were created after Lei Feng, such as “hno Lei Feng”, meaning a living Lei
54 All three are w ell -known heroes o f  The Romance o f  Three Kingdoms. Their names often came up 
in my fieldwork experience when I talked to people about classical heroes.
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Feng, or “Lei Feng shushu”, meaning Uncle Lei Feng. These categories are usually 
not differentiated from the term yingxiong A similar tendency can be also 
observed in the way in which Dr Zhang talked about Li Suli. However, in the 
conversation with Wang Lei and Cai Weifeng they both demonstrated that heroes 
(yingxiong renwu d&MA.f¥dJ) and model figures {mofan renwu do not
simply assume the same kind of subjectivity, although neither of them could explicitly 
elaborate on what the differences are.
At the end of the above conversation, when I asked the differences between 
the various terminologies that appeared in the conversation, Wang Lei brushed off my 
questions by saying “Who cares?” This response was not simply a case of Wang Lei 
being awkward. I have noticed that many people had difficulties and showed 
reluctance in describing their definition of terminologies such as yingxiong renwu 
or mofan renwu jAdlA'jA When I mentioned that my research was on the
topic of heroes, the first thing people usually asked me was “Who is the hero of 
China?” When I, then, asked what kind of people they considered yingxiong renwu 
to be, many people responded to by saying, “You tell me because you are 
the one who is doing the research.” It appeared that defining the idea of heroes is not 
something ordinary people feel at ease with. Quite a few people suggested that I 
should talk to someone from the university, and found it odd that I was interested in 
their ideas. What were the kinds of things about which made people generally 
comfortable when it came to talking in terms of heroes? I foimd that people, like 
Wang Lei and Cai Weifeng were often concerned and willing to talk about what 
heroes do. It was probably not so much that people do not talk about heroes, but 
because defining ideas of heroes is a discursive practice, ordinary people did not feel
55 Jiechu connotes outstanding achievements through efforts.
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comfortable in making a claim. This was quite a crucial point in forming my 
approach to the study of heroes. I will come back to this point in more detail in the 
conclusion of this chapter. First I want to look further at some of the terminologies 
for heroes and their representation.
Among such a wide range of terminologies for heroes, I want to consider 
Jackie Chan being described as a yingxiong Pi iff  Jackie Chan was the only actor
who was described as yingxiong Pi//iff in media outside of his role. Not only that, 
during my fieldwork, some scholars and media professionals I interviewed mentioned 
that Jackie Chan could be yingxiong Pi&t in discussing the topic of heroes in 
contemporary China. Usually film stars and pop stars are referred to as mingxing 
JR, or onxiang 'fPl'fil, rather than yingxiong Pl/41. So, a film star will be dianying 
mingxing dUTpHjjJl {dianying !%>!£, meaning film), or dianying onxiang 
Mingxing RJj JP., literally minty\ meaning bright and xing M as a star, refers to a 
popular icon. And onxiang on iiP meaning a statue, portrait, or reflection, and 
xiang M  an object or icon also refers to a popular icon. Originally onxiang was
used in a religious context referring to religious idols, and is still used in this context 
today. One may argue that Jackie Chan may not be a stereotypical star. He 
consistently plays a morally upright good-hearted ‘ordinary’ person who possesses 
incredible martial art skills to fight against bad people. There is a notable blurring 
between the heroes he plays in films and his public self. Moreover, his martial arts
56 There are also many other colloquial ways o f referring to these stars. For instance, four o f  the most 
popular Hong Kong pop singers, Jacky Cheung, Andy Lau, Leon Lai and Aaron Kwok are grouped 
together, and called “si da tianwang literally meaning the four great heavenly kings. The
term tianwang 'T/IF (and tianhou ik/o', meaning queen for females) is often used to refer to very 
popular stars. Someone who is very popular is also commonly described with the adjective hong %L, 
meaning red.
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skills often remind people of the knight-errant who appears in the martial-arts 
literature (wuxia xiaoshno or in classical novels such as The Water Margin
or The Romance o f Three Kingdoms. The point of this enquiry, however, is not to 
determine whether or not Jackie Chan is a hero, but to look at the way in which he 
was talked about so as to consider the idea of hero. To do this, I will illustrate a 
conversation I had with Wang Qichao, a close friend, who was a big Jackie Chan fan. 
Wang Qichao was in his late twenties at the time of my fieldwork, a professional 
bodybuilder who won the title of Mi* Beijing in 1997, and was a person with a great 
sense of humour and sensitivity. He was married to a French woman, also a close 
friend of mine. Before they immigrated to France in the summer 1998,1 quite 
regularly spent time with them.
The evening prior to this conversation taking place, we watched the Jackie 
Chan’s film Who Am I  (Wo Shi Shei so we were talking about the film and
Jackie Chan’s performance in general. I asked Qichao, why Jackie Chan can be 
called a hero, yingxiong PPijf, whereas the term is not used to describe other popular
stars. He responded that he thinks that first of all, Jackie Chan plays a hero in all of 
his films. Secondly, Qichao said that he is not only a hero in the films, but in real life 
he is a hero as well. Qichao related that once he saw the out takes of a film -  in which 
Jackie Chan, unsuccessful in the shooting of a particular scene, walked off the street, 
then saw a can on the street, so he picked it up and put it in the rubbish bin. Qichao 
commented that because Jackie Chan cares about a little thing like that he is heroic. 
Jackie Chan has money, fame, and popularity, so he could have told others to pick the 
can up and put it in the bin. Instead, he did it himself, and moreover, he never 
preaches to anyone that he or she should do the same. This shows that he has a good 
moral sense. Qichao further stated that:
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Jackie Chan is very close to you. Even if you have not met him; you feel that 
if you happened to meet up with him, then he will be your friend, because he 
respects others. If you have a problem, you can be assured that he will try to 
help you whatever the problem is. This is an ability to unite, and he himself 
unites with others. Mao Zedong is considered to be yingxiong because no 
matter how short the period was, he united China. Unification is very 
important for China, as unity will create strength.
(From my own field notes)
From this comment, some might say that Qichao cannot distinguish between film 
characters and the actor as a real person, although in my view, he is fully capable of 
making such a distinction. This is not confusion between heroes and idols.
What is important to draw from Qichao’s comment is that he is concerned 
about what heroes do, and for him the issue of who is a hero is a secondary issue. 
Jackie Chan, even though he is a film star, possesses some qualities of the hero -  here 
Qichao pointed out his moral stance and the ability to unite people. Qichao also 
compared Jackie Chan with Mao Zedong on the basis of their common skill at uniting 
people. During the communist period up to the late 1970s, Mao Zedong existed as 
someone above all communist heroes. Mao Zedong had been the sanctioning voice of 
all communist heroes. In this respect, putting Mao Zedong and Jackie Chan in the 
same category indicates a fundamental change in the idea of heroes in the 
contemporary period.
Moreover, Jackie Chan as public self actively engages in various charities and 
social programmes. He blurs the lines between the roles he plays in films and his 
public self rather than simply relying on the imagination of viewers. It must be noted 
that there is certain blurring between the term hero and protagonist, and sometimes 
heroes and protagonists are used inter-changeably in English. Such blurring seems to 
be increasingly common in Hollywood, as the screen stars who played ‘heroes’ in the
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films are often promoted as if the heroic screen character was a natural expression of 
their actual personality (King 1984, Leighton 2000). Moreover, in the capitalist 
American society, stars are examples of ‘success’ in terms of their earnings and 
lifestyle. In the past, it could be argued the English term hero meant the son of a god 
(ancient Greece), often who died in the battle. The connection between heroes and 
war is strongly held in much of western literature. A hero was a man of courage and 
nobility and was willing to die for his cause. King (1984), however, argues that with 
the development of Hollywood, the depiction of hero has acquired a more ordinary 
meaning.
To some extent, Jackie Chan’s heroic image is created in a similar ways to 
those Hollywood stars, while in Chinese, these two terms are relatively differentiated. 
Yingxiong 5*1//ff, in particular, implies the behavioural articulation of his heroic
quality while protagonist simply refers to the main character -  a protagonist may or 
may not be a hero or heroic. Yet, with the rapid growth of market economy and 
increasing influence of Hollywood entertainment to the media scene in China, such 
ideas are also changing. At the time of my fieldwork, however, Jackie Chan being 
described as yingxiong seems to be grounded in his moral prominence and 
possession of certain heroic quality which can affect people to follow him.
The Interpretive Framework for the Idea of Heroes
So far, I have looked at the broad ideas and the divergent uses of the term 
heroes in contemporary China. How can we categorise the different types of heroes 
in Chinese society? There are some works on heroes in Western literature which I
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could use as a starting point for considering categorization of different types of heroes 
in contemporary China. Propp (1968) analysed the structure of various Russian as 
well as some Euro American folktales according to the functions of its dramatic 
personae. He argues that the functions of the dramatic personae are the basic 
components of the tale. According to Propp, function is understood as an act of a 
character, defined from the point of view of its significance for the course of action in 
the narrative. In this analysis, it is assumed that functions of characters serve as 
stable, constant elements in a tale, independent of how and by whom they are 
fiilfilled. Based 011 his examination, he assumed that the number of functions known 
to the fairly tale is limited, noting 31 functions altogether.
According to Propp, there are seven categories of characters, such as hero, 
false hero, villain, donor, helper, dispatcher, and princess -  all have different 
functions within the narrative structure. Among them, Propp writes that the 
morphological significance of the hero is great, since his intentions create the axis of 
the narrative. The hero of a fairly tale is the character who either directly suffers from 
the action of the villain in the complication, or who agrees to liquidate the tragedy of 
another person. In the course of the story the hero is the person who is supplied with 
a magical agent, and who makes use of it or is served by it. It is a quality of the hero, 
expressed in the acts which serve as the motive for his adventure. Therefore, a hero is 
not by choice but destiny. Similarly, in his analysis of the transformation of heroes of 
culturally defined ideas based on Greek myth and European literature, Rorty 
(1969:303) described heroes as: 1. persons whose fates are determined by their 
parentage; 2. heroes take on superhuman tasks; 3. acts of heroism are revealed in the 
face of fate and chance as courage and endurance. By looking at these attributes, it 
appears that some Chinese chivalrous heroes from martial arts novels seem to fit into
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this category, while communist heroes are not chosen by destiny nor have they 
engaged in superhuman tasks.
Communist heroes seem to fit well in what Rorty calls ‘figures’. He defined 
‘figures’ as: 1. they are defined by their place; 2. they are not assigned roles, but have 
the traits of their prototypes in myth of sacred script; 3. they are partly stereotyped; 4.
I
figurative identity shapes the significance of the events in his life; 5. they are an 
idealization and become exemplary (1969: 307). Lei Feng would probably be a good 
example of ‘figures’. Yet, as I have looked at in the above, there seem to be different 
kinds of communist heroes, and some may fit better in this category than the others.
In the analysis on models in China, Bakken (2000) came up with two different 
typologies: one is a ‘functionally diffuse’ and the other is a ‘functionally specific’ 
model. Functionally diffuse models are “symbolizing the grand narrative of society in 
its most general form. The texts are about stability, order, thrift, sacrifice, and 
attachment to the group” (Bakken 2000:177). These models play a key role in the 
overall process of socialization and cultural identity. Functionally specific models are 
“models for learning a specific task, or they may give important clues about a specific 
and limited area of information” (Bakken 2000:177). It seems that the former 
typology is more similar to what Rorty calls ‘figures’, though these two types can be 
so clearly differentiated as Bakken claims.
In practice, however, using such a classification for examining different heroes 
in contemporary China presents some problems. Foremost, it is not so clear-cut 
which heroes and models fall into what typology, and characterizations of a particular 
hero can be ambiguous. Also there are many texts about the same hero -  each can be 
slightly different from the other -  and they are subject to modification over the time. 
Moreover, depending on the framework, the use of each term like yingxiong
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mofan and weida renwu f|! A  A ^  could present rather different meanings. It is
the reading of a scholar that determines which elements are to be attended to and 
which to be left out when considering a particular hero. Thus, while the classification 
of heroes discussed earlier seems to work at the conceptual level, in practice and 
actual application, it is far more problematic. It presupposes the text as a given and 
that there is a hidden structure to be read.
As discussed earlier, Dilly (1999) writes that anthropologists interpret social 
and cultural phenomena with reference to ‘context’. In the same way, the idea of hero 
is determined by the context -  whether that is a structuralist, structural-functionalist, 
or poststructuralist one. Like the text, context is often treated as something self 
evident, stable, clear and sufficient. In his study of context, however, Dilly 
extensively shows that context not only includes certain phenomena as relevant, 
others may be excluded as marginal. It is our sense of relevance, driven by our 
theoretical outlooks and practical dispositions towards the world that defines where 
the frames were to be placed (1999: 38). When the context shifts then our 
interpretation and the meaning which attached to the object also change. From this 
point of view, then, a classification of different types of heroes only makes sense with 
a particular frame of reference.
Bakhtin assumes that some narratives do not have fixed meanings but are open 
to dialogue. Explaining Bakhtin’s idea on the openness of the narrative, Emerson and 
Morson write;
In the world according to the novel, the image of a person necessarily changes 
over time. Main characters in novels can and become different, and they 
never exhaust the possibilities they can become and could have become.
(1990: 424)
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The idea of hero is articulated as the audience engages with the representation of 
heroes. It does not exist as a set idea. Articulation emerges as the representation is 
enacted. It is this articulation I am interested in as an analytical tool to understand 
different kinds of heroes in this thesis. In the following section, I will discuss what I 
mean by hero and how articulation can be used to examine the different types of 
heroes.
Conclusion
Up to this point, in this chapter, I have looked at various ideas of heroes at 
different levels, from scholars, individuals at the grassroots level, and the Party.
These were sometimes incongruent with each other. The idea of heroes in 
contemporary China is plural and is irreducible to particular qualities. While the 
Party continues to engage in the discursive practices of heroes in the post-reform 
period, they are engaged with at the individual level. The actual usages of the idea of 
heroes at the micro-level are messier than, and some times even contradictory to, the 
ones assumed by the Party. This will be further complicated by the idea of heroes in 
the academic discourse where scholars portray heroes as the embodiment of social 
values and popular sentiments which he/she projects on to Chinese society. Here, 
heroes serve as a means for scholars to appreciate and understand the society and 
people in different phases.
This enquiry only led me to take the concept of heroes to be what Gallie 
would call an “essentially contested term.” Referring to the different uses and
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characteristics which groups of people expressed about the proper use of different 
concepts, Gallie notes,
There are disputes, .. .although not resolvable by argument of any kind, are 
nevertheless sustained by perfectly respectable arguments and evidence.
.. .there are concepts which are essentially contested, concepts the proper use 
of which inevitably involves endless disputes about their proper uses on the 
part o f  their uses.
(1956:169, emphasis is mine)
As Gallie points out here, there are categories which the meanings and usages of 
which are not always coherent, and therefore for some words, it is not possible to 
determine precisely what the term means. Gallie claims that recognition of 
“essentially contested concepts” is an appraisable way of understanding concepts 
based on the comparison of different uses and how it came to be that is very different 
from the clarification of any concept based on scientific deductive comparison 
(1956:198). Such an approach to the idea of heroes seems to be more appropriate for 
this thesis, as my interests lie in exploring various articulatory practices for heroes at 
different levels.
Then, it may seem different from common usages of the term hero, in this 
thesis I will use the term hero to refer to subjects who play heroic functions. I have 
drawn this idea of heroic functions from Foucault’s “author-function” (1977c). In 
discussing the relationship between the author and text, Foucault notes that
The name of the author is a variable that accompanies only certain texts to the 
exclusion of others. .. .In this sense, the function of an author is to 
characterize the existence, circulation, and operation of certain discourses 
within a society.
(Foucault 1977c: 142)
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Author does not stand for a mere individual person, nor does it form spontaneously 
through the simple attribution of a discourse to a particular individual. It results from 
a complex operation which constructs the rational entity we call an author. Thus, the 
term author serves as a means of classification of discourse. There are parallels 
between authors and heroes. Like Foucault’s author, what I mean by hero in this 
thesis is irreducible to an actual individual, or a set of individuals. Neither can it be 
reduced to the rules of grammar and logic, nor to laws that govern objects. Hero 
characterizes the existence, circulation, and operation of a certain discourse within a 
society. As I have described in the previous chapter, my interest in this thesis is to 
examine how the idea of heroes is articulated within different social relationships, 
instead of starting off with a pre-defined set of particular attributes. Such 
understanding of hero is useful for going beyond the gesture of pointing out a 
particular individual and what he/she signifies.
By heroic functions, then, I want to highlight many of the aspects which 
people cited as what heroes do -  such as to inspire people, serve as a model for people 
to strive for, be someone to be admired, embody desire and social values, help others, 
unite people, and change history -  all the noble, courageous, and outstanding things 
said to be what heroes do. Not all these elements are necessarily present in each 
representation of hero at any one time. As in the discussion above, whether the ideas 
of heroes assumed by the Party or how various heroes were talked about by people at 
the micro-level, there was an emphasis on what heroes do which seems to be 
important to ideas of heroes in China. This could be also noted in the Confucianism 
and its emphasis on behaviour rather than a set of ideas. What I would like to further 
emphasize is the discursive importance of what heroes do, rather than structural role 
they play in the study of literature.
I l l
This approach to heroes is similar to Wittingstein’s approach to language. 
Wittingstein argued that in order to understand a concept, one should not ‘ask for the 
meaning’ of content, but should instead ‘ask for the use’ of the concept (Dilly 1999:2, 
8&9). This is to further suggest that the importance of heroes lies not so much in who 
the particular individuals are and what each category means, but how people talk 
about what heroes are and how they are used. In addition to this, part of difficulty in 
defining the term heroes also arises out of the violent paradigm shifts in the Chinese 
language -  the vemacularisation of the language in early twentieth century, and with 
the addition of ideologically loaded language of the Maoist period. In this respect, it 
appears that there are different discursive frames of heroes coexisting in the 
contemporary society. As such, it is difficult for ordinary people to really respond to 
the meaning of what or who is a hero.
Aside from heroes who are called yingxiong and communist models who
are often called mofan my usage of the term heroes in this thesis also includes
some historical figures and popular stars like Jackie Chan who represent certain 
heroic functions -  that could be any noble, courageous, and outstanding things said to 
be what heroes do. Only in the context where I find that specification of Chinese 
terminology is necessary, will I translate each Chinese term more literally. Thus, 
despite my attempt to introduce the use of term heroes in this thesis, it is beyond the 
limit of this thesis to further deal with the question of who is a hero or what is the idea 
of heroes in contemporary China. What this thesis will do is to explain why certain 
subjects are articulated as heroes and the ideas of heroes in the particular context. 
Then, having defined the use of the term heroes, in the following chapters I will 
examine various articulatory practices involved in the televisual representation of 
heroes in contemporary urban China.
112
Chapter Three
From Perfection to Ordinary: Changing representation of heroes
TV needs to be more popular
"There are a lot of trashy programmes, but real good programmes are rare,” 
said Pu Xiao, a foreign company clerk in Beijing who spends her free time 
either in bars in Sanlitun, in eastern downtown Beijing, or watching TV 
programmes at home. “I hate to watch those long, slow and unconvincing old 
stories of emperors and ministers from feudal Chinese dynasties. But there are 
too many of them. I like to watch cartoons such as 'Little Detective Kenan,’ 
game shows such as 'Lucky 52' and talk shows such as 'Tell It as It Is,' but I 
do not feel satisfied. I watch romantic films on VCD and listen to music on 
CDs, but I still feel lonely until I take hold of TV remote and click on a time- 
consuming, involving TV series," ...
To some degree, films and TV series are reflections of social, political, 
economic and cultural life in a certain period. Since the reform and opening 
policy was earned out in China in -1978, ... some feature films and TV series 
which mirror common people's lives have been put on the screen. Most of 
them involve living situations, working and emotional experiences of common 
people in both cities and rural areas. ...
Speaking of the TV series' success, a viewer said, “the way of life, the joys 
and sorrows of the characters shown in this TV series are known by common 
people. While watching the characters life, we like to connect it with our own 
life, for it always arouses our sympathy.” ...
"Chinese TV series producers may as well learn from their Japanese and 
Korean counterparts in creating audience-appealing power for their works, 
such as more a skillful shooting style, better-crafted subplot and more 
convincing details," said Gu Zheng, a freelance TV scriptwriter in Beijing.
... "Though depicting a somewhat idealized picture of contemporary society, 
these (Japanese and Korean) soap operas actually enjoy a large fan base in 
most Chinese audiences," said Zhong Dafeng, a Beijing Film Academy 
professor...
(From China Daily web version,
05/30/2001, by Xiao Zhu and Yang
Yang. English is original)
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Common People and Common People’s Lives
Having clarified the use of the term heroes for this thesis, in this chapter I will 
examine the televisual representation of heroes in contemporary China. I fust start by 
looking at how new heroes are represented in recent television programmes, then 
proceed to examine some of the claims as to how new heroes should be represented 
on the specific medium of television in contemporary society. As I discussed in 
Chapter 1, my interest is specific to the televisual representation of heroes. Therefore, 
it is necessary to look at the state of contemporary Chinese television, a medium 
which used to be simply the ‘mouthpiece of the Party’. This chapter also inquires into 
the kinds of subjects this new representation of heroes embodies, and further 
considers the emergence of a new representation of heroes in relation to the changing 
socio-political milieu of post-reform China.
In discussing contemporary television programmes, especially television 
drama, the opening China Daily article cited above suggests a departure in hero 
representation in contemporary television programmes from the earlier Lei Feng -type 
communist heroes discussed in the previous chapter. The article locates some key 
issues for considering televisual representation in contemporary society. The first 
point I want to draw from it is that the new televisual representation of heroes 
involves the ‘common’ people. The article claims that the key to strong audience 
appeal is the depiction of real people’s lives, as seen in successful programmes like 
Aspirations57 and Hold My Hand. The article argues that common people are familiar 
with the way of life, the joys and sorrows of the characters depicted in those TV series
57 The title o f  television drama Kewang M M  has been translated as ‘Yearnings’ (Rofel 1994), 
‘Aspirations’ (Barme 1999a), or ‘Expectations’ (Keane 1998a and Wang Yi 1999). In this thesis, 
unless quoting or referring to a particular passage by a particular author, in general I will stick with 
Aspirations which I think is the best translation because it captures the meaning o f  Chinese term
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which therefore arouse viewers’ sympathy. In other words, lives and characters with 
which common people are familiar allow viewers to relate what is represented on the 
television screen to their own living situations, working and emotional experiences, 
and hence speak to their emotions. So the key here appears to be some kind of 
emotional bond with the viewers. This argument is reminiscent of what Williams 
refers to as “structure of feeling” (1961), for the way in which television drama 
connects with popular tastes by portraying social reality in the common form, 
whereby people can relate and organise their own lived experience. So, the characters 
and narratives of TV drama bring dramatised emotions into the quotidian lives of 
viewers, though one may note a sense of contradiction between dramatised emotions 
and ordinary lives. Thus, there is an emphasis on feeling in the new representation of 
heroes that affects the audience more personally by mobilising emotions. In earlier 
representations of the Lei Feng type of communist heroes, such a portrayal of 
personal feelings was absent. Instead, heroes were described using sets of model 
behaviours.
The second point I want to suggest is that the driving force changing the 
representation of heroes is the need for popularity -  as noted in the article’s title, 
television needs to be popular. What is presupposed here is that appealing characters, 
more specifically the familiar heroes and heroines in this article that the audience can 
relate to, are the key to gaining popularity among viewers. Since the 1980s, the 
commercialisation of Chinese television that followed the Party’s reform policies of 
decentralisation and considerable relaxation of the broadcasting regulation policy of 
cultural institutions has increasingly necessitated television producers and directors to 
seek out and invent a variety of means to secure their own funding.
Kewang M M .
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Commercialisation of Chinese Television
In 1979, China’s first television advertisement, for a Chinese herbal wine, was 
broadcast 011 Shanghai television. Subsequently, the central government has approved 
and endorsed media advertisement as a feasible way for generating finances (Stross 
1990). In 1983, the Party advocated a “four-tier policy” (siji ban zhengce
$L), encouraging television to attract local investment. This meant the
decentralisation of financial responsibility from the central administration to 
provincial, city, and coimty levels (Keane 1998b.). By the early 1990s, the state had 
ended most government subsidies for media institutions, as a result of which 
television professionals were forced to cultivate and secure their own sources of 
funding. These Party reform policies were intended to make the television industry 
operate more efficiently and cost-effectively. Under enormous financial pressure, 
popularising television became a part of the agenda for television professionals.
Keane portrays the condition of television under commercialisation:
The deregulation policies which were endorsed in the 1980s enabled television 
to begin to see itself as a communications industry subject to self-regulation 
and market competition more than an ideological apparatus administered and 
funded by the state.
(1998b:477)
Here, Keane points out the increasing necessity since deregulation for the television 
industry to operate in a commercial market. In this sense, the meaning of ‘popular’ 
has changed from any political sense of belonging to ‘the masses’ to more the 
commercially oriented notion of winning the attention of consumers.
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The new objective for making television popular was further supported by the 
developing of a political agenda. Party cultural officials, such as Li Ruihuan, a 
Politburo member, praised the success and popularity of Kewang {Aspiration) (Zha 
1995:28). Wang Meng, Minister of Culture in the 1980s, also publicly supported 
Wang Shuo, a novelist and scriptwriter for the latter’s popular television serials 
Kewang and Bianjibu de Gushi (Keane 1998b: 488). The
concern for audience appeal described in the China Daily article is, therefore, a part of 
this new agenda. In this respect, the commercialisation of television has resulted in a 
shift from conceptualising viewers as an “audience-as public” to an “audience-as- 
market” (Ang 1991:29). Television thus needs to win audience approval by making its 
programmes more appealing to the new viewers of the reform period. Within such a 
framework, the new type of hero emerged on the contemporary Chinese television 
scene.
Relating to the above point, a third point I want to suggest deals with the 
changing socio-political condition of China since 1978. Chinese television since the 
1980s has been changing quite rapidly, with the expansion of an infrastructure for 
production and dissemination, and cultural influences from Hong Kong, Taiwan, 
Japan, South Korea, the United States and Europe. This transformation was reflected 
in the changing concerns and interests of media professionals who are producing 
programmes and also working within structures tied simultaneously to both national 
and commercial interests. Moreover, through exposure to foreign television 
programmes, in particular to popular Japanese and Korean television series, producers 
have faced competition and seen alternative, possibly more appealing, ways of 
producing programmes. Consequently, variation has started to emerge in the 
representation of heroes dining this period.
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In the above-cited China Daily article, the emergence of the televisual 
representation of common people is tied to 1978, the beginning of the ‘reform and 
opening up’ of China. It is noted that since then, the number of television works 
depicting common people’s lives has risen sharply. In 1978, the Party embarked on 
economic reforms, followed by various projects for economic development. As a 
result, the material condition of many people has improved greatly since the 1980s. 
Under the new politico-economic conditions, people’s life experiences have changed 
from time of Lei Feng. So many media professionals have assumed that previous 
communist heroes were no longer effective as models for emulation, since the 
representation of Lei Feng -type communist heroes had become alien to the people in 
present day conditions. Adjusting to the various social changes of the reform period, 
then, the new televisual representation of heroes was believed to best be common 
people like the viewers themselves, depicting their life experiences under new social 
circumstances.
Despite the various changes that have taken place in the realm of television, 
and in particular despite commercialisation and relaxation in the broadcasting 
regulation policy, present-day television, at least in theory, still remains the 
‘mouthpiece of the Party’. In this respect, then, one could assume that the shift 
towards the depiction of common people and their ordinary lives for the new 
televisual representation of heroes is probably not only aimed at winning popular 
support, but also holds a wider ideological implication. But first, in the following 
discussion, I will further examine some actual televisual representations of heroes in 
order to consider what kinds of modern subjects are portrayed as television heroes in 
contemporary China.
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The Representation of Ordinary People on Television
Aspirations is often cited as a successful example of contemporary Chinese 
television drama. In the China Daily article cited at the opening of this chapter, it is 
described that Aspirations’ achievement lies in its depiction of “an array of vivid 
characters, their personal experiences, emotional entanglements and the chemistry
5 8among the main characters”. There is a strong emphasis on the emotions of the 
characters which are believed to be the link with viewers. Then, what are the kinds of 
heroes portrayed in this television drama? It is noted in the same article that “The 
most prominent leading characters are the kind hearted, mild-mannered, pretty young 
woman Liu Huifang (played by Kai Li) and the honest, persevering but reticent 
middle-aged man Song Dacheng (played by Li Xuejian)”. From such remarks, we 
could state there are a hero called Song Dacheng and a heroine called Liu Huifang, 
both of whom appear to be positive and morally good subjects. We can go further 
and say that in the representation of Liu Huifang, perhaps the more feminine qualities 
of kind -hearted, mild, and pretty are emphasised, while the hero Song Dacheng is 
portrayed as persevering and yet reticent, an image often used for describing a manly 
man. So the gender difference between the hero and heroine appears to be quite 
explicit in then representations. In this respect, their representations differ from the 
image of Lei Feng who is a model to be emulated by both women and men, and 
whose gender has, as a consequence, been played down. In fact, we hardly know 
anything about Lei Feng’s personality other than he was dedicated, diligent, and hard­
working in relation to the Party.
58 Aspirations has been widely discussed by various scholars (E.g. Barme 1999, Rofel 1994, Zha 1995,
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Aspirations is a fifty-episode television serial produced by Beijing Television 
Arts Centre and broadcast on many major television stations in 1991. The story 
covers the lives of two Beijing families during and after the Cultural Revolution: the 
Lius are an ordinary working-class family living in a traditional courtyard house, 
whereas the Wangs are an elite intellectual family living in a modern apartment. At 
the height of Cultural Revolution fanaticism, Wang Husheng, the son of Wang family, 
is sent down to a local factory to do manual labour. There he meets Liu Huifang, the 
daughter of Lius, who is an epitome of virtue and self-sacrifice. Despite having a 
long-standing admirer in a man called Song Dacheng, Huifang marries Husheng, and 
the couple have a son. Meanwhile, Husheng’s sister Wang Yam has secretly given 
birth to a child by her lover, Luo Gang, another intellectual who has been arrested by 
the Red Guard and sent off to labour camp. As a result of this, Yaru abandons the 
baby, Xiao Fang, who is taken in by Huifang, who then raises her. Over time, as 
China goes through socio-political changes, Huifang and Husheng’s marriage falls 
apart, and they end up divorcing. The story ends with a tragic scene tragic in which 
Huifang loses custody of her son in the divorce trial, and Xiao Fang is sent back to her 
natal parent -  Yam, who then gets hit by a car and is paralysed.
By looking at this brief synopsis of Aspirations, one could wonder how this 
television series can be the portrayal of common people’s lives. Neither Liu Huifang, 
who is portrayed as an epitome of virtue and self-sacrifice, nor the plot of the story 
which is, I would say, overly dramatic, seems to represent ordinary people or their 
lives. Then, what is it about this television series that could be described as the 
representation of ordinary people? The depiction of common people’s lives in 
Aspirations seems to lie in the portrayal of personal feelings -  particularly ‘desire’ or
Wang 1999). This comment is noted in the above -cited China D aily  article, though I have excluded
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‘aspiration’ presented through different characters, which gives us the title of the 
drama Kewang Other notable themes include marriage, children, power and
betrayal. All these could be experienced in different forms in the lives of common 
people then and in contemporary China. As Barme notes,
This soap opera created of something of a China in miniature: it depicted a 
world of frustration, half-truths, goodness abused, betrayal, social hierarchy, 
and selfishness masquerading as self-sacrifice. The clash between two 
families, through focus on a child, involved a range of highly emotive issues 
concerning privilege, education, class background, and the sense of self-worth. 
It displayed the abiding tensions between the haves and have-nots, and the 
masses and the cardres (here thinly disguised as intellectuals) in Chinese 
society.
(1999a:102)
In the previous representation of communist heroes, such complicated differentiations 
and emotional entanglements existing among people were concealed. At the time, the 
good and bad, right and wrong are all very clearly marked on the basis of political 
stance. Yet, the popularity of Aspirations has suggested that the experiences of 
ordinary people are not so clear-cut, and viewers are eager to see alternative views of 
life on television. Characters in this drama, therefore, brought out varieties of 
previously untold, and often negative, experiences of ordinary people that were absent 
in the positive and monotonous representation of communist heroes. In this sense, the 
drama has depicted the lives and emotions of ordinary people, and as a result, 
appealed to popular taste.
As a more recent example of successful drama, the China Daily article 
mentions Hold My Hand (Qian Shon an eighteen-part TV series broadcast on
CCTV in the spring of 1999. In comparison to Aspirations, one could probably say
the opening extract.
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that Hold My Hand is more down to earth, even though there are still elements of 
melodrama involved, particularly since the plot revolves around a love triangle.59 
The characters in this drama are portrayed as ordinary people who have both good and 
bad sides. They can be tempted by common desires and sometimes make mistakes. 
Perhaps there could be a debate on whether to call these characters heroes. The point 
I want to make is that there are various kinds of narratives and commentaries in 
magazines and newspapers which create a closure in terms of how the audience 
should engage with these characters and what to learn from them -  which resembles 
articles on Lei Feng and other models in the 1960s and 1970s commenting on how to 
learn from them. In this respect there is at least an attempt at making its protagonists 
into heroes or heroines. Xia Xiaoxue, the main character, serves the heroic function 
which 1 have discussed in Chapter 1.
Figure 3.01
Screenshot: the im age o f  Xia 
X iaoxue, the main character o f  
te lev ision  drama series < Q ian  
Shou >
(From B eijing Qingnian Bao, 
1999/5/5 . p. 11)
The story revolves around the marriage crises of middle-aged urban Chinese 
couples and the issue of adultery. The computer technician Zhong Rui is very busy 
with his work, and neglects his family. Xia Xiaoxue is a laid-off worker who devotes
Here I use the term ‘melodrama’ to refer to the feature o f  placing strong emotions in the everyday 
interpersonal world.
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herself to her family, and grows increasingly impatient with her husband’s neglect.
To make matters worse, Zhong Rui has an affair with a young colleague Wang Chun, 
who gets pregnant with his child and ends up having an abortion. Finding out about 
her husband’s affair, Xiaoxue agrees to get a divorce. Wang Chun goes to stay with 
her best friend who happens to be Xiaoxue’s younger sister. While staying at her best 
friend’s home, Wan Chun witnesses Xiaoxue being an “exceptional wife” (yige 
youxin de qizi and suffering because of Zhong Rui’ infidelity.60
Wang Chun then decides to leave the city. Meanwhile, Xiaoxue works hard to pass a 
job -qualification test and gets employed by a joint venture as a translator. While 
Xiaoxue works, Zhong Rui takes care of their son -  and through this exchange of 
roles, each learns what the other has gone through while one has been working or 
looking after the home. Despite divorce, Zhong Rui and Xia Xiaoxue still have 
feelings for each other and the series ends with suggesting they will reconcile and get 
back together.
Such a representation of characters differs very much from the incorruptible 
perfect heroes of the Maoist period. One commentator writes in Beijing Television 
Weekly, “They are all ordinary people (pntongren and none of them is
perfect”.61 There are no absolute right or wrong characters, as ordinary people are not 
perfect. Unlike in the representation of communist heroes, the new representations of 
heroes incorporate human weakness and shortcomings, and what is right and wrong is 
highly ambiguous. Yet at the same time, at the end of the series, it seems that all 
three of them leam from their mistakes, and the drama ends on a positive note. In
60 Many comments on this programme in television magazines and newspapers describe Xia Xiaoxue 
as an exceptional w ife and fine woman as I have pointed out in the main text, so this reading is one I 
share with many commentators, eg. Beijing Television Weekly. Issue 14 (12/4-18/4), pp.20.
61 From “Dense Feeling o f H old M y Hand''' (Nongnong Qian Shou Qing by Li Baojiang,
Beijing Television Weekly, 5th May. p. 31. Translation is mine.
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particular the representation of Xia Xiaoxue as an ‘exceptional wife’ and her approach 
to life’s difficulties set out an exemplary model. In this respect, these characters still 
serve a didactic purpose.
The Beijing Television Weekly commentator further notes that one of the 
reasons this programme has attained enormous popularity is because it “vividly and 
exquisitely portrayed a group of colourful and lively characters, who are just like your 
family, your friends, and your colleagues”. This television drama attempts to portray 
lives of ordinary urban people in present-day China. And the topics taken up in this 
drama are all very common social issues -adultery, divorce, moral dilemmas, 
financial issues, and even the relatively recent issue of laid-off workers. At the same 
time as this programme was broadcast on television, there was a great deal of public 
debate on the themes of marriage, adultery and divorce in newspapers and magazines 
coming from the many viewers who had shared similar experiences. Such reactions 
suggest how common these issues are. The depiction of these issues at the personal 
level had been neglected in previous social realist dramas, which were oriented 
toward portraying public issues related to the accomplishment of a communist utopia. 
The characters in Hold My Hand shed light on the often-vulnerable and imperfect side 
of human nature through the portrayal of the quotidian dilemmas which ordinary 
people face, and thereby broaden the scope of ordinary people’s lives beyond ‘red’ 
and white.
Another example of popular television drama I want to discuss is Garrulous 
Zhang Damin’s Happy Life (Pinzui Zhang Damin de Xingfu Shenghuo t u i j t l
This twenty-episode drama was produced jointly by Beijing Television
Art Centre and Beijing Television. Garrulous Zhang Damin is a family drama and 
also a tragicomedy, and its storyline is relatively straightforward. The drama centres
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on the humble life of its hero Zhang Damin -  how he pursues small pleasures in life, 
and gets through difficulties and tragedies. As with the other two programmes we 
have discussed, there was much debate and commentary in newspapers and 
magazines about the implications of Zhang Damin. Damin is a chubby and warm 
character, and known in the neighbourhood for his garrulousness. He is in his early 
30s and works for a state -owned thermos flask factory. He lives in a small and 
crammed traditional courtyard house with his mother, two sisters, and two brothers, 
and is later joined by his wife Yunfang and their son. As Darnin’s father died when 
he was young, Damin, as the eldest son, filled the role of father and looked after his 
family.
Damin wins the heart of his childhood sweetheart who is dumped by a rich 
and successful man. People around him see him as a desperate substitute, but Damin 
is content and his sincerity reaches Yunfang. The couple struggles to find privacy and 
time of their own but keep getting caught up in the problems of their family members. 
Along the way, one of Darnin’ sister gets divorced, and his other sister suffers from 
leukaemia. Even then he does not give up his optimistic attitude towards life.
Despite all the attempts to save his younger sister, she eventually passes away. The 
characters portrayed in Garrulous are all lower-income ordinary people in Beijing. 
The youngest brother, after the second attempt, finally gets into the university owing 
much to Damin for all the support he has provided. This brother then gets a job at the 
Agricultural Ministry, but forgets all the things Damin has done for him, and even 
looks down on him for his uneducated and low social background. Yet, Damin does 
not lose his concern and love for his younger brother. Darnin’s life is an endless 
attempt to overcome the difficulties and gloomy realities that life presents to him. 
Centring on Damin, the drama presents the lives of common people, and how they
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cope with a variety o f  everyday challenges.
Figure 3.02
Screenshot: the main character 
Zhang Damin from telev ision  
drama series < P in zu i Zhang  
D am in cie Xinfu Shenghno>  
(From the w eb site sina.com , 
2001)
Figure 3.03
Screenshot: the im age o f  D am in and his w ife , Yunfang from telev ision  drama series 
< P inzu i Zhang D am in d e  Xinfu Shenghuo>
(From  the w eb site sina.com , 2 0 01 )
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One of the main features of this drama is conversation between characters, 
particularly Zhang Darnin’s speech. It utilises ordinary people’s everyday language
f }and common knowledge, and twists them to add humour. Because of such 
dialogues, in spite of Darnin’s rather gloomy life, the drama has a sense of optimism. 
For instance, one episode deals with the serious social issue, at the time, of housing. 
Damin’s younger brother is planning to get married. As the young couple does not 
have a place of their own, they will have to live with Damin’s family in the crammed 
house. This marriage, therefore, presents a practical family problem, because there is 
no room for the married couple to put their newly purchased double bed, as the whole 
family is packed into two rooms. So the rest of the story is about how Damin comes 
up with a way of making a room for young couple’s double bed so that they can get 
married. Darnin’s dream is to build a small room where he and his wife can have 
their private space. This touches in a humorous way on the common and yet serious 
issue of housing in Beijing, particularly for lower- income people. During my 
fieldwork, one of the main topics of conversation I heard when travelling by public 
transport was the inability to purchase houses. They are far too expensive for 
ordinary people -  the most frequently heard phrase was "labciixing mai buqi
” (“Ordinary people cannot afford it”). Since 1997, when the state abolished
housing support by the work unit, the issue of housing has become an even more 
serious concern for many people. As in the drama, Darnin’s family deals with their 
problems and sorts out their own situations in humorous and clever ways. Yet it is 
clear in this television drama that none of them presents any ultimate solution for such 
common issues of the lower-class people.
Everyone in Damin’s family is a worker, apart from his youngest brother, and
62 This speech style is quite common in Beijing. For instance, there is a popular form o f  comedy talk
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each earns only a small income. They are constantly facing financial difficulties. 
They are left behind in the modern competition of the post-reform economy. In this 
sense, this drama sheds light on the lives of the great majority of people who haven’t 
found economic reform an empowering experience, contrary to the commonly 
depicted image of reform. Garrulous Zhang Damin's Happy Life presents the 
alternative experience of economic reform and lives in contemporary urban China 
from the point of view of ordinary people from a lower-class background. Whether 
this TV series faithfully presents the point view of families like this in Beijing, 
however, is open to further discussion which I intend to pursue in Chapter 4.
Like Xia Xiaoxue from Hold My Hands, Zhang Damin is not necessarily a 
model for emulation in an authentic Lei Feng way, although some commentators 
argue that what viewers can learn is Darnin’s optimistic spirit when coping with 
difficulties. One Chinese article claimed that the representation of Zhang Damin 
touched the feelings of great number of the people who are in the same situation. A 
Chinese scholar, Wang Xuetai, notes,
Some people see Zhang Damin as “backward” (luohou fenzi with
negative effects, but the main creative persona was never expected to be 
criticised as being backward. In reality, when an author portrays the hard life 
of ordinary people (putongren jlfiilA)-- their joys, anger, sadness, and 
happiness — the representation of heroes never constitutes heroic characters 
(yongxiong yuezhang as expected by the theorist. When these
characters actually exist amongst us, however, they touch the heart of the 
ordinary masses (putong minzhong
(2000:13)63
It is suggested here that the televisual representation of Zhang Damin is not just an 
imperfect subject, but actually a backward one. Some critics even think that it may
called Xiangsheng which uses similar wordplay.
63 From “RangLaobaixing Zuoge Putongren i l l^ 'B  ifek'feSt'L iK iE A ” (Let Laobaixing be an ordinary
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have a negative effect on people, rather than serving as an emulation model. Yet 
Wang Xuetai argues that Darnin’s optimistic spirit and ability to cope with difficulties 
are something that audiences can copy, and that have touched the hearts of viewers 
who can share his emotions and hardships. It is interesting to note that, as I mentioned 
in my discussion of the term hero in the previous chapter, the character is talked about 
in terms of what effect they have 011 viewers, rather than simply who they are. In the 
above comment, Wang Xuetai implicitly suggests that the changing representation of 
heroes is from behavioural exemplars to subjects who influence and guide people 
through emotions. Zhang Damin, then, represents a new kind of hero.
The three programmes discussed above in this section have all achieved wide 
popularity with television audiences.64 Each has portrayed varieties of characters, 
even though my examination here is necessarily limited and incomplete. It is 
debatable whether we can call these characters new society’s heroes, but at the 
minimum they all fulfil the heroic function discussed in Chapter 1. These characters 
are all portrayed in the media with an expectation of having a positive impact on their 
viewers. In this respect, these characters are heroes as I have defined in the previous 
chapter. What is common to all these kinds of heroes is that they are all ordinary 
people, though the representation of ordinary people in these programmes varies 
greatly, from the Lei Feng- like kind- hearted heroine Liu Huifang to the rather 
backward, yet positive and optimistic Zhang Damin. All of them are vehicles for 
strong sentiments which allow audiences to relate the characters to their own lives.
In this respect, a new representation of heroes has emerged on the post-reform
person), in Southern Weekends (Nanfang Zhotnno jul ^ ) .  30/11/2000, pp.13. Translation and 
emphasis are mine.
64 The latter two examples were extremely popular in Beijing. Although I cannot comment on what 
was the case for other regions, at least, some articles in newspapers and television magazines note that 
they were popular throughout China. As for the phenomenal popularity o f  Aspirations, it has been 
noted by several scholars.
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television scene, replacing the previous communist heroes from the 1950s and 1960s, 
and it seems to have appealed to viewers’ tastes. Ordinary people seem to hold the 
key for the new heroes on contemporary Chinese television.
Laobaixing ^  W Ordinary People
The background images that play dining the opening theme song of the 
television drama series Us Ordinary People (Zan Laobaixing I'lil ^  WMi) portray 
images of businessmen, construction workers, peasants, mothers, children, family 
gatherings, high technology items, old women, good-luck symbols (fit hung upside 
down), marriages, eating together, the underground railway, Chang’an Avenue.65 
These images remind one of daily life in Beijing. The term ‘laobaixing Mi’ or
‘baixing is the most common way by which people refer to themselves and how 
people are addressed in various media. Laobaixing, composed of character lao as a 
suffix to express familiarity, bai meaning hundred and xing meaning surnames, was 
originally a term used to refer to the nobles in classical Chinese. After the Warring 
States period (475- 221 BC), laobaixing came to be a common way of referring to 
ordinary people.66
According to the Xinhua dictionary, the term laobaixing refers to
everyone excluding public servants or officials. However, the ways in which 
laobaixing M: is used that I encountered during my fieldwork are more 
complicated and context -dependent than this lexical definition. For instance, when I
65 The main road in central Beijing, running east to west along the northern edge o f  Tiananmen Square.
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interviewed Zhu Yuanliang, chief editor of CCTV’s Television Research (.Dianshi 
Yanjin magazine, he commented that the main audience for news
programming consists of cadres in national organisations, leaders of various 
companies, and highly educated people - in other words, those who are often 
recognised to be power holders. He stated further that dramas are popular among 
common ordinary people (putong laobaixing such as housewives,
workers, those who have low educational backgrounds, and people with low standards 
of living. If Laobaixing is supposed to be the category which embraces all these 
varieties of people, then what does this term ‘common ordinary people’ (putong 
laobaixing actually mean? Why it is necessary to add ‘common’
(putong to ordinary people? According to Zhu Yuanliang, even though
laobaixing is by definition everyone, including the cadres and intellectuals, the actual 
usage it is often confined to lower social strata, especially those with little education. 
In the post -reform period, people have become increasingly differentiated by income 
as well as by geographical factors (urban/rural), educational level, and social status. 
Therefore, where to draw the boundary between who is and is not laobaixing 
is not as clear-cut as the definition given in the dictionary.
The meaning of the term laobaixing therefore, is contextually relative
and relational. So instead of determining who they are, perhaps the crucial point to 
consider here is a question of when people are being laobaixing. Laobaixing 
could be anyone when people eat, gather with family, watch television -  engaging in 
all sorts of activities in their daily lives. In this sense, for instance, Party officials can 
also be considered as laobaixing 3k Yf 33 when they are at home watching television
66 From Cilia i fif #5. 1989. Shanghai Cishu Chubanshe 3 : '/3f3 Tj tH life f t .
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with their families, even though strictly speaking they are not a part of laobaixing by 
definition. The term laobaixing A  U jfck implies some kind of humbleness and a cosy
side of ordinary people’s lives. In recent years, there has been an increasing tendency 
for people to start classifying themselves within a particular class category, yet, 
people in general still refer to themselves as laobaixing ^  WMi.67 Most of those I
met in my fieldwork addressed themselves casually as laobaixing A]=f M:. in our 
everyday conversations.
The term ‘ laobaixing escapes specific references to occupational,
economical, or political class distinctions that the term 'renmin A H  (the people)’ 
may have.68 In his essay “Zhongguo Gemingyu Zhongguo Gongchandang H |I| AArt 
0  AMAH’ (“The Chinese Revolution and the Chinese Communist Party” 1939), 
Mao Zedong used the term renmin A H , the components of which are ren A  as 
human kind in general, a specific person, or people, and min A  also meaning human
kind in general and a classical character for the common people, to refer to the 
following groups of people: intellectuals and students (apart Rom those who were 
close to the imperialists and capitalists and opposed the people); urban poor, such as 
factory workers and entrepreneurs; workers for governmental organizations; and also 
small businessmen. In this definition, it is clear that the term renmin AH: does not 
refer to everyone, but is applicable only to the working masses, the main body of the 
new nation of the People’s Republic of China. Both the landlord class (dizhu jieji Mi
AlAt$) and the capitalist class (ziben jieji ^  APMIS) are to varying degrees excluded
67 Quite a few people indicated in general conversation the class to which they belong. — The most 
commonly heard ones are middle class (zhong ceng lP M )), upper -middle class (zhog-gao ceng T  inj 
M ), and those widiout class {pingmin T  hi). Pingmin T  K: could also refer to the proletariat.
68 O f course, one could argue that such particular subject position itself is a political construction, but it
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from this category. They are, instead, defined as the enemy (diren jSSfc A) of ‘the 
people’ of the Chinese nation.69 The term dazhong A A , literally meaning a big 
collective of people, also often appears in Mao’s writings. Dazhong A $ ; is 
commonly used to refer to ‘the masses’ or ‘the people’, though in comparison to the 
term renmin AEA may have a more general application in referring to the masses or 
commoners of different occupational backgrounds. In both terminologies, ordinary 
people are defined on the basis of political background and particular class, so the 
ordinary people are assumed to be political subjects. The category of laobaixing A  IT 
Wc plays down differences in politically constituted subjective positions, and 
emphasises the sense of political indifference.
Luo Gang, a social scientist based in Shanghai, assumes that ‘ordinary people’ 
plays on the link between ‘the people’ (renmin AK;) and ‘the masses’ {dazhong A  A: 
). He writes,
“Ordinary people” {laobaixing A flA t) has to break through the frame of 
politically-centred language, and let the abstract notion of “people” {renmin A  
Pi) return to its original condition that is truer to the lives of non-identical 
individuals. At the same time, the term differentiates itself from the notion of 
“the masses” {dazhong A  A ) which are the target of fashionable culture 
{linxing wenhua YJuA? A'A)- (2000:154)
has a quite different kind o f  political implication.
69 The categorization o f  ‘enemy’ changes with time, and as a result, the content o f  renmin also changes. 
Many o f  those who were originally in the category o f  renmin, especially intellectuals {zhishifenzi $11 ill 
A T ) ,  came to be defined as enemies in the later years o f the revolution. The position o f  intellectuals in 
China is very complicated. At the beginning o f the communist era, intellectuals were held as leaders o f  
the Chinese revolution. Following the Anti-Rightist campaign, and particularly during the Cultural 
Revolution, however, intellectuals were purged in ongoing anti-intellectual campaigns. They have 
been defined as the enemy o f  the people and called the ‘stinking ninth category’. However, in the 
Reform period o f the 1980s, their position was restored again, though perhaps only to make their status 
even more complicated. In 1978, the leader o f  the CCP, Deng Xiaoping, claimed that highly educated 
experts were to be considered as part o f  the ‘socialist working class’, saying that mental labour is no 
different from physical labour and should therefore be privileged to the same kind o f  political trust 
(Schwartz 1995:248). Officially, intellectuals are incorporated back into the category o f  renmin A  A  
yet this seems to apply only to new intellectuals called ‘technocrats’, who possess particular skills.
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According to this definition, the term ‘ordinary people’ is concerned with and 
recognises a more personalised reality, and breaks away from the realm of politics. 
Moreover, what is implied here is that the category of ‘people’ does not recognise 
individual differences, while ‘ordinary people’ assumes people to be non-identical.
At the same time, the notion of ‘ordinary people’ differentiates itself from the term 
‘the masses’ as the consumers of popular culture.70 In other words, ‘ordinary people’ 
is neither a politically or commercially implicit term, but used by people to refer to 
themselves. In this respect, the term ‘ordinary people’ takes a humanistic stance, and 
perhaps implies the growing awareness of civil society in contemporary China. 
However, whether this increasing frequency of televisual representations of ordinary 
people means any growth in power for those people is open to further discussion, 
which I will take up in the next chapter.
On a different take of ‘ordinary people’, Wang Yi claims that the term baixing 
pingmin f f K  is a fairly recent category that emerged in relation to popular 
culture developed during the 1990s. She defines ‘ordinary people’ by drawing on 
Fiske’s definition of ‘people,’ as a huge variety of social groups that are relatively 
powerless and “accommodating themselves with, or opposing themselves to, the 
dominant value system in a variety of ways” (1999:224). Ordinary people, according 
to Wang Yi, have differentiated cultural forms and interests of their own from those 
the intellectuals promoted in the 1980s. She notes, they “have retained material, as 
well as ideological, differences usually through devalued cultural forms... like 
television drama” (1999:224). It is interesting to note that Wang Yi sees the
70 It seems that, in this context, Luo Gang takes the notion o f ‘the masses’ (dazhong A  A )  as 
consumers o f  mass culture in the sense the Frankfurt school has viewed it, rather than the ways in 
which the term has been used in Chinese to refer to mass culture (<dazhong wenlma A A A f t ) ,
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television drama as ‘devalued cultural forms’ which belong to the ordinary people, 
while television in China has long been the ‘mouth-piece of the Party’ and television 
drama has served the state ideological apparatus. I will look further into how 
television drama since the 1990s has served the interests of ordinary people in the 
later part of this thesis.
The way in which laobaixing are defined here presents a different
view from my take of the term discussed above. Ordinary people in this definition 
remind one of those people who adopt tactics in their everyday lives to resist 01* 
oppose dominant values and ideology by making do with what is available -  as 
depicted in de Certeau’s The Practice o f Everyday Life (1984) or in Scott’s Weapon of 
the Weak (1990). In this respect, one could depict ordinary people as against the state, 
01* in Wang Yi’s view, the intellectuals, Wang Yi assumes that ordinary people are 
powerless and less privileged, and in her definition intellectuals are excluded from the 
term baixing 15*Mi. Yet, as I have already mentioned, in the actual usage of the term,
laobaixing ^  "@*M refers to broader ranges of people.71 In this thesis, then, I will use
the term laobaixing in a less dialectic way than the one Wang Yi suggests.
The Televisual Representation of Heroes in the Post-Reform Period
In recent years, there have been a number of debates among Chinese scholars
meaning a more grassroots popular culture without the sense o f consumers in the Maoist time.
71 For instance, most o f  the teachers at Beijing Broadcasting Institute viewed themselves as a part o f  
the laobaixing M:. and often talked about the audience by referring to them as “women laobaixing 
(“we the ordinary people”), even though they are highly educated people by ordinary 
standards in China.
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and journalists on how to represent heroes on television.72 In these debates, previous 
communist heroes are set up as the antithesis of the new representation of heroes.
The most frequently pointed out problem about previous heroes is the unrealistic way 
in which Maoist heroes were represented, which is so out of tune with the current 
social conditions that people feel alien to them. For instance, Zhang Xiaoqian, a 
scholar at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, says of the representation of 
heroes from the late 1950s and 1960s,
.. .heroes (yingxiong renwu 3^$= A ^ )  have often been raised too high, 
granted abstract ideological values, and given a deifiedflavour. ... heroes in 
those TV dramas at the time are respectable, but hardly appear intimate... 
Heroes like these have kept the audience away from them, and generated an 
oppositional and counter mentality.
(1996:176)73
Here, Zhang criticises heroes for, first of all, being raised unrealistically high, to the 
point of being deified. Secondly, heroes were portrayed with a single dimension of 
ideological implication, and therefore did not share the life of this world. Thirdly, 
these heroes were criticised for lacking in human feelings. Zhang, thereby, pointed to 
the ineffectiveness and lack of appeal of Maoist communist heroes. Many scholars 
seem to agree that, no longer able to fulfil the function of inspiring and establishing 
emulation models for the people, communist heroes from the 1950s and 1960s are and 
should be pushed out of the spotlight. Thus, the new representation of heroes has 
emerged out of necessity, as the previous representation of communist heroes has 
become anachronistic.
In addition, what was previously assumed to be the representation of how any 
ordinary communist person should be is now claimed to be unrealistic and made too
72 Eg. Zhang Xiaoqiang 1996, Luo Gang2000, Wang Xuetai 2000, Yue Xiaodong 2000.
73 Translation and emphases are mine.
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perfect. Zhang, in this article, even goes so far as to say that they have been deified.
It is worth remembering that, as I discussed in the previous chapter, Lei Feng was also 
portrayed as an ordinary person back in the 1960s. Taking a similar position to 
Zhang, in his article “Let laobaixing be an ordinary person”, Wang Xuetai, the scholar 
at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences cited above, traces how the representation 
of ordinary persons, laobaixing as the reification of an ideal subject assumed
by the Party had became a common exercise in art and literature after the Great Leap 
Forward.74 He also makes the criticism that ‘common workers’ {putong laodongzhe 
from the 1950s were transcended high above the ordinary people, even
in comparison to other revolutionaries. Thus, in that respect, Lei Feng’s ordinariness 
is not ordinary in the contemporary sense. The crucial point in Zhang’s comment is, 
however, that the appropriateness of the discursive practice of heroes has yet to be 
denied, or even questioned.
Zhang Xiaoqiang (1996) further discusses the televisual representation of 
ordinary people. He notes, firstly, that compared to previous heroes, ordinary 
people’s lives are simple and unadorned; they utter no brave words nor make 
earthshaking outstanding achievements. Secondly, he states that the ordinariness of 
common people lies in their ‘mixed-colours,’ which refer to both their merits and 
shortcomings, good and bad, superiority and inferiority, black and white, often all 
intertwined together. Finally, Zhang notes, ordinary people often have obvious 
weakness in their thoughts, and have some kind of shortcomings in their character. 
Similarly, on the representation of contemporary heroes, Zhang Shaoling, a well- 
known director, notes,
74 From “Rang Laobaixing Znoge Putongren i t ' t '  'h'iifi A ”, in Southern Weekends (Nanfang 
Zhoumo 30/11/2000, P. 13
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one must first make the hero ( y in g x io n g  r e n w u  A ^ A ^ )  be an ordinary 
person, a person with various kinds of emotions and desires, and let heroes be 
real in front of the audience, be familiar and approachable, for them to be a 
vivid artistic form, and only in this way succeed in allowing the audience to 
open their minds to like him, to recognise him, and to be influenced by him
75
In these descriptions, the new televisual representation of heroes assumes a more 
rounded and complicated subjectivity, with a mix of both weaknesses and strengths, 
as with those television characters I have already discussed. The new representation 
of heroes is constructed as the antithesis of those heroes of the 1950s and 1960s 
discussed here, so as to be more realistic and appeal to the audience. Such an 
orientation of popular appeal is a new criterion for state- promoted heroes in the 
reform period. Yet, it is worth pointing out that the fundamental role of heroes from 
the 1950s and 1960s - to influence the audience - has not changed, and is still 
expected of such contemporary heroes.
At the same time, the televisual representation of heroes was not portrayed in 
any odd popular form. What is perhaps particular to China is that, because of the 
importance of heroes to the Communist Party discussed in Chapter 2, there are certain 
ways of representing heroes on television, though the question of who makes such a 
formula and how is not at all clear. In one of the classes at the BBI, for instance, Mr 
Chu, who taught a TV programme commentary (jiemu cihua tT PI class, once 
said it is easy to portray heroes on television, because one only has to follow a ‘set 
narrative’ {tciohna ^ iA ).76 According to Mr Chu heroes {yingxiong renwu A ^A 'j^ /)
75 This passage was quoted in Zhang Xiaoqiang 1996:181 Translation is mine
76 By saying ‘set’, I do not mean that this is the only ‘proper’ way o f representing heroes on television, 
or that it is written as a television regulation. What I mean here is in the sense o f  being taken as a set 
narrative that was taught at the BBI during my course. It is also a way frequently recommended in 
textbooks as how to represent heroes on television, Taofma literally means a “set speech”.
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are supposed to be described following the formula below:77
1. Start from the description of some great thing he or she did — perhaps 
illustrate one particular incident as an example.
2. Describe background of what has happened.
3. Describe his or her academic career and work background.
4. Portray family background.
5. Illustrate how he or she was working.
6. Comment on his or her contribution to the larger environment {da huanjing
7. Perhaps portray his or her character (gexing ''M i), such as speaking ability 
or personal charm etc.
The overall emphasis is on what heroes have achieved that can influence viewers5 
feelings and induce familiarities. I want to point out that the notion of heroes implicit 
in this set narrative refers to some of the heroic functions I mentioned in Chapter 2. 
Mr Chu further suggested that each of the items above should have details that 
illustrate styles and characters (fengge gexing that highlight the originality
of heroes. He claimed that the story could be told in three ways:
1. Through the voice of a reporter introducing heroes which is a way Mr Chu 
thinks is the best as a person who is reporting, describes the hero.
2. In an objective {keguan way that is often used to portray government 
-promoted heroes -  described in the third person.
3. A hero's self portrait - I ,  as a hero myself, describe myself.
In the first option, because the hero is discussed by another person who is believed to 
hold an ‘objective5 stance, the story is opened up to the viewers, and yet still 
maintains some of the author's authority for the claim of value for heroes and their 
heroic acts. In the second option, as the reading of plot is given in the narrative, it
77 It could be further argued that claiming such a set narrative is an attempt by the Communist Party to 
draw closure on the idea o f  heroes, by restricting the ways in which heroes are represented. This seems 
to suggest that it is not important who the hero is, but what is crucial about the representation o f  heroes
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closes down room for individual reading. The third option may be seen as too 
subjective and therefore not so convincing to the viewers. Mr Chu has also pointed 
out that interviews with the people around heroes -  such as his or her friends, 
colleagues, classmates or family, will be a good method for creating the objective 
effect in describing the achievements of heroes.
In this set narrative, the implication of heroic deeds is located in the actual 
context of people’s lives and described through the voices of various people existing 
in society. The emphasis on portraying a hero’s personal characteristics and social 
relations indicates that the hero is a person existing in this world, no longer a ‘screw’ 
of the Communist Party like previous communist heroes. Perhaps one could also 
draw from this set narrative that what constitutes objectivity has shifted from the 
unchallengeable voice of the third person, which was the Party, to the multiple voices 
of various people surrounding heroes. In this sense, heroes are not simply imposed on 
viewers as a given reality, there is at least an attempt in the set narrative to make 
heroes more appealing and accessible to the audience. In this sense, one could argue 
that the relationship between heroes and the audience is also changing in 
contemporary China.
The Relationship between Heroes and the Audience
Up to this point, I have discussed how communist heroes from the 1950s and 
1960s are being replaced by the representation of ordinary people in contemporary 
Chinese television, and that ordinary people are no longer portrayed as ideal subjects
is the way in which heroes are constructed in the narrative. To what extent this formula is applied in
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assumed by the Party for emulation by the masses. I have also argued that there is 
much emphasis on personal experiences, feelings and voices in the televisual 
representation of ordinary people, instead of the heroic deeds and achievements 
portrayed in the representation of Lei Feng type heroes. Moreover, the new 
representation of heroes assumes variety, and ordinary people are presented as if from 
the point of view of ordinary people. Heroes are no longer elevated ideal subjects 
assumed by the Party for the people to look up to and to emulate subserviently. In the 
new televisual representation, heroes and the audience stand on equal ground.
In order to elaborate this point, I shall present a conversation I had with Shi 
Dong, a yoimg scriptwriter and a lecturer at Central Drama Academy in Beijing. He 
has great passion for and knowledge of literature, and is innovative in his creation of 
drama. I think of Shi Dong as a romantic and sensitive person. I met him when I 
was taking a TV production course at the Beijing Broadcasting Institute and he came 
to give a lecture on idol drama (Ouxiangju fPHI^.1) which shared some similar 
themes with my study of the televisual representation of heroes.78 We have been 
good friends since.
One day in September, 1999, over lunch in Dongsi, Shi Dong told me a story 
about his actor friend. A few years ago this actor was interviewed by a newspaper 
journalist who asked his opinion on the phenomena of the declining popularity of the 
revolutionary hero drama on television, as the current younger-generation audience 
prefers idol dramas or the isi da tianwang (‘four heavenly kings’) .
the actual production is another issue to be examined and I shall look at this point further in Chapter 5.
78 Shi Dong defines idol drama, ouxiangju , as a television drama which makes you want to be like the 
hero o f the drama. It is about people you like, admire, and want to emulate, and could range from 
revolutionary hero dramas (including ones which are about previous leaders like Mao), war films, and 
historical dramas, to current love stories. In this sense, his idea o f idols fulfils the heroic function 
which I discussed in the previous chapter. This definition may be slightly original. In the common 
usage, ouxiangju i'AiWM often is used as youth and idol drama, qingchun ouxiangju  and
refers to dramas which are associated with commercial culture; their predominant themes are love,
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According to Shi Dong, the journalist expected the actor, being famous for his roles in 
revolutionary hero dramas, to say that it was a bad trend. However, the actor replied 
that he thought it was a very good phenomenon, because the audience now had its 
own sense of ‘self in choosing whichever idol which serves and entertains them, even 
a pop-star. In the past, the relationship between idols (ouxiang jPH§0 and the 
audience was different since the idols -  whether they were leaders, politicians, 01* 
revolutionary heroes— were all positioned as superior to the audience, so the audience 
was supposed to look up to and admire them. Thus, idols always transcended the 
ordinary people. Now, Shi Dong claimed, the new relationship between the audience 
and the idols is based on equality. Young people nowadays could and would freely 
choose as an idol whomever they admire, listen to songs of a particular idol they like 
and watch his or her performance on the screen.
This conversation suggests two points about the new relationship between 
heroes and their followers. First, people can choose their own heroes. During the 
Maoist period, it was the Party which decided who was to be the hero for the people, 
so at the individual level there was no choice but to accept the heroes promoted by the 
Party. In the Chapter 2, for instance, I described Mr Zhang’s experience with the 
Party -promoted heroine of Beijing, Li Suli, and how he felt that he had no choice but 
to accept Li Suli after being exposed to a great deal of media promotion of her as a 
new heroine. But now, Shi Dong claims, people have choices in deciding who is to 
be their hero, hence the domain of heroes has broadened. Thus, heroes have 
increasingly become an indeterminate category in contemporary China.
Secondly, contemporary heroes exist on equal ground with ordinary people, 
though at the same time, Shi Dong has stressed that an important thing in the idol
relationships, and youth.
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drama is the capacity to inspire the audience. Shi Dong argued that the significance 
of heroes (ouxiang iPHIO lies in their giving an ideal to young people without placing
themselves above the audience. Shi Dong’s point is that in contemporary times no 
one is saying that one has to admire or look up to particular heroes. Now heroes 
themselves have to possess some kind of quality that can inspire and appeal to the 
audience. Those qualities are not necessarily the commitment to the Party or great 
revolutionary causes that are often embodied in the representation of Lei Feng type 
communist heroes, but are inspirational quality, popularity, and marketability which 
make the audience want particular heroes.
It is not only the relationship between the representation of heroes and the 
audience that has been changing, but this change is accompanied by a shift in the 
balance of power in the realm of television. Barme, referring to the growing trend of 
advertising culture in China during the 1980s and 1990s, notes,
People had a sense that in the marketplace there was a room for the 
“expression of individual” and a kind of “consumer empowerment” that had 
been virtually unknown in the past. It was a period in which the individual, 
increasingly freed from subservience and fealty to the Party-state, discovered 
the heady delights of individual identity, of feeling special because he or she 
was being appealed to through advertising rather than simply propagated at by 
the state.
(1999b:2)
This is to suggest that with the growing marketplace, people have discovered a realm 
where they can be non-identical individuals where their personal feelings can be 
expressed, instead of simply being treated as a part of a mass aggregate to be 
moulded. In conjunction with wider social changes, television scenarios have also 
been expanded to make room for the “expression of the individual,” where people can 
enjoy, no matter how ephemerally, the sense of “consumer empowerment,” albeit that 
the latter is a somewhat mythical beast. In this respect, the relationship between the
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televisual representation of heroes and viewers has become more personalised and 
granted viewers some sense of power, no matter how limited it may be.
It then becomes crucial that media professionals take audiences’ tastes into 
consideration in producing the televisual representation of heroes. Yet, I argue, this 
changing relationship between heroes and audience is not simply a shift towards 
submission to the market economy, but rather that the inspiring and appealing quality 
of contemporary heroes has been become a part of the new political agenda.
From Eternity to Ordinary
In order to further this argument, one needs to consider the change in the 
politico-economic situation of China since the late 1970s. As I mentioned earlier in 
this chapter, in 1978, the Party, under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping, embarked on 
a programme of economic development, which was followed by gradual reforms 
pursued in the 1980s. After Deng Xiaoping’s southern tour in 1992, the Party took 
further measures for economic reform. The way in which Deng Xiaoping approached 
guiding the people is quite different from the approach adopted by Mao, who urged 
the ideals of collectivism and altruism. Deng viewed improving the economic 
condition of the nation as the first priority, and assumed that the people’s conduct 
would be more efficiently modified and regulated by appealing to self-interest and 
economic incentive (Keane 1998b).
As a part of such politico-economic reform, in the mid-1980s the Party, as part 
of promoting decentralisation and relaxation in broadcasting regulation policy, did 
away with financial subsidies for the television industry. According to Hong Junhao
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(1998:67), even CCTV was a victim of this cutback in subsidies, and had to depend 
on advertising money. The expansion of China’s media market and commercial 
dependence has required TV producers to be more sensitive towards consumer 
demands. As a result, the quantity of programmes which appeal to and entertain 
audiences has greatly increased (Li Zhurun 1998, Zha Jianying 1995, Zhao Yuezhi 
1998, Keane 1999). In discussing emerging popular journalism and journalistic 
practices in China since the late 80s, for instance, Li Zhurun writes, “localisation of 
news reporting and attention to human interest and popular feelings, needs and 
demands, have become an accepted trick to attract audiences” (1998:324). We could 
draw a parallel between the representation of heroes and journalistic practices in post­
reform China. In both cases, the key element of concern is the appeal to the audience, 
which has been endorsed by the state.
So the transformation of the televisual representation of heroes from the style 
of the 1950s and 1960s to today’s ordinary people is not simply a reflection of the 
empowerment of ordinary people due to commercialisation. It was a part of the 
cultural policy adopted by the state. In the mission statement for television for the 
year 2000, Zhao Huayong, the director of CCTV, claims,
.. .(Chinese television needs to) pay attention to the lives and voices of the 
masses (qunzhong frf-Xk), and wholeheartedly serve the people. Chinese 
television needs to fully and enthusiastically portray the story of ordinary 
people, and forever maintain a position that sides with the people {renmin 
qunzhong A P ^ A )  in televisual dissemination.79
In this speech, one could detect the shift in interest for television from representing 
the voice of the Party to portraying the lives and voices of ordinary people.
Moreover, one could also point out the changes implied in the notion of ‘serving the
79 Dianshi Yanjiu hVJWI ;)'? 6/2000, p.8. Translation is mine.
145
people’. During the Maoist period, ‘serve the people’ implied the sense of self- 
sacrifice for the common good and for hurrying the coming of a communist utopia; 
however, in the reform period, it seems to be more oriented by commercial 
imperatives. Contemporary heroes no longer clean buses and read out Mao’s teaching 
to their comrades like Lei Feng; they entertain consumers.
In the state’s view, in the reform period, good television programmes are 
defined as both commercially successful and socially responsible. As Liu Xiliang, 
vice-minister of the State Administration for Radio, Film, and Television, notes,
If the quality of a material product is good, it gives great satisfaction to the 
consumer whereas if the quality is inferior it will bring about an economic 
loss. As artistic work is a spiritual product, superior quality can stimulate 
national spirit, mould moral sentiment, increase aesthetic appeal, and enrich 
cultural life; if inferior, it will damage the spirit of the people, foster an 
unhealthy atmosphere, lead to all kinds of social problems...
(Liu 1997:3, quoted in Keane 1998a:83)
Here the criteria for artistic work are compared to, and defined in, economic terms. 
Thus, in this definition of good programmes, the aspect of commercial success has 
been incorporated into the political agenda of the state in the reform period. It has 
been co-opted by the Party as a means of influencing the conduct and thinking of the 
people in a form that is more appropriate to the new social conditions of a socialist 
market economy.
In the post -reform period, there are also attempts to repackage Lei Feng type 
heroes in glossier, subtler forms of representation. For instance, in a recently 
published newspaper, there was an article about Lei Feng’s girlfriend from the time 
when he was still alive. In another magazine, there is an article describing how Lei
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Feng was popular among his fellow female comrades.80 Such a romantic love -related 
theme appears to be quite popular for modifying communist heroes. Then, even 
though Lei Feng still continues to be portrayed as a good old selfless communist hero, 
his representation has changed, or at least diversified, in the reform period. A similar 
process of repackaging has been applied to the representations of other communist 
heroes -  often dressing them up in a way more appealing to viewers by incorporating 
popular cultural forms. Thus, the political message in the representation of 
communist heroes in contemporary times is less ‘in your face,’ and has become 
subtler. Barme writes,
As the currency of party propaganda becomes increasingly devalued, more 
refined forms for packaging, presenting, and selling the party line were 
developed. The ham-fisted methods of propaganda, though hardly abandoned, 
increasingly gave way to soft sell.
(1999a: 115)
To quickly summarise this section, then, the changing representation of 
communist heroes to ordinary people parallels different approaches in guiding the 
conduct of the people in the Maoist and post-reform periods. At the same time, there 
is also less concern from the Party for guiding the conduct of people in the reform 
period, as profitability and other factors enter the equation. In order to consider this 
point further, I will look at the wider political implications of the televisual 
representation of ordinary people as heroes of the reform period.
80 E.g. Xtmzhao Leifeng Dangnian de Ninyou Tj- m M  4^ ifJ A  A . In Beijing Youth Daily, 27th 
M ayl998, p.22. Also see Biekan Ta GeziBngao, Que TingN engXiyin Guniang i f
3 l&A'&h (D on’t think that he is short, he is very capable o f  attracting young girls) in Chu 1998, 
pp.14-22.
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The End of the Communist Utopia
The changing representation of communist heroes to ordinary people parallels 
the political transformation that Ci Jiwei calls ‘from utopianism to hedonism* (1994), 
Croll terms ‘from Heaven to Earth’ (1994), or in the words of Tang Xiaobing ‘from 
Heroic to Quotidian’ (2000). These scholars, each in a different field, depict the 
political transformation of the end of the communist utopia in the reform period. 
During the Maoist era, in the name of a communist utopia, people’s happiness had 
been promised as something that would come from China’s successful 
accomplishment of socialism. In the reform period, the current condition is taken to 
be where ultimate happiness exists, in other words, there is no longer any promise of 
further happiness. In this sense, utopia is this world. This new idea of everyday life 
as the source of ultimate happiness presents a reversal of the Maoist view of utopia 
where everyday life was seen as something to overcome. The Maoist idea of utopia 
seeks a full and complete life by systematic suppression and reorientation of everyday 
activities and desires. Here, a secular everyday life is transformed to become part of 
the grand narrative of the project of achieving socialist revolution. In the reform 
period, on the other hand, such transcendence has become no longer necessary.
Tang Xiaobing depicts these contrasting approaches to everyday life in the 
Maoist time and the reform period with reference to the transformation of Chinese 
modern literature. He notes “the transitional quality of late twentieth-century Chinese 
culture can be observed as two related discourses: an anxious affirmation of ordinary 
life and a continuous negotiation with the utopian impulse to reject everyday life”
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(2000:284). As I have been discussing so far, a similar tendency can be observed in 
the televisual representation of heroes. Heroes from the Maoist period were elevated 
ideals and had no life in this world. They found the significance of everyday life in 
the accomplishment of a communist utopia and so the meaning of secular everyday 
life and individual experience was denied, while contemporary heroes are grounded in 
this world and affirm ordinary, everyday lives. At the same time, it is not simply a 
transition from one to the other type of representation, but rather, as Tang Xiaobing 
assumes in this comment, both discourses seem to exist side by side in contemporary 
China.
Ci Jiwei also examined two such nearly opposite approaches to everyday life 
in the Maoist and reform periods. According to his view, the shift from one to the 
other approach was not a violent disjuncture. Ci claims that the idea of material well­
being as a high priority in the vision of a good life was always there in Mao’s vision 
of utopia, right from the beginning. He writes, “Mao Zedong’s utopianism was 
nothing but hedonism sublimated and postponed” (1994:134). Mao’s utopian project 
has aimed at setting China free from poverty. So, after Mao’s failure to deliver 
material well-being which he promised in exchange for the people’s commitment to 
utopian projects and their enduring of hardships, people grew impatient. Ci assumes 
that Deng Xiaoping’s economic reform has been a solution to displace this anxiety to 
people’s materially suppressed lives. As he notes,
Deng’s reform, in particular, with its relaxation of moral and economic 
austerity, was an acknowledgement of a growing impatience that dragged 
hedonism from heaven to earth, from future to present.
(1994:166)
Under reform, consumerism has been encouraged as one of the means to displace
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anxiety about everyday life. On this point, Tang Xiaobing writes, “A direct function 
of the rising consumerism is to contain and dissolve the anxiety of everyday life, to 
translate collective concerns into consumer desires” (2000:283-284). While Ci argues 
that the completely failed Maoist project, which demanded asceticism and 
postponement of pleasure, has ended in disenchanted hedonism in the reform period.
The new consumerist ideology has not been a solution to all the anxieties of 
everyday life, and nor has everyone benefited greatly from it. In fact, the new 
Chinese cities appear to be developing in a direction quite opposite to what was 
promised in the vision of a socialist city, such as “productive places with full 
employment, secure jobs with a range of fringe benefits, minimal income and life 
style differences...” (Tang 2000:275-276). China in the post reform period is facing 
the issues of unemployment, the breaking up of the ‘iron rice bowl,’ followed by the 
falling apart of other social welfare provision such as in housing, wide income gaps, 
and conspicuous consumption for some. There are plenty of people who are left 
behind in this new consumerist boom, and increasing numbers of social issues have 
emerged in the new social enviromnent. The affirmation of ordinary life as a new 
ideology presents further problems in dealing with existing social ills and difficulties 
of life, as people are left without any further salvation, since now the utopia is this 
world.
Under such circumstances, then, the televisual representation of ordinary 
people assumes the function of helping individuals to overcome the anxiety of 
everyday life and cope with secular life. Tang Xiaobing notes both socialist and 
capitalist realism represent the transcendence of everyday life in different ways, and 
both invite viewers to participate in the promised good life -  in other words, utopia. 
Thus, the representation of ordinary people on television presents viewers with what
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good life could mean in this world. Although none of the heroes discussed above, 
from three different television series, has portrayed what could be described as the 
‘good life,’ however, each one has implicitly suggested what a good life could mean 
in this world. For instance, it could be the good heart of Liu Huifang, the enduring 
love between Xia Xiaoxue and Zhong Rui despite their ups and downs, or the family 
values portrayed in the representation of Zhang Damin. The point I want to make 
here is that there is no longer a single set vision of what a ‘good life’ means in 
contemporary China, while during the Maoist time a more stylised image of happiness 
and the socialist ideals of the good life were illustrated in various media. Hence, in 
the post -reform period, each person has to find his or her own means for life 
enrichment As Tan Xiaobing puts it, “the pursuit of a full life is now a personal 
commitment” (2000:287).
The representation of Lei Feng type heroes promised a communist utopia and 
served as a means to produce the communist subjects who are needed to achieve 
socialism, while the current representations of ordinary people are an end in 
themselves.81 The new affirmation of everyday life is based on the principle that 
people need to help themselves to find their own version of a full life. Together with 
such a change in ideology, then, there is a shift in the emphasis on the relationship 
between heroes and the audience from ‘emulating’ heroes to ‘identifying with’ 
ordinary subjects who, implicitly or explicitly, present different possibilities and 
meanings for a full life.
8] In a quite different context, with reference to Foucault’s works, Rabinow and Dreyfus write, “It was
no longer a question o f  leading people to their salvation in the next world, but rather ensuring it in this
world. And in tins context, die word salvation takes on different meanings: health, well-being (diat is,
sufficient wealth, standard o f  living), security, protection against accidents” (1982: 215), So the idea
o f  salvation has changed from transcendental salvation to salvation o f  this world with the development
o f  the modem state. From this point o f  view, then, one could argue that the construction o f  laobaixing
provided the state with a body to be cared for, protected, cultivated, and preserved from any dangers
whereby its power can be generated, instead o f  a body taking part in the grand narrative o f socialism.
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The Help Yourself Ideology
The principle of helping yourself in enriching life is noticeable in debates 
about the televisual representation of contemporary heroes. In order to further 
explore this point, I will look at the review of the television drama Garrulous Zhang 
Damin’s Happy Life, by commentator Li Yuehua. Li notes,
Where do the good qualities of this script lie? I think the spirit of optimism is 
a magic weapon for defeating difficulties. Every person has difficulties, but if  
one has the optimism to confront such difficulties in life, it will become a 
different situation. One should not blame anyone or anything but oneself, and 
just work very hard. In reality, the lowest class characters like Zhang Damin 
are often in an inferior position in the competitive modern world. Yet, they 
seldom ask others to help them, and only depend on their lives o f honest 
labour. ...
[Zhang Damin] has little in the way of abilities or means, and can only pursue 
goals which other people see as not even worth mentioning. ...Once his goals 
have been achieved, he is very happy. These kinds of continuous 
compromises in life and the persistent advance and retreat of spiritual triumph 
are the only way he can overcome unfavourable material conditions, and also 
what we see as his happiness overcoming his gloomy life.82
Here, the help yourself ideology, rather than waiting for the coming of ultimate 
salvation, is quite explicit. As Li notes, Zhang Damin has worked hard for the living 
not expecting others to help him. It is neither society, nor the Party, but one’s honest 
labour that is responsible for overcoming individual difficulties. Moreover, Li’s 
comment suggests that the solution for ordinary people to find a full life and 
overcome difficulties is an optimistic spirit and the ability to compromise, rather than 
devotion to the Party. There is a clear message that happiness is in the eye of the
82 From Dianshi Yanjiu % 6/2000, pp. 66-67. Translation and addition are mine.
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beholder. Liu Heng, the scriptwriter of Garrulous even notes that optimism is the 
good medicine for the Twenty-first century.
Moreover, according to Li above, the role of the representation of Zhang 
Damin is to encourage people by showing that even those people who are less 
privileged and face very difficult lives can find happiness. As Li notes, “The fact that 
small characters, like Zhang Damin who is in the bottom class (di ceng JfS JH) of
society can live happily like this, encourages people in the real world. . In this 
respect, the televisual representation of Zhang Damin assumes the heroic function of 
inspiring people and setting up a model to emulate. Such a change in ideology and 
the concept of the full life clearly marks the end of the Maoist utopia, and presents the 
new social reality where ‘social illness’ can be treated and improved, but that does not 
further promise any ultimate salvation.
Conclusion
In this chapter I have discussed the changing televisual representation of 
heroes from Lei Feng type perfect moral subjects of the 1950s and 1960s to one of 
ordinary people in the reform period. The new televisual hero is represented as a 
common person living in ordinary circumstances, and a subject who exists on equal 
ground with the audience. There is a lot of emphasis on personal experiences and 
feelings in the way in which new heroes are represented. Moreover, the kinds of 
heroes portrayed on television have become diverse. At the same time, it is important 
to note that Lei Feng type communist heroes have continued to exist and appear in
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various media in contemporary China, though the frequency has dropped drastically 
in recent years, particularly on television.83
On the macro level, there is a change in the way in which the state plays a role 
in cultural production in contemporary China. For whilst television officially 
maintains its position as a ‘mouthpiece of the Party’ {dang de houshe ),
there is still a commitment to provide guidance for the conduct of people and to 
influence their thinking. At the same time, popular appeal, in other words 
consumability, has become the crucial element in contemporary cultural production. 
Particularly since the state no longer subsidises the television industry, the market law 
of supply and demand is an inevitable factor to consider for survival (Keane 1999). 
Contemporary Chinese television necessarily serves two masters -  both the Party and 
the market. Thus, the changing televisual representation of heroes from Lei Feng type 
communist heroes to ordinary people is not simply that the Party is becoming 
increasingly anachronistic due to the growing power of the market, but rather a 
changing operation of power which I will discuss in more detail in the following 
Chapter 4.
I have further argued in this chapter that the emergent ideology is no longer 
the communist utopia promised in the representation of Lei Feng type heroes, but 
everyday life embodied in the representation of ordinary people. The idea of a full 
life is diversified and individuals are expected to help themselves to attain happiness, 
and are to some extent responsible for so doing. In the reform period, a new form of 
hegemonic power of the Communist Party has emerged and continues to be at work 
through different means. In the next chapter, then, I will examine how this power
83 These communist heroes tend to appear more in print media, especially in newspapers. On 
television, Lei Feng type heroes appear occasionally in special programmes (zhuantiplan  Ji'), 
children’s programmes, or old revolutionary films, and are sometimes mentioned in the news.
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operates through the televisual representations of ordinary people in contemporary 
China.
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Chapter Four
Story of Laobaixing : Modern subjects and ordinary people
As the reforms deepened, the necessity for turning citizens into political 
subjects in order to ensure compliance was obviated by benefits such as higher 
standards of living and more freedom to get rich. .. .The kind of “economic 
subject” now addressed in popular culture is a significantly different moral 
subject from the selfless citizen symbolised in propaganda Lei Feng.
(Keane 1998b: 494)
Following on from the previous discussion on the changing representation of 
heroes from the perfect moral subjects to ordinary people, in this chapter I will further 
examine the representation of ordinary people as the new heroes of the television 
scene in terms of the politics of cultural production. In Chapter 3 ,1 examined the 
emergence of the televisual representation of ordinary people as the new heroes in the 
reform period, and argued that such a trend reflects the changing politico-economic 
situation since the late 1970s. Similarly, in the above-cited passage, Keane points out 
that with the growth of the market there has been a shift from political to economic 
subjects in the ways in which citizens are conceptualised by the government in order 
to ensure compliance. He argues further that the new economic subjects depicted in 
contemporary popular culture are significantly different moral subjects from previous 
Lei Feng -type selfless subjects, as political conversion is no longer a primary concern 
for governing people in the reform period. This argument continues the discussion of 
my previous chapter.
At the same time, I have looked at how contemporary television has not 
simply come to serve the market in order to win popular support, contending instead 
that the overall operation of state power is changing in contemporary Chinese society.
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I have suggested that the changing televisual representation of heroes from Lei Feng - 
type communist subjects to ordinary people is the result of ideological transformation 
in conjunction with the shift in the socio-political condition of China. In the post­
reform period, ideology is no longer a Maoist vision of a communist utopia promised 
in the Lei Feng-type representation of heroes, but that of everyday life as embodied in 
the representation of ordinary people. The new affirmation of everyday life is based 
on the principle of people helping themselves to find their own full life. So, the new 
socio-political condition requires different kinds of modern subjects.
In this chapter, by adopting a Foucaudian approach to subjects, I will consider 
the changing operation of power through the production of particular subjects as the 
televisual representation of ordinary people. I will do this by examining what kinds 
of subjects are represented as ordinary people on contemporary Chinese television. In 
particular, by looking at a variety of subjects embodied in different kinds of television 
programmes, I will attempt to demonstrate different kinds of subjects constituting 
multiplicities. I will also ask which subjects are excluded from the televisual 
representation of ordinary people, and further discuss why they have been 
marginalised. The central argument of this chapter is, then, that the representation of 
ordinary people serves as a new instrument of the state, and thus, as discussed in the 
previous chapter, the depiction of ordinary people and their lives on television is a 
new guiding principle.
One departure point in this chapter is the topic of subjects and power. In the 
different context of modern Western societies, Foucault explores the relationship 
between subjects and power. He assumes that power is productive, and analyses how 
‘subjects’ are constituted through the working of power. Foucault writes,
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The individual is not a pre-given entity which is seized on by the exercise of 
power. The individual, with its identity and characteristics, is the product of a 
relation of power exercised over bodies, multiplicities, movements, desires, 
forces.
(Foucault, 1980:73-4)
This is to say that human beings are made into subjects through the working of power. 
Then, ordinary people in the new televisual representation of heroes are not simply 
the reflection of actual ordinary people as is claimed, but are subjects constructed 
through the exercise of power under the new socio-political conditions of the post­
reform period. On the articulatory practice of representation, as 1 discussed by 
drawing on the work of Goodman (1968) in Chapter 1, the televisual representation of 
heroes is an articulatory practice of representing something/someone as heroes. In 
other words, the subjects represented as heroes are not given or fixed, but are made. I 
have also discussed how the new heroes are portrayed with human feelings and 
desires, and through personal experiences and social issues similar to those that 
ordinary people undergo in their daily lives. So the crucial point is that such a 
representation of personalised emotional subjects is a part of the articulatory practice 
for new modem subjects called ordinary people.
Moreover, the televisual representation of ordinary people further assumes 
multiplicity in the reform period. As Foucault says in the quote above, such 
multiplicity is also constructed through the exercise of power, rather than being the 
result of a sudden blooming of individuality due to the growth of the market. The 
pluralism articulated in the televisual representation of ordinary people in the reform 
period needs to be viewed in relation to the changing operation of state power by 
accommodating and compromising with the power of the market. The televisual 
representation of ordinary people is a new technology used by the state to make the
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operation of its power more accountable and efficient. Below, then, I will start by 
looking at different kinds of programmes to examine a variety of modern subjects 
assumed for ordinary people in contemporary Chinese television.
Different Subjective Positions
Equipping people with scientific theory, leading them to a correct public 
opinion, holding up lofty ideals to mould people, and inspire the people with 
works of excellence.
(State Secretary General Jiang Zemin’s speech on propaganda 
thought work and the Spiritual Civilisation campaign, stated 
#36 Dianshi Yanjiu A  4. 2000 translation is mine)
In response to Jiang Zemin’s pronouncement on propaganda thought work, 
Tian Congming, the director of the SARFT, says that the ‘glorious’ (gucmgrong A ^ )  
and ‘sacred’ (shensheng mission of broadcasting work is to ‘equip people,’ 
(wnzhuang ren A ^ A )  ‘guide people,"iyindao ren 3111 A) ‘mould people,’ (snzcio 
ren H iaA ) and ‘inspire people’ {guwu ren fJcl'I^A) (Zhonggno Gucingbo Nianjian 
4 115 2000:9). It seems that even though there is a much greater variety of
programmes shown on contemporary Chinese television, the fundamental task of 
television is to produce particular modem subjects. Then, it could be argued that what 
is taken for granted as the, explicit or implicit, representation of ordinary people in 
various television programmes are particular modern subjects which fit such mission.
The Subject to be Developed
The kind of programme linked most explicitly with Jiang Zemin’s speech are 
those of a science and educational type. The idea of using television to promote
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science and to educate viewers is related to the assumption that the role of Chinese 
television is to achieve national development. In discussing contemporary Indian 
television, Monterio and Jayasankar note that approaching television as a part of 
modernisation discourse is based on the idea that;
The cure for underdevelopment calls for a massive injection of modernization 
through mass media, aimed at breaking down traditional values, disseminating 
technical skills, fostering national integration and accelerating the growth of 
formal education.
(1994:152.)84
A similar political agenda could be assumed for the role of Chinese television in 
promoting science and education for developing the national economy and alleviating 
poverty. One of the main objectives during the tenth Five-Year Plan period (2001-05) 
calls for developing science, technology and education, and fostering talented 
professionals. For this purpose, a significant investment has been made by the state to 
enhance scientific and educational programmes.
This political agenda of using television as an instrument for national 
development has been made into a project referred to as '’ciincun tong giiangbo 
dianshi jft tjifJS, ’ (‘connecting villages with radio and television’) that is
officially an important mission for present -day Chinese television. “Cuncun tong ^  
tj'M  ” is a project to spread access to radio and television to the hundreds and
thousands of villages in remote and poor areas where currently there is no access to 
broadcasting. In 1999, the project had provided sixty thousand villages with radio 
and television access. By the end of 2000, forty thousand villages, particularly remote 
and poor areas in the western region, remained to be connected. The state further
84 According to Curran & Park (2000), in the 1960s, developing modem media systems in developing 
countries was thought o f  as the key to modernization. Lila Abu-Lughod (1995, 2002) also writes about 
the role o f  television as an instrument for modernization in contemporary Egypt.
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planned to disseminate broadcast access through developing new energy resources, 
and by using satellite technology in minority regions where the population is widely 
scattered and are without any access to electricity {Zhongguo Guangbo Nicinjian 1:|:l
mr 2000: 10&11). In the wider context, this “cuncun tong” project is also a
part of the national project for developing the Western part of the country (Xibu Kaifa 
M i 'i f  and the national poverty alleviation programme. In 1999, it was recorded 
that RMB 6 million has already been spent on this ‘cuncun tong’ work (Zhongguo 
Guangbo Nianjian 4 1 ffl r- 2000: 17). It is further recorded that in 2000 the 
budget was subsidised partly by a special fund for 1 cuncun tong provided by
the National Planning Committee and the SARFT, to be combined with funding 
raised locally.
The key question to address here is why so much emphasis has been placed 
on, and money poured into, this project, while other state subsidies were cut off long 
before, in the early nineties. One outcome of the ‘cuncun tong WttM’ project, Tian
Congming states, is to “uphold the unification of motherland, strengthen the 
integration of the nation, raise the scientific and cultural quality of the broad mass of 
the peasantry, and to advance the development of extensive farming areas and social 
progress” (Zhongguo Guangbo Nianjian 41 2000: 11). Based on this
comment, then, I want to suggest three points on the kinds of subjects that emerge 
through this project.
Firstly, as I briefly mentioned earlier, connecting the broadcasting system 
throughout the country is a part of modernisation. Tian Congming writes that the 
National Planning Committee considers that ‘cuncun tong will not only
satisfy the demand for television from the rural population in remote poor areas, but
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also mobilise market demand in these regions (Zhongguo Guangbo Nianjian ^
2000: 9).85 Despite the question remaining as to how true it is that the money
generated from any created market demand will be more than the cost of maintaining 
and supporting the television system in those regions, this view claims that it can 
mobilise and stimulate the local economy, and develop the infrastructure of those less 
developed, poorer regions. So through the 1 cuncnn tong project, the rural
population in remote poor regions are constructed as modem economic subjects.
Secondly, television can function as a means for spreading knowledge and 
information to individuals in remote areas, and thus enhance their education in ways 
to improve their lives. In this respect, television can be seen as a useful instrument of 
poverty alleviation. Zhang Yanwei, a media professional at the Shangdong Feicheng 
television station, for instance, points out that one of the important tasks of county- 
level television stations is to make good agricultural and science and technology 
programmes, so as to effectively promote the general use of scientific methods, and to 
guide farmers out of poverty towards affluence.86 The main audience of county-level 
television stations consists of local fanners, particularly since they are not 
broadcasting in the broader area outside of the local county. Then, in the '‘cuncun 
tong project, these people in rural and poor regions are seen as subjects to be
educated and developed -  in Anagnost’s term “backwards” (Anagnost 1997:104) 
elements of modern subjectivity.
A similar kind of process has been depicted by Harrell (1995) in discussing
85 In China each province has a satellite television channel, which covers a broader region outside o f  its 
own province, though not all o f them cover nationally. No television channels are covered nationally, 
other than CCTV 1 and CETV 1, and most channels only get coverage within their own regions. Yet 
often provinces from the Western region, such as Ningxia, get priority for getting channel coverage in 
big cities, such as Shanghai and Beijing. Such special treatment could be seen as part o f  the state’s 
attempt to mobilize market demand in these areas.
86 Dianshi Yanjiu 11/2000, p.56
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‘civilizing projects’ for minorities or what he calls ‘periphery’ people in China. 
According to Harrell, the ‘civilizing projects’ are an interaction between the 
politically and economically powerful civilizing centre and periphery people with the 
pmpose of raising peripheral civilization to the level of the centre. Harrell notes that 
not only does the centre attempt to rule ‘periphery’ people and their territory, but also 
to define and educate them. At the same time, such project differentiates between 
those who are ‘civilizing’ and ‘being civilised’ (1995:28&29). Despite the difference 
between periphery people and the rural population, then, there is a similar kind of 
discourse going on concerning the construction of particular kinds of subjects -  both 
discourses portray their targets as subjects to be civilized and developed.
Thirdly, and perhaps most importantly, this “cuncun tong project
promotes national unification and thus is a form of disciplinary communication. It 
assumes that by being connected to radio and television, the population in remote 
areas, who previously remained outside the reach of state power, are brought under 
the state. Moreover, by their being exposed to broadcasting, national identity is 
strengthened. Such a view echoes Anderson’s (1991) argument that the development 
of print media as a commodity is a key to the rise of a new kind of national 
consciousness, which enabled members sharing the same language to imagine the 
possibility of sharing in the same community.
Anderson notes,
the convergence of capitalism and print technology on the fatal diversity of 
human language created the possibility of a new form of imagined community, 
which in its basic morphology set the stage for the modem nation.
(1991:46)
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In the same way, the dissemination of television access allowed viewers to imagine 
the sharing of the same community, and therefore television became a means of 
promoting national consciousness and unification. In this sense, it was important that 
each individual was connected to radio and television, as television produces the 
national subject. This was particularly significant for those belonging to minority 
groups, as minorities often assert their own cultural identity and, implicitly or 
explicitly, pose a threat to national unification. For producing unified national 
subjects, then, this ‘cuncun tong’ project places much emphasis on, and puts a great 
deal of money into, creating broadcasting access in the minority areas, as noted above.
Moreover, the majority of characters which appear on television are portrayed 
as pro-science and technology, not just those in specifically science and educational 
programming. For instance, in a number of news and current affairs programmes 
from different television stations throughout the country, a programme presenter has a 
computer in front of him or her as though reading the news in the usual manner. 
Normally these computers do not work, though this fact is not obvious to viewers. 
What is the significance of having a computer, even though it does not work, framed 
in the viewable television image? Perhaps this is simply a trend or style copied from 
foreign news programmes such as CNN or Phoenix TV. At the same time, one could 
also assume that the presence of the computer creates the impression of ordinary 
people as scientifically or technologically capable subjects, and is an attempt to 
further promote such modem technology as computers, in the perception of everyday 
lives of the people. Then, these pro-science and technology subjects are ‘advanced’ 
elements which ordinary viewers should aspire to emulate.
Anagnost argues that the distinction among the people in the Dengist period is 
between those who are ‘advanced’ and those who are ‘backward’. She writes,
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.. .the distinction between shi and fei remains and continues to be coded in 
terms reminiscent of the Maoist period... The aim of these distinctions is 
therefore no longer to exclude a pariah group but to absorb as many subjects 
as possible into the embrace of a state-defined standard through the 
reformation of behaviour. Shi and fei now mark the distinction between 
“backward” (houjin fenzi) and “advanced” (xianjin fenzi) in radically new 
ways that reflect the modernization ideology of the Dengist state.
(1997:104)
Thus, 1 argue that the televisual representation of heroes also reifies what it means to 
be ‘advanced’ in contemporary society. During the Maoist period, the distinction 
between shi zE and fei -||^  used to be marked by class background based on modes of
production, while in the reform period, it is defined in terms of advanced or backward 
with respect to technological and scientific capability. In this respect, various images 
of ordinary people projected on television define what ‘advanced’ and ‘backward’ 
subjects are in the contemporary society.
This point about pro-science and technology is further supported by the case 
of CCTV 10, launched in Oct. 2001, a channel dedicated to high -quality 
programmes. Chinese television very much wanted to produce similar programmes to 
these seen on the Discovery Channel. Discovery Channel programmes are regarded 
highly by Chinese TV producers, and are often looked up to as examples of the most 
refined programming (Jingpin -  in terms of the level of technology and the
techniques used to produce a programme, the level of the content, and the cost 
involved.87 There is a sense of aspiration among Chinese television professionals to 
produce high-level science and educational programmes. I assume the interest in 
producing internationally recognised refined programmes further extends to an
87 This is based on my own experience o f taking classes at the Beijing Broadcasting Institute, as w ell as 
meeting Chinese television producers. Discovery Channel programmes are quite expensive for most 
Chinese television, but there are some government subsidies for purchasing these programmes for the 
purpose o f promoting science, so some are seen.
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interest in advancing China’s status internationally in the world of global commerce, 
declaring that China, like any other developed country, has both the technology and 
the talent needed to produce programmes like those seen on the Discovery Channel.88 
One CCTV 10 programme is called ‘People’ {Renwu A 4#/). It is aimed at
more educated viewers such as intellectuals, white -collar workers, media 
professionals, and those who have had the experience of working abroad. It is a half - 
hour documentary programme about different people who have achieved success.89 
TV producers for this programme are encouraged to choose the lives of scientists, 
inventors, educators, authors, and artists -  regardless of whether they are Chinese or 
foreigners. In this programme contemporary heroes are assumed to be successful 
subjects, but further, the standard of success here is not restricted just to China but is 
framed on a ‘global’ scale. Thus, these people not only embody subjects who are 
equipped with science and lofty spirits, and are able to encourage people, but are also 
a part of the international world. Modern subjects are looking outwards.
The Subject o f Law
One of the growing trends on contemporary Chinese television is law programming, 
exemplified by programmes such as Today’s Law (,Jinri Shuofa A  0  One of
the crucial aspects of the present-day representation of ordinary people is that they 
exist within the framework of law. On the debut of the Science and Education
88 Hooper argues that the Open Door policy might look like a reversal o f assertive Chinese nationalism 
but it is not. She notes that there has continued to be a strong consciousness o f  imperialist past in China 
and a determination never again to allow the country to be dictated to by foreigners (1992:96). It 
seems that the element o f  Chinese nationalism plays a critical element even in the contemporary 
television scene.
89 The information about this programme is based on an internal document and also from talking to one 
o f the producers o f  Renwu A'-IA For the purpose o f  protecting the person who provided me the 
information from any trouble, 1 cannot provide any further details.
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channel on Beijing Television, it is stated that as China tries to build a society 
governed by law, teaching citizens about the legal system is one of the media's most 
important tasks.
The topic of laws also appears in talk shows, documentary programmes, 
television dramas, and educational programmes. There are increasing numbers of TV 
dramas and reports about policemen, judges, and lawyers, who are portrayed as 
guardians of the law. All these programmes enforce the reach of the law, and thereby 
ordinary people are assumed to be subjects of law. Tian Congming claims that one of 
the important points raised at the 15th plenary meeting of the Communist Party is to 
“strengthen the establishment of a democratic law system, to carry out the dependence 
on law to rule the country, and to establish a state ruled by the socialist law”.90 In this 
respect, ways in which people are governed have been changing in the reform period 
and demand a new kind of subjects.
Tian Congming repeatedly emphasises the importance of ‘yifa xingzheng
\  ‘administration according to law’, by making duty explicit, classifying
responsibility, managing one’s own affairs, and shouldering one’s appropriate 
responsibilities.91 Such an emphasis indicates that the state wishes to secularise and 
rationalise the public sector, and to establish the legal system. The development of a 
new legal system further suggests the changing operation of power in China. Chin- 
Chun Lee (1994) argues that the primary goal of the state in the post- reform period is 
to establish rule by law, rather than rule of law. He claims here that the Party is
90 Zhongguo Guangbo Nianjian 'j-1 U l f ^ 2000,  p .14. Translation is mine.
91 Zhongguo Guangbo Nianjian 4 1 I2IP 2000. p p .ll . Translation is mine. In modern
Western societies, with reference to Foucault’s work on the subject, Rabinow and Dreyfus note, “new 
political rationality the state, not the laws o f  men or nature, was its own end. The existence o f the state 
and its power was the proper subject was that matter o f the new technical and administrative 
knowledge, in contrast to juridical discourse, which had referred power to other ends: justice, the good, 
or natural law” (1982:137). One could argue a similar process is taking place in the context o f
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attempting to strengthen its legitimacy through the spread of more concrete 
guidelines. Lee argues that because the boundary of what is and is not acceptable is 
not clearly spelled out, such a law leaves room for the state to interpret and use the 
system appropriately, depending on the situation. Whether the goal of the state is to 
establish rule o f or by the law, in contemporary China there are increasing numbers of 
televisual representations of subjects defined by the legal system.
In this respect, the new subject of law marks a transition from the subject of 
the Maoist period, which was hailed with political propaganda and ideology, and 
defined by the obligation, duty and morality. In contemporary China, however, in 
theory, people are conceptualised as subjects defined by the law and juridical rights. 
For instance, in the mission statement of television given by Zhao Huayong,92 the 
director of CCTV, there is a passage where people are addressed as gongmin f t  K;,
gong f j  meaning public and min fc meaning the people, used as gongmin qnan f t  Pc
$L, meaning citizenship or civil rights. This further demonstrates the
conceptualisation of people as legally recognised subjects. Such a way of addressing 
ordinary people is increasingly common, and thereby, the new subject is granted some 
kind of legal rights and social responsibilities.
The Subject with Emotions
Perhaps one of the most popular types of programme on Chinese television in 
the year 2001 was the talk show, indeed 2001 has been called the Year of the Talk 
Show. A variety of talk shows were broadcast on Chinese television that year.93 The
contemporary China.
92 Dianshi Yanjiu 6/2000, P.8
93 According to Zhu Kun & Zhou Zhou, iD ui hua’ Yuan man 'XljiS ’ (The Year o f  ‘dialogue’),
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talk show trend was triggered by a programme called Tell It As It Is (Shi Him Shi 
Shuo Debuting in 1996 as China's first talk show, Tell It As It Is has
become enormously popular for its ‘humanistic approach’ to contemporary social 
issues drawn from people's real lives. The programme touches on various topics 
ranging from relationships between married couples, parents' attitudes towards their 
children's weddings, and stories about China's first bankrupt state-owned enterprise, 
to Chinese people's obsession with playing mah-jong. People from different walks of 
life, depending on the topic, are invited to the studio to tell their stories, and are joined 
by a host and audiences. The programme involves lots of humorous, sometimes 
emotional, interactions between the host, guest commentators and audiences. Shi 
Jian, one of the programme's original producers, has commented that this programme 
is intended to encourage deep discussions among participants to promote 
understanding of different issues. In this respect, he believes that the programme has 
been playing a very important role in reconstructing ethical values in the society (Zhu 
Kun & Zhou Zhou 2000). It is said that many critics believe “Tell It As It Is” has 
stirred up a revolution in China's TV industry and offered a unique arena for public 
discourse and communication; of course that is still within limits.
So the talk show produces a site where different social issues are dealt with by 
generating public debate on television. The new subject assumed in such programmes 
is responsible for solving social issues. In this respect, the subjects assumed in the 
talk show reinforce my point about the end of communist utopia and the new 
televisual representation of ordinary people as the embodiment of the help -yourself 
ideology which I have discussed in Chapter 3. As implied in programmes such as Tell 
It As It Is, under contemporary socio-political circumstances, each ordinary person is
InXin Zhou Kan HrJnlf'J, issue no. 19, 1/10/2000. pp. 22-47.
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responsible for his or her social environment. As has already been mentioned above, 
such social responsibility is now defined by the law as a social obligation of the 
citizen.
It is worth pointing out that not all social problems can be discussed in talk 
shows. Then, what is the limit? Zhu Yuanliang, the chief editor of Television 
Research published by CCTV, once commented in an interview I had with him that as 
long as the central themes of the talk shows revolve around so -called soft topics 
(man xing kuati M) -  such as lifestyles and emotions— there is no problem
with their being debated on television, while it is generally believed too sensitive to 
deal with so -called hard topics (ying xing huati M) -  such as policy,
regulations or politics. In practice the actual distinction between the two is rather 
vague. Zhu Yuanliang has commented that in fact the television show can deal with 
legal regulations or general policy, as long as these themes are dealt with in a general 
manner. This means that no specific names of particular politicians, places, or 
govemment-level policies can be used in the TV show.
A similar point was made in one of my classes at the BBI when I participated 
in choosing the theme for one of the episodes for the television series Today ’s Law. 
Mi* Zhang, who is a programme presenter of this programme as well as a teacher of 
the Programme Planning class at the BBI, commented that we can deal with the such 
social policy as corruption or dysfunctions of the system in an institution, as long as 
we do not deal with them specifically in terms of who and which institution in the 
programme. Both Zhu Yuanliang and Mr Zhang agree in that the social issues that 
can be debated on television are limited to ‘soft’ topics or ‘hard’ themes without 
specifics. At the same time, in real terms, such a guideline is only the ‘surface,’ and 
what themes can and cannot be broadcast is not so clear-cut, but contingent upon
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different conditions,94 From such claims, I argue, there is a deliberate intention to 
focus on soft topics, so as to shift attention away from the core issues that are 
classified as ‘hard’ topics. What this means, then, is that ordinary people are made 
responsible for their social environment and are expected to deal with their own 
problems; however, they are not allowed to challenge established social institutions 
and systems. Such operation of state power fits Foucault’s notion of ‘discourse’.
Furthermore, the talk show celebrates the expression of individuality and 
personal sentiments. The new kind of ‘truth’ in the reform period is rooted in personal 
sentiments and the everyday lives of ordinary people, while previously the ‘truth’ lay 
in Mao’s thoughts and socialism. In the talk show, ordinary people who are 
presupposed to be bearers of the truth are made into speaking subjects whereby their 
agency is articulated. Audiences are no longer passive subjects who simply watch 
what they are given, but now participate in producing the programme. As BBI 
teacher Mr Zhang once pointed out in class, audience participation is a key factor for 
the success of TV programmes.
The Consuming Subject
There are also large numbers of lifestyle programmes on present-day Chinese 
television, whereby people are assumed to be consumers (xiaofeizhe For
example, at the television production house where I did my internship, most 
programmes I came across were infotainment programmes offering news on various 
consumer products, ranging from the price of cooking oil and clothes to music
94 In all my time studying at the BBI and serving my internship at the Milky Way, I never encountered 
any case in which a submitted report was officially rejected for political reasons. It seems to be that 
what is or is not suitable for broadcast is pre-decided on the basis o f  self-censorship and censorship
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concerts and art exhibitions. More fundamentally, television cannot get away from 
the idea of audience as consumers. In particular, as I discussed in detail in chapter 3, 
if one considers the mechanism of current television production, most programmes 
are sponsored by advertisements, hence, in varying degrees, television production 
must serve the interest of advertisers who view the audience as consumer subjects. 
Within this framework of consumerism, individuality is very much celebrated. 
Consumers are supposed to be free to construct their own identities through 
consumption and pursuing of particular lifestyles. These infotainment programmes 
are there for the service of consumers by enhancing their consumption activities. 
Banne notes:
the rising tide of commercialisation allowed for the reification of the 
individual in the public sphere, not in terms of autonomy but rather as the 
subject of advertising propaganda, a matrix of stimulated desires embodied in 
the moulded persona of the shopper.
(1999b: 3)
What is crucial in Banne’s comment here is that the expression of individuality is 
only limited to the sphere of consumption, and the consumption activity is 
differentiated from the autonomy of individual.
Lifestyle programmes advocate consumer rights and the right to choose what 
they want. For instance, March 15th is celebrated as a day for protecting the rights of 
consumers {xiaofeizhe quanli baohit jieri 0). At the same time,
there is a limitation to these rights. Barme notes:
Consumerism was part of the successful attainment of “economic” rights: the 
rights and value of the individual were articulated solely in terms of the self as 
consumer, and this was non-threatening to Party hegemony.
(1999b: 3)
among colleagues.
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The subject assumed in this framework is a consumer, rather than a sovereign citizen. 
As Eric Ma also notes 011 this point, . .the state is policing the media and the media 
are empowering consumers, not citizens” (2000:31). The crucial point here is that 
individual rights are strictly limited to the arena of consumerism which is assumed to 
be non-threatening to the Party hegemony. Then, I argue, the representation of 
ordinary people as empowered consumers with rights and individuality is intended 
to shift ordinary people’s concerns away from other individual rights -  such as the 
right to form associations, political rights, worker’s rights, freedom of speech, etc. By 
granting a particular kind of right, therefore, the state attempts to gear the interests of 
ordinary people towards something less threatening to the Party hegemony. Within 
such a framework, ordinary people gained some sense of empowerment within the 
limited sphere of consumption, and at the same time, mostly remained within the 
framework of the state.
In this section, I have looked at some of the subjects produced in different 
kinds of television programmes in contemporary China. From this examination, it 
emerges that the new subjects are assumed to be multi-dimensional, though limited in 
scope, while not so far away from the interests of the state. One thing they have in 
common is that none of them particularly contradict state policy and ideology. As 
Keane writes:
[A] key concern for China’s propagandists is to use television to “mould and 
shape” new standards of ethical behaviour appropriate to a modem commodity 
economy; that is, to mould citizens (gongmin) who are more productive and 
less dependent on welfare but who retain “the four haves” (si you): values of 
idealism, moral integrity, education and discipline.
(1998b: 479)
In this respect, not only does the diversification of subjects not simply mean the
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weakening power of the state, but these subjects also serve the ways in which state 
power operates in contemporary Chinese society. This aspect, then, has not changed 
greatly from the previous type of heroes, even though their representations have been 
adjusted markedly to meet the needs and interests of the people in the post -reform 
society. However, the issue of the extent to which propagandists’ concerns play a part 
in constructing the televisual representation of ordinary people needs to be further 
discussed by looking at actual television production practices.
If the televisual representation of ordinary people were to play a significant 
role in people recognizing themselves as subjects, then such a representation could 
also internalise particular kinds of subjects and limitations to viewers. Abu-Lughod 
(2002) in her work on television in contemporary Egypt points out the similar role of 
television series in producing new modem subjects and encouraging individuality.
Oil this process of categorizing the individual, in discussing Foucault’s work on 
subjects, Rabinow and Dreyfus write,
This power applies itself to immediate everyday life which categorizes the 
individual, marks him by his own individuality, attaches him to his own 
identity, imposes a law of truth on him which he must recognize and which 
others have to recognize in him. It is a form of power which makes 
individuals subjects.
(1982: 212)
Even though Rabinow and Dreyfus here comment in the context of modern Western 
society, my examination on the construction of particular subjects through ordinary 
people, implicitly or explicitly, in different kinds of television programmes on 
contemporary Chinese television suggests a similar process. The new subjects 
categorise the individual, and thereby an individual creates particular kinds of self- 
knowledge and experience of the world that support the operation of state power. 
Next, in order to further explore the relationship between the operation of state power
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and modern subjects, I will consider what kinds of subjects are excluded from the 
representation of ordinary people on contemporary Chinese television.
Taming the Marginal
Despite the common assumption that the term 'ordinary people’ (laobaixing 
W is a broad and all-inclusive category, my above discussion demonstrates that
the televisual representation of ordinary people is particularly constructed so as to 
serve the operation of state power in society. The televisual representation of 
ordinary people is not given and fixed, but is an articulation which needs to be 
continuously reconstructed and re-enforced in the media. Bhabha notes that "the 
political unity of the nation consists in a continual displacement of the anxiety of its 
irredeemably plural modern space” (1994:150). To put this complex idea more 
simply, Bhabha here assumes that the unity of the nation is constructed through the 
displacement of misfits. Moreover, Bhabha, drawing upon Foucault, further notes, 
“people emerge in the modem state as a perpetual movement of ‘the marginal 
integration of individuals’” (1994:150). So, ordinary people as national subjects are 
not a set category, but are constructed through continuous practices of displacing 
anxiety.
Then, what is the anxiety to be displaced from the representation of modern 
subjects in contemporary China? In this section, by drawing on Bhabha’s point, I 
argue the plurality in the televisual representation of ordinary people is an attempt to 
transcend the heterogeneity of the unified society. Such transcendence of 
heterogeneity to a single category of'ordinary people’ is also constructed through
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displacing undesirable subjects as defined by the state in terms of the operation of 
power. In order to further consider this point, I will examine some of the subjects that 
are marginalized from the televisual representation of ordinary people. The point I 
want to discuss in this section is that if the production of the televisual representation 
of ordinary people is to serve the operation of state power, some marginalised subjects 
remain outside the reach of the state. Not only that, I argue they are elements which 
could potentially undermine the operation of state power.
Let us consider for a moment who could be ‘the other,’ the people 
marginalized from the representation of ordinary people. Subjects that immediately 
come up in my mind are the usual victims of marginalization -  such as minorities, 
homosexuals, and other floating populations. Perhaps, the super-rich and powerful, as 
well as those who belong to informal associations, ranging from Fahmgong believers 
to gang members, are also excluded from the category of ordinary people. There are 
more specific marginalised subjects. The first kind I want to consider here is unhappy 
old people without jobs, houses of their own, or even any support from their children, 
who live in fear of losing access to the basic necessities due to the collapse of the 
socialist social security system. The second type includes the large number of 
discontented and frustrated rural residents who are deprived of consumer 
empowerment. The numbers of these two kinds of subjects are ever growing in 
contemporary China. From this brief reflection, it is clear that considerable numbers 
of subjects are excluded from the televisual representation of ordinary people. There 
are likely to be other kinds of marginalized subjects; however, instead of further 
speculation about marginalized subjects, I want to discuss what could be the 
undesirable factors of these subjects.
The first example I want to look at is the minorities. They are probably classic
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examples of breaking away from ‘the reach of the state’. Even though they are 
supposed to be part of the ‘unified’ nation under the Communist Party, they have a 
social organisation and system of their own that often causes them to exist beyond the 
control of the state.95 Such aspects of their existence could be seen as a threat which 
might undermine national unity. Localities such as Xinjiang and Tibet are well 
known to be very sensitive topics for television presentation, especially since there are 
radical groups in these regions which make claims for independence. Yan Jiande, a 
television producer, claims that it is very difficult for Chinese producers to get 
permission from the government to make documentaries or special programmes about 
these minorities to be broadcast on Chinese television. This is not to say that 
minorities do not appear on television. They do -  but when they do, there is a strong 
emphasis 011 the element of national unity. The obvious example is the representation 
of minorities and national variations within China in the Chunjie Lianhuan Wanhui #
(The New Year Eve Extravaganza) in which national unification is 
heavily propagandised.96
The so-called ‘floating population’ (liudong renkou A  P ) portrays
another type of subject existing outside the state social system. ‘Floating population’ 
(liudong renkou V/iiAj A  □ ) refers to the rural migrants in big cities who do not hold 
proper permits to stay and work there. At the time I was doing my fieldwork in 1997- 
1999, rural populations were allowed to travel freely and to find work in different 
major cities if they could obtain temporary resident permits. However, to get this
951 do not mean that they are subjects existing autonomously from state power. The state imposes its 
control in various realms such as language and education; however, at the same time they are granted 
some kind o f autonomy in determining and continuing their ways o f life. This is a sensitive and 
important issue that requires further research and debate.
96 I w ill describe Chunjie Lianhuan Wanhui Hf- © c  l i f e (New Year Eve Extravaganza) in more 
detail in Chapter 5.
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temporary permit requires several documents97 that are not always easy to obtain and 
which can take a long time to process. So quite often people do not wait to have all 
their documents ready before they leave their hometowns, and simply migrate to big 
cities to find work. As a result, there are enormous numbers of rural migrants in 
major cities like Beijing, Shanghai, Guangdong, and Shenzhen who stay and work 
illegally, and who are collectively called the floating population. Their lives in the 
city are far from easy, but at least, they have usually developed their own means of 
survival in urban areas. In Beijing, for instance, there are networks for female 
migrant workers (eg. dctgongmei zhi jia  and nongjianu peixun xuexiao
which help with finding work, accommodation, and by providing
knowledge and skills as well as emotional support. These particular organisations 
appear to be semi-official, funded partly by Chinese women’s newspapers (zhonggito 
funu bao 'j:| H Al A-fl'A These people not only do not meet the conditions for 
ordinary people as law-abiding subjects, but they also pose a challenge to the existing 
social system by living under an alternative one. In this respect, they are marginalized 
from the televisual representation of ordinary people.
Homosexuals seem to fall into a similar category. At the time of my 
fieldwork, homosexuality was not recognised by the state as an individual preference, 
and it was often regarded as a psychological illness which needed to be treated. There 
are a considerable number of existing bars and networks specifically aimed to support 
homosexuals in contemporary Chinese urban cities, and yet their existence and 
activities still remain outside of the state view of acceptable social systems. In this 
respect, they are also marginalized from the televisual representation of ordinary
97 Required documents include such items as a marriage certificate, graduation certificate, invitation 
letter from the host work units or company in the city, address in the city, and permission from the 
local government.
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people. It is important to point out that such marginalization has nothing to do with 
any actual danger they may pose to the society or social system. Because their 
behaviour is beyond the pale of normalcy assumed by the state, these subjects pose a 
threat to the discursive practice by which the state maintains the social and symbolic 
order. Whatever is ‘out of place’ is regarded as polluted, dangerous, and taboo, and in 
order to maintain the ‘purity’ of social and symbolic order, those anomalies must be 
excluded (Douglas 1966).
Another type of subject I have mentioned above is the super-rich and 
powerful. I argue that they, too, exist outside the social system, and hence are 
marginalised from the televisual representation of ordinary people. In order to 
explain this point, I want to offer an example by way of illustration. On the topic of 
the one-child policy, Tan Zhifang, a tailor working near my apartment block in 
Beijing, mentioned in Chapter 1, argued that the reason this policy does not work very 
well in the poor areas is because poor people have so little to lose from any legal 
sanctions against them. No matter how simplistic his argument may appear, Tang 
Zhifang makes an important point here. As he suggested, for the law to function, 
people have to have something that they can lose -  such as material possessions, 
freedom, or various rights and hopes. If people are not afraid of being deprived of or 
losing whatever they have, or if they actually have nothing to lose, then the law does 
not work. As I have discussed above, it is crucial that ordinary people be represented 
as subjects of law. In this respect, many of those who are in unfavourable conditions, 
whether they are the floating population or discontented and frustrated rural people, 
pose the ultimate threat to the operation of the power of the state. Then, for similar 
reasons, the quite opposite subjects of the super-rich and powerful are also displaced 
from the televisual representation of ordinary people, since they will too often find
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ways to get around the law, and thus exist above the operation of state power.
Above, I have suggested more specific marginalized subjects. One group was 
the unhappy old people who live in fear of losing access to basic necessities due to the 
collapse of socialist social security system. These people have no one to take care of 
them. The other was the very many discontented and frustrated rural residents who 
are deprived of consumer empowerment. Despite being quite different kinds of 
subjects, the point I argue is that the reason for then marginalization is because these 
subjects are victims of the new political ideology which the televisual representation 
of ordinary people embodies. As I discussed earlier, the new political ideology marks 
the end of communist utopia, and instead, promotes the idea of helping oneself to 
enrich one’s life. Deng’s reform with its relaxation of the moral and economic 
restrictions of the Maoist period was a solution to growing impatience and 
dissatisfaction with the failure to create the well-being promised in the name of a 
communist utopia. So these two types of subjects suggested here point to the issue of 
what happens when people still cannot find comfort and moreover are caught up in 
the pressures of the new system. Under the new political ideology, for the moment, 
there is not much in terms of solutions available for curing the unhappiness and 
dissatisfaction of these subjects.
As for the discontented and frustrated rural population, this group is often 
depicted on television within the framework of development projects, particularly the 
‘Developing the West’ programme. But, as I have discussed above, they are usually 
shown as subjects to be developed and educated. As subjects to be developed and 
educated, these unhappy people are incorporated into the ‘backward’ element of 
ordinary people. Such articulatory practice is reflected in the very common image of 
rural people as being lower quality (su zhi di Such televisual representation
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of rural population serves to defer their dissatisfactions and frustrations with the 
current social system and policy by portraying them as subjects willing to be educated 
and developed. What is excluded from such a representation is the current political 
system that generates an ever -growing gap between urban and rural populations and 
favours the urban. The urban population tends to benefit more from the new socio­
political conditions and growing commercialisation while the rural population may 
not. Yet, with the end of utopia, the rural population is left with no promise of a 
better life, and as a result, has become frustrated and angry with the state. In this 
respect, these rural populations are victims of the new political system.98
The televisual representation of elderly people assumes even further 
complexity. As mentioned above, I once had a conversation with a producer for the 
CCTV 10 programme People (Renwu K ’W) about potential subjects for this
documentary programme. I spoke to a producer about Wang Bin,99 the father of a 
close friend, who was laid off just before retirement. Wang Bin’s wife had been laid 
off a long time ago and their only son had left for France. Several months after his 
son had left for France, Wang Bin appeared on my doorstep in Beijing. He had come 
to look for a job. He told me that he feared losing his house because the state had 
been demolishing old courtyard houses all over Beijing with very little or no 
compensation, and many people were being left with nothing to eat. Not only did 
Wang Bin need to support himself and his wife, he had his own parents to take care 
of. He was angry with the Party, as he had dedicated his youth to the Communist 
Party and had worked in Xinjiang for several years, leaving his son in Beijing when 
he was young and needed his parents’ love. Now when he needed help, the state did
98 In fact there have been several cases o f  these frustrated and angry fanners expressing their anger 
against the state through uprisings, though these are never covered on the television news.
99 As the precaution to any problem, I have used the fictional name here.
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nothing to help him. The son never forgave him for being sent to Wang Bin’s parents 
in Beijing and for being left alone till the age of eight. Now, Wang Bin was left with 
no one to support or even to seek help from. I felt that Wang Bin’s story could 
generate an interesting debate on a familiar social issue, and therefore suggested to 
this producer that this would be good documentary programme material. The 
producer told me, however, that in fact there were lots of people like Wang Bin, but it 
was too sensitive to produce a story about them.
Wang Bin’s story shares elements with those of many elderly people who live 
in fear of the loss of access to basic necessities due to the collapse of the socialist 
social welfare system. For them, the new socio-political conditions and growing 
market economy have not necessarily been empowering experiences. Not only that, 
many elderly people have suffered under the new political system, which has 
dismantled previous socialist social welfare schemes and urged people to help 
themselves in times of difficulty, while those same people have been left with no 
means to create security for themselves. In this sense, Wang Bin’s story has exceeded 
the acceptable boundaries of discourse for televisual representation. As I said above, 
television programmes can take up social issues and problems with the system, but 
cannot, however, criticise the state. Wang Bing is a victim of the new socio-political 
conditions, and his story necessarily involves criticism of the state. So as the 
producer commented, it is too sensitive to be used as a programme theme. Similarly, 
Zhao Yuezhi (1998:153) notes that the media has paid little attention to the many 
unemployed or underemployed workers who fear the loss of basic necessities or to 
heavily exploited workers, and none at all to workers on strike. These examples 
suggest that television does not have any room for subjects which address any 
question on social arrangements that restrict social resources available to these people
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and which restrict their life chances.
Here, I have only dealt with a few specific examples and discussed them in a 
simplified maimer. What I want to conclude from these examples is that the 
televisual representation of ordinary people is a discursive practise which attempts to 
blind people to the growing inequality and anxiety existing in contemporary society. 
The media often focus on the positive effects of economic reforms so we hear and see 
one-sided views, yet in reality, as Chinese society has opened up, some have gained a 
variety of opportunities and attained success, but many have suffered growing 
inequality and anxiety. So the subjects described in this section who have no solution 
for their problems are excluded from the televisual representation of ordinary people 
as they undermine a positive outlook 011 the new socio-political condition.
This brings me to consider Laclau’s (1990) notion of ‘constitutive outside5. In 
his short essay “The Impossibility of Society” (1990), Laclau assumes that the ways 
in which a society is conceptualised are entirely focused on its positivity, while the 
way in which the society is really defined is through ‘what is not,5 that is, its 
antithesis, such as partiality and indetenninability, for example. These elements 
which define the society are completely silenced in the representation of that society. 
As Foucault assumes, marginal parts are the formative elements for the state's 
discursive practices where its power can be generated (Foucault 1978). In other 
words, by focusing on the totality of society, what threatens such the discursive 
practice that constitutes the totality is silenced in the representation of the society.
This argument is also echoed in Bhabha (1994) who argues that the unity of the nation 
is constructed through the displacement of the misfit, as I discussed in the opening of 
this section.
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From this point of view, some of the subjects looked at here are the 
‘constitutive outside,’ or ‘the other,’ of the new subjects called ordinary people. They 
are the antithesis of ordinary people, which threatens the operation of the power of the 
state, and hence are marginalised from the televisual representation of ordinary 
people. Thus so-called ‘backward’ subjects, as opposed to ‘advanced’ elements, in a 
new classificatory category, are in fact not the real antithesis that exists outside the 
reach of the state. Both ‘backward’ and ‘advanced’ are categories on the same side of 
the coin produced by the discursive practice of the state in order to generate its power, 
and thus are different in the same way. In this sense, ‘backward’ elements are no 
threat to the state; on the contrary, they even serve the operation of its power.
Perhaps a good example to illustrate my argument is the case of Falungong 
practitioners. Falungong is one of the many new religions that emerged in Mainland 
China in the late 1980s and early 1990s. It is a belief based on Qigong practices 
combined with Buddhism, and is led by Li Hongzhi. In late 1990s it made its name 
known in the media by its protests against a TV station in Tianjin, then later against 
the government outside Zhongnanhai ^  pH$5, the compound that houses China’s
political leaders. The protests demanded the recognition of Falungong as a religion 
that could be practised freely. Falungong has a widespread network throughout the 
country and its members include many retired high-level cadres and officials. Despite 
many theories surrounding why there has been such a big crackdown on the 
movement, Falungong practitioners have been presented on television as a threat to 
the national unity, national security, and social order. Moreover, as it has been called 
evil teachings (xiejiao and superstition (mixin iS'ffi), Falungong was portrayed
as obscurantist and anti-scientiflc. So these people have been framed as the antithesis 
to the ordinary people.
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My argument here, however, suggests that the televisual representation of 
Falungong practitioners is, in fact, not an antithesis existing outside of the reach of 
the state which threatens the operation of state power. By having been portrayed as a 
social problem or illness to be treated, in Foucauldian terms, Falungong practitioners 
are subjugated to normalisation. In this respect, they are formative elements for the 
state’s discursive practices. The point I want to make here is that the televisual 
representation of Falungong practitioners is discursively produced ‘backward’ 
elements to be corrected and enhanced. As a potential destabilising factor for society 
and thus an antagonistic element to the hegemonic power of the state, they are 
silenced altogether in televisual representation. On the other hand, the capacity of the 
audience to reinterpret what has been represented, or to what extent they are aware of 
discursive absence, is another story, which I will discuss in Chapter 5.
The Truth about Laobaixing ^ l=f
So far, I have discussed the sudden attention to the televisual representation of 
ordinary people in the reform period that has to do with the changing operation of 
state power and its ideology. Not only are ordinary people all of a sudden assumed to 
have stories to tell, they are made into speaking subjects who possess different stories 
to tell. As a matter of fact, in any programme, there have always been many ordinary 
people presented on the screen -  and yet for decades, most are ignored or 
downplayed, so that one or two could rise as heroes. For instance, in communist hero 
dramas, there are many minor characters suffering from the abuse of a horrible 
landlord, or nameless ones who die in the battle for socialism, all in the end in order
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for one hero-to-be to emerge. As Zhang Xiaoqiang writes, “TV dramas cannot lack 
ordinary people, because ordinary people demonstrate the other side of life (to the 
hero). .. .ordinary people reflect the state of living, multiple complexities of living 
and inner details of deep and broad lives” (1996:183). The televisual representation 
of ordinary people is not totally new. The celebration of ordinary people’s stories 
{laobaixing de gushi ^  on present-day television is a discursive
creation.
Contrary to the much -celebrated status of ordinary people’s stories 
{laobaixing de gushi on present-day television, the demand for
documentary programmes has been low. Mi' Zhang, a teacher from BBI, argues that 
documentary programmes do not have any selling points {maidian -35/^), because 
people do not want to watch their own lives on television. This comment points out a 
paradox. As discussed in the previous chapter, on one hand, it is assumed that 
ordinary people’s stories are a key factor for making television more appealing to the 
viewers, while on the other hand, it is claimed that viewers are not interested in 
watching stories about people’s lives -  yet both assumptions are about the lives of 
ordinary people. This suggests that the ‘ordinary people’ on contemporary Chinese 
television are not the same subjects as those ordinary people who live in the mundane 
reality depicted in documentary programmes.
‘Ordinary people’ do not simply exist out there waiting to be discovered. Mr 
Zhang’s point suggests that previous representations of ordinary people or ordinary 
people in documentary programmes are mundane depiction of subjects existing in a 
familiar environment, while the newly rediscovered ordinary people I have been 
discussing up to this point are the dramatic depiction of subjects adjusted for popular 
appeal. These different representations of ordinary people are all articulations, and
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neither is a truer ‘ordinary people’ than the other. The idea of ‘ordinary people’ is 
constructed in their very representation on television. Rabinow and Dreyfus write:
Subjects do not first preexist and later enter into combat to harmony. In 
genealogy subjects emerge on a field of battle and play their roles, there and 
there alone. The world is not a play which simply masks a truer reality that 
exists behind the scenes. It is as it appears.
(1982:109)
Then, the key to further understanding the implication of the televisual representation 
of ordinary people in relation to the workings of power in post-reform China is the 
rediscovery of ordinary people in the contemporary television scene. The new 
ordinary people are articulated as bearers of the ‘truth’ about the human condition, 
and their stories are regarded as ‘truer’ depictions of reality. It presents itself as 
newly discovered knowledge which leads to the emancipation of people from the 
oppressive power of the Maoist state. On the relationship between power and truth, 
Foucault writes:
Truth is of this world; it is the product of multiple constraints ... Each society 
has its own regime of truth... not those true things which are waiting to be 
discovered but rather the ensemble of rules according to which we distinguish 
the true from false, and attach special effects of power to “the truth”.
(1980:131)
The point Foucault makes here is also relevant for understanding the televisual 
representation of ordinary people in contemporary China. What I have examined 
above is “the ensemble of rules according to which we distinguish the true from false” 
about ordinary people, and as discussed in the above, their televisual representation is 
a technology of the State for producing new kinds of selves. The point to which I 
want to bring attention is that the new representations of ordinary people are claimed 
to be the discovery of the ‘truth’ in relation to their depiction in the Maoist period.
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In contemporary society, the new representation of ordinary people 
distinguishes itself from the Maoist one by emphasizing the human condition where 
individuality and personal sentiments are recognized and celebrated as the ‘truer’ 
vision of reality. By doing this, the state establishes a more humanitarian appearance 
than that of Maoist Party control . Moreover, by creating Maoist oppressive Party 
control as the ‘other,’ the state conceals its new operation of power. In this way, not 
only has the failure of Maoist propaganda never become an issue for the operation of 
the power of the state in contemporary China, but it also has used it to its advantage. 
Thus, the new televisual representation of ordinary people marks a change in state 
technology used to govern people from the previous form of repressive domination to 
governing through more positive means; even though, in practical terms, the former 
partially continues to exist, and thus, one is not merely replacing the other.
This concealing of the new operation of power is further reinforced by the 
ways in which power remains to be talked about very much in its negative aspects -  
that is to say, power can ‘do’ nothing but say no -  by both foreign and Chinese 
scholars.100 As Zhao Bin notes, ‘‘State control is always easier to identify with its iron 
fists striking out from concrete institutions and governing bodies” (1999:302). 
Foucault, on the other hand, notes that in a modern state “power is tolerable only on 
condition that it masks. Its success is proportional to its ability to hide its own 
mechanisms” (1978: 86). I argue, as Foucault has pointed out here, that the operation 
of state power has become harder to recognise in contemporary China. Moreover, the 
language of the ordinary people serves a new political language. It has enriched the 
sign system of the Party in order to effectively win over the competition with
100 Foucault argues that the principle features o f  the political analysis o f  power in the history o f the 
West are defined in a restrictive way. He points out that before 1968 power was analyzed usually in 
terms o f  either ‘the Sovereign’ (by ‘the Right’) or ‘the State’ (by Marxists) and as a consequence ‘the 
mechanism o f the new formation o f  power was rarely analyzed (1978:169).
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commercial culture in disseminating its ideology (Barme 199b). So despite the much 
celebrated importance and influence of the market, the hegemonic power of the state 
can still remain firmly in place.
A similar argument can be made for the ways in which knowledge and skills 
are taught in the TV production course at the BBI. TV production has been taught 
with much emphasis on what kinds of programmes there are and the different ways of 
producing them. For instance, we were often taught elaborate classifications for 
different kinds and styles of programmes as well as methods of production. On the 
other hand, I had long expected there to be many codes, rules and regulations for 
television production. In this respect, at first, it almost appeared as if there were no 
controls on television production in contemporary China. The knowledge taught at 
the BBI has been very much focused on what you can do, while what you cannot do 
has been greatly underplayed. There was little mention of censorship and regulations, 
or even media laws in the class. So, media professionals-to-be are placed under the 
positive operation of the power of the state, so as to serve the workings of power in 
the realm of television without those professionals necessarily being conscious of this.
Moreover, many teachers at the BBI were critical of comments on the role of 
political control on Chinese television. They often argued that one has to give credit 
for the amount of transformation Chinese television has achieved in recent times and 
to consider the cultural and historical background of China. I assume that these 
teachers were not consciously serving as instruments of the state to hide the workings 
of state power existing in present-day Chinese television. As many of them had been 
producers, and considering that the BBI is a training institute for media professionals, 
they were interested in what, in a practical sense, one can do to produce a television 
programme. They often had other considerations, and as producers, they had to
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consider what they could do in China now. They saw no use in talking about what 
one cannot do and criticising the environment of Chinese television.
So ‘the truth’ about the ordinary people also varies for people in different 
positions depending on what their agenda and interests are. Within the realm of the 
‘do-able,’ media professionals 011 different occasions push the boundaries for different 
reasons. Television production is never likely to be a simple matter of ‘encoding’ 
ideological messages. In the next chapter I will discuss this point further by looking 
at actual television production practices.
Conclusion
To conclude this chapter, I have argued that while the marketisation of 
television has provided the momentum for an appeal to the audience, this has not 
meant that television has ceased to serve as a state technology. In a speech reviewing 
the work of 1999 and planning the work for 2000, Tian Congming has claimed that 
the relationship between television and the Party is for the former to obey (fucong UR
/A) and to serve (fuwu UR^ ) the latter.101 It is clear that the stance of contemporary
television still acknowledges its service to the interests of the state, although there are 
increasing presences of other agendas which make the situation of contemporary 
Chinese television more complicated. In this chapter I have shown how the televisual 
representation of ordinary people, despite its plural and individualised form, serves 
the operation of state power.
Perhaps such a conclusion is not surprising, for a fundamental principle of
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Chinese television remains even today to serve as the mouthpiece of the Party, though 
certainly such role is performed in more subtle and less direct ways. Unlike Western 
media, Chinese television publicly recognises its ideological and moral 
responsibilities. In fact, the argument about contemporary Chinese television as the 
mouthpiece of the state itself is not new. The reason I have looked in detail at the 
televisual representation of ordinary people in relation to the operation of state power 
is to illustrate how it serves ideological and moral concerns. As I discussed in 
previous chapters, many scholars working on China portray the transition from the 
monotonous communist heroes to multiple individualised subjects as an indication of 
the empowering of ordinary people. In this chapter, I have attempted to demonstrate 
the ways in which the hegemonic power of the state still exists in the post-reform 
society. The point here is that power does not operate in any mythical way.
On the whole, Chinese television has remained under the control of the state. 
Popularisation or marketisation of television cannot be simply regarded as a step 
towards democratisation, even though some television programmes may occasionally 
cause unintended consequences, as in the case of River Elegy.102 It is important to 
remember that it was the state that actually forged the whole process of marketisation, 
in the name of economic reform in the late 1970s, taking the view that if the market is 
properly managed and regulated, then it will serve as a means of enriching the life of 
the people, and hence enhancing the legitimacy for the Party.
At the same time, since the commencement of market reforms, there has been 
growing pluralisation and social fragmentation within Chinese society. People are 
increasingly differentiated by income as well as by geographical factors (particularly
101 Zhonggno Guangbo Nianjicmg l:|:| ^  2000, P.8. Translation is mine.
102 The provocative message o f calling out to China to open up like the yello river flowing into the sea 
in the television series River Elegy is often used as the symbolic reference o f the pro-democracy 
movement o f  1989. See Liu 2001.
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the urban/rural divide), educational levels, and political status. Thus, the creation of 
the ordinary people as new heroes can be regarded as the Party’s attempt to contain 
such broad social trends and differentiated masses under its control. The examination 
of them in this chapter through a Foucaudian approach illustrates that they are 
constructed as particular subjects with diversities. In this respect, the televisual 
representation of ordinary people seems to be a “correlation between an increasing 
individualisation and the reinforcement of totality” (Foucault 1988:162-3 quoted in 
Bhabha 1994:151). The multiplicity of the ordinary people is multiple in a particular 
way.
The operation of state power changed together with China’s rapid social 
change since the late 1970s. One of the trends I discussed in this chapter is the 
increasing development of the institutionalisation of society. Ordinary people are 
assumed to be the subjects of law, whereas in the past, the people were considered to 
be the ‘object’ of propaganda activities. Under the new socio-political conditions, 
people need to be governed and administered by creating particular desires, producing 
knowledge, multiplying discourses, inducing pleasure, and generating power, instead 
of merely through oppression. The state does not simply hail people with 
propaganda, but uses the success of popular programmes to modify its propaganda 
work by incorporating more affective dimensions (cf. Keane 1998b, Barme 1999b).
As Keane notes “modern forms of culture such as television act on the social in a 
more indirect way, to influence “ways of life” rather than to make people believe CCP 
ideology” (1998b: 481). The new televisual representation of ordinary people is a 
part of such a wider discourse, and thereby influences the ways in which people relate 
with and understand their everyday life.
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This changing way of disseminating state ideology further extends to the way 
in which the audience is referred to. In his “Talks at the Yan’an Forum on Art and 
Literature” in 1942, Mao Zedong referred to the audience as dnixiang MUX meaning 
the ‘target’ or ‘object’ of media, which implies a view of television as a propaganda 
activity (Mo Takuto Bimken Shifyo Kenlcyu Kai A  A  A  % 4t 1971:114),
while now the terms guanzhong meaning ‘viewing masses’ and shouzhong A A
meaning ‘receiving masses’ are used to refer to the audience. These terms are used in 
a way similar to what Ang calls ‘audience-as-market’ (1991:29) whereby 
“communication is considered effective as soon as attention is actually given by 
audiences, no matter its quality or impact” (Ang 1991:19). Kane (1998b: 490), 
however, notes in official statements about television the term ‘the audience’
(guanzhong MXk, shouzhong 5tiX) is still rarely used. He claims that policy 
documents from the Ministry of Culture, instead, call viewers of television 
programmes ‘the masses’ (dazhong A A , qnnzhong S & )  or ‘the people’ (renmin A  
Oc), both of which have political connotations as discussed in Chapter 3. Perhaps
such a Party view of television viewers as political subjects further supports my 
argument in this chapter that the state sees television as a means of guiding and 
influencing the people.
Up to this point, I have examined the televisual representation of ordinary 
people from a more theoretically oriented position, although I have drawn on some 
voices of local people, mainly media specialists, and have used examples of actual 
programmes. In the following chapter, however, by drawing on actual television 
viewing practices, I will discuss that theoretical propositions about cultural production 
do not always correspond to actual experiences.
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Chapter Five
Engaging Heroes: Television audience and articulation of multiple 
subjects
On the second day of the Chinese New Year 1999, on the way back from 
dinner with friends, being at that time a blindly romantic anthropologist, I said to 
Wang Lei, “ Wanhui {The New Year's Eve Extravaganza) is just the thing to 
watch on the eve of Chinese New Year when you are with your friends or relatives 
eating and chatting!” In response, Wang Lei commented “ Watching Wanhui
when you are playing majiang is even better, and it especially looks good if you are 
winning, but if you are losing then everything looks bad.” Suddenly, the romantic 
anthropologist in me was drawn back to the cold chill air of a Beijing winter.
The New Year Extravaganza (commonly called Wanhui -  full name
being Chunjie lianhuan wanhui jT_JP E F ^ c h a s  been broadcast on CCTV, as well 
as on many of the other main provincial channels,103 on Chinese New Year’s Eve 
every year since the early 1980s. It consists of variety of song and dance numbers 
{gewu sketches {xiaopin /hrm) and cross-talk {xiangsheng 4'(j -the latter
two often themed around topical issues for ordinary people in a comical entertaining 
manner. As a key programme of the entire Chinese television output, the production 
of The New Year Extravaganza is directly supervised by CCTV cultural officials as 
well those from the SARFT. In the months running up to its broadcast, preparation
103 Since the mid-90s, many regional and local television networks began to make their own New Year 
Extravaganza. Yet still many o f  the provincial satellite channels broadcast CCTV Wanhui on the 
Eve o f Chinese N ew  Year.
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for the show gets wide press coverage which generates much subsequent comment 
and criticism.
The New Year Extravaganza has a quite explicit message of unity amongst the 
nationalities {minzu tuanjie which is brought to the audience's attention by
different segments throughout the programme. In this respect, The New Year 
Extravaganza becomes more than just a traditional Spring Festival ‘happy family 
gathering’ and attempts to be a realisation of national belonging and unity. The 
common image of how Chinese New Year Eve is spent, as depicted in various media, 
is a family gathering with the television set showing The New Year Extravaganza in 
the background. Watching The New Year Extravaganza has become part of the ritual 
of celebrating the Chinese New Year for many households, not just in Beijing but 
probably in many other places throughout China. It is regarded as “indispensable for 
the Spring Festival culture itself’ (Zhou 1997:43 quoted in Zhao 1998:44).
Like many Chinese families, Wang Lei’s family -  Wang Lei, his parents, his 
sister and her husband, and the husband’s parents— went out for dinner on New 
Year’s Eve at a nearby hotpot restaurant. When they came home, they tuned in to The 
New Year Extravaganza while they chatted. This description of Wang Lei’s Chinese 
New Year’s Eve fully echoes the rhetorical image of a happy ordinary Chinese 
family. Then, how are we to understand Wang Lei’s comment? Is Wang Lei 
‘resisting’ the dominant discourse which claims watching The New Year 
Extravaganza on New Year’s Eve as a time for national unification? Is he trying to 
subvert the ideological values encoded in Wanhui Ujfo^? Should I take this comment
as an indication of Wang Lei’s orientation and concern about ‘money,’ and hence 
towards capitalist values? Or, perhaps, Wang Lei does not share the appropriate 
‘cultural code’ to appreciate this programme? As a frustration to both academic and
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market researchers, the relationship between audience and media -  in particular, how 
media reception affects the thoughts or actions of members of that audience— is far 
from clear (Gurnham 2000:119).
In recent years, however, according to television magazines and newspapers, 
the popularity of The New Year Extravaganza has been declining, and fewer people 
watch it. The importance of the programme is reinforced by the amount of 
commentary in a variety of media which take the declining popularity of The New 
Year Extravaganza as a kind of social issue to be discussed. In previous chapters, I 
have discussed how, in the reform period, it is important for programmes to be 
appealing to the audience. Considerable efforts were made both by government 
officials, scholars, and media professionals to win the support of the audience. In an 
attempt to make the televisual representation of heroes more appealing to viewers, 
previous communist heroes were replaced with ordinary people with qualities and 
conditions that resemble their own reality. Communist heroes of the Maoist period 
were criticised as raised too high, so that people could not relate to them. I have also 
demonstrated that it was a major concern of television professionals to satisfy the 
taste of the audience. The question remains, however, what is it about the 
representation of heroes which appeals to viewers.
Wang Lei’s above comment suggests that viewers do not necessarily engage 
with The New Year Extravaganza as an experience of national unity. Even if some 
audiences were to experience a sense of national reunion at some point while 
watching The New Year Extravaganza, viewing practices are not so straightforwardly 
elucidated. Viewers seem to articulate their own agendas and interests, different from 
those of the state or media professionals, in their engagement with the televisual 
representation. In this chapter, then, I will examine how viewers engage with and
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articulate their thoughts about the televisual representation of heroes in the context of 
contemporary urban China. In particular, I will consider how modern subjects 
produced through the televisual representation of heroes intersect with the 
subjectivities of viewers so as to form the idea of modern subjects in their everyday 
lives. To do this, I will first examine the kind of subjectivity assumed for the 
audience through some existing literature on the reception of television in the context 
of China.
Literature Review of Audience Studies in a Chinese Context
In Chapter 1 ,1 discussed how the anthropological approach to television 
viewing shares some interests with ethnographically-oriented audience studies (e.g. 
Ang 1991, Radway 1987, Willis 1997, Morley 1992), for each attempts to understand 
the ways in which audiences watch television programmes as a cultural practice, by 
taking into account then socio-cultural background. They suggest that there has not 
necessarily been any ‘fit’ or transparency between the encoding and decoding ends of 
the communication chain, as had previously been assumed by textual determinism, 
the predominant approach in the field. This position assumes that the ways in which 
audiences watch television are determined by the socially governed distribution of 
cultural codes and discourses which different sections of the audience inhabit, which 
is similar to the idea of ‘cultural/symbolic capital’ discussed by Bourdieu (Jenkins 
1992). Within such a framework, it is commonly assumed that audiences are ‘active’ 
and ‘multiple’ in the ways in which they ‘decode’ media texts.
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At the same time, such a notion of an active audience presents a problem in 
providing the frame for empirical research on audience. There is an issue of “the 
impossibility of determining any social or textual meaning outside of the complex 
situation in which it is produced, it is difficult to imagine where to begin and where to 
end the analysis” (Ang 1996:73). As a solution, I have suggested that it needs to be 
located within the actual context, so as to let the research decide where to begin and 
end. Hence in what follows I shall look at the ways in which some scholars have 
portrayed how viewers watch television programmes within a Chinese context. 
Through this examination, I want to explore what is it about the television 
programmes that appeals to viewers, and what kind of cultural activities they are 
engaged in. On this basis, I will consider possible framings of the Chinese audience.
Audience Studies in a Chinese Context
One of the key contributions on television and television audience in China 
was made by Lull (1991). To date no other academic work on the television audience 
in a Chinese context has carried out empirical study on such a scale.104 As a part of 
his study of the Chinese audience,105 Lull examined comments made by viewers on 
the television series New Star (Xinxing). New Star, which Lull calls a “political soap 
opera,” was a 12-part television series broadcast on the national network in 1986.
104 Prior to the 1980s, audience research was conducted by television stations to determine audience 
response to their programming. Their research consisted primarily o f  neighborhood and small focus 
groups, and letters to the stations from viewers. For more information see Lull 1991: 35-38. More 
recently, a number o f Western audience research companies have been doing some television research 
for commercial purposes, while the television stations continue to carry out their research.
105 Lull’s research method was to interview families in China’s four major cities — Beijing, Shanghai, 
Guangzhou, and Xian— in 1986. He had set questions, which were asked through a Chinese 
translator/researcher o f  all the families in the form o f informal interviews, and which were recorded. 
Since he was not a Sinologist nor did he speak Chinese, he had to rely for interpretation o f viewers’ 
comments on this Chinese translator/research. Lull does not take a reflective position, however, it is 
worth asking how much this background influenced his analysis. Furthermore, the question still 
remains as to the extent that his being a respectable, white, American professor influenced what people 
said and did, particularly in the family context, which is assumed to be intimate and closed from the
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One of Lull’s findings was that television serials such as New Star articulate a form of 
resistance to institutionalised authority. The depiction of politically orientated 
viewers engaged with the series runs throughout his account. This theme becomes 
even more explicit in the ways in which Lull argues how Chinese viewers have 
identified the socio-political conditions of the series with their own reality, and 
engaged with the political discourse of the Communist Party through watching New 
Star. As for the specific relationship between the representation of Li Xiangnan, the 
hero of this drama, and the viewers, Lull notes:
.. .most viewers of New Star praised Li for his aggressive and rather self- 
righteous personality. They often spoke of him as friend. They said that they 
could participate vicariously in reform through him.
(1991:120)
Lull claims that most viewers had identified with Li Xiangnan, and participated 
vicariously in reform through him as they watched the programme. Then what is it 
about the televisual representation of Li Xiangnan viewers identified with? Have they 
experienced the programme in a same way? Smith (1995) argues that viewers 
identify with the situation which the narrative sets up, rather than with a particular 
individual. He claims that identification is a series of different psychological states 
viewers experience while watching the television programme that are beyond rational 
responses to the television programme as text.106
As mentioned in Chapter 1, Miller (1992) studied the viewing practices of 
American soap operas in the context of Trinidad. He argues that Trinidadian viewers
outsider under ordinary circumstances.
106 Smith breaks ‘identification’ down to into a number o f more precisely defined concepts: 
recognition, alignment, and allegiance, and argues that these concepts are systematically related. 
Together they constitute what he calls the structure o f  sympathy, which is to be supplemented by 
concepts that account for the ‘empathic’ phenomena -affective mimicry and emotional simulation 
(1995:73).
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identify with characters in a programme through their clothing, rather than the 
common assumption about identification between the audience and the characters as 
emotional experiences. In this respect, the identification could be founded in an 
aspect of social life that is significant to different viewers. Morley (1992) assumes 
that there is no television viewing without any identification, as he takes identification 
to be a complex notion which could take different kinds and levels. He notes:
Identification implies not just a one-to-one correspondence between a viewer 
and some favoured character, but also a more general identification, at a 
number of different levels, between what appears on the screen and the lives, 
understandings or emotions of those who attend to it. This does not only 
apply to the realist text. One can hardly imagine any television text having 
any effect whatever without that identification.
(1992: 208&209)
This is not only to say that there are different levels and kinds of 
identifications, but also suggests that how viewers identify with the programme is 
further embedded in the different social lives of each viewer. In other words, 
identification is not an activity that can be isolated from the socio-cultural 
backgrounds of viewers. It is likely that different viewers with different socio­
cultural backgrounds have identified with the televisual representation in different 
ways. On this point Ang notes:
what is at stake is not the understanding of ‘audience activity’ as such as an 
isolated and isolatable object of research, but embededness of ‘audience 
activity’ in a complex network of ongoing cultural practices and relationships.
(1996: 42)
In this respect, it appears that what viewers of New Star identified with in the 
televisual representation of Li Xiangnan may not be the same. Viewers did not 
necessarily identify with Li Xiangnan’s righteous spirit against authority, or even the 
socio-political condition of this drama. There could be more to the television
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programme that viewers have engaged with. In Lull’s analysis of the Chinese 
audience, however, viewers are constructed as politically conscious, often resistive, 
subjects whose hopes and desires are embodied in the television series through the 
righteous acts of Li Xiangnan. Though Lull’s work is a ground-breaking piece of 
research on Chinese audience, it presents two major issues. Firstly, Lull’s account of 
viewers’ comments is listed without any contextualisation. As a result, they get in 
some ways blurred with Lull’s own reading of New Star, and especially with his 
assumptions about how Chinese viewers have appreciated the programmes. One of 
the dangers with research on reception, then, is that we could easily fall into this trap 
by saying more about the authors’ construction of a particular ‘audience’ than about 
how people actually engage with the television programme. Second, even though 
Lull’s study of audience presents a variety of voices of Chinese viewers, I observed 
that there is an underlying assumption of viewers as a collective in opposition to the 
government.
These points could be grounded in the fundamental approach of Cultural 
Studies. Despite the differences between the contexts in which each of them are 
commenting, one could argue Lull’s work shares some of the fundamental approach 
to the empirical work on the audience produced in Cultural Studies, such as Morley’s
107Nationwide project for instance. In both works, there is an emphasis on accounting 
for the counter-hegemonic, or oppositional, meanings which viewers have produced. 
Concerning the purpose of his Nationwide research, Morley writes,
... we were concerned with the conditions under which counter-hegemonic, or 
oppositional, meanings were produced within the communicative exchanges 
initiated by the programme.
(1992: 91)
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Cultural Studies aims to identify the ‘resistance’ or counter-hegemonic readings 
expressed by viewers, as opposed to some ‘preferred’ set of meanings or definitions 
of events assumed in dominant readings. It needs to be pointed out, however, that 
while these cultural studies scholars are more interested in ‘negotiated’ and ‘resistant’ 
readings of audiences, it is not because they assume audiences are always resistant but 
because these readings cannot be simply read off programmes themselves.
This approach was widely adopted in the study of popular culture in post- 
refonn China. The ideas of heroes assumed by different scholars in academic 
literature on post-refonn China, discussed in Chapter 2, fit with such a trend. It seems 
that the accomplishment of such an objective was even more strongly supported due 
to China’s social circumstances. As Keane notes:
with the onset of refonn and the increasing pluralisation and social 
fragmentation within Chinese society, the task of identifying resistance (in 
particular the kinds of sub-cultural forms of resistance that cultural studies has 
championed in western academies) has been made easier.
(1998b: 482)
The fact of China being a communist country, whether it is true or not in reality, often 
makes for associations with oppressive government, and a view of Chinese media as 
Ideological State Apparatus to be ‘resisted’.
Perhaps, Freedman’s study of the Chinese audience elucidates this point 
further. In his study of the ways in which people in China ‘interpret’ what he calls 
‘Leninist media,’ Freedman writes:
Oppressed people incapable of political action often grow cynical about 
political views and actors... because China’s rulers lack legitimacy, the 
alienated citizenry decode government propaganda to harmonize it with 
popular oppositional presuppositions. There are such contradictions within the 
system, ... that to classify the state system as totalitarian obscures potentially
107 Although the emphasis on class -based analysis is absent in Lull’s work, unlike Morley’s research.
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powerful popular opposition.
(1994:134)
One could notice an emphasis on the depiction of a dialectic relationship between the 
‘people’ and the government through the use of the words ‘oppressed people,’ 
‘oppositional culture’ or ‘popular opposition’ here. The way in which people engage 
with Chinese media described here echoes the image of oppressed farmers fighting 
against the totalitarian government in the Weapon o f the Weak (Scott 1990).
Freedman presupposes the Chinese state to be something bad, and viewers to be 
meaning-making and political subjects who constantly resist the regime through 
oppositional decoding.
It is true that there are many occasions when viewers read in meanings other 
than the ones articulated by the state; however, whether such alternative meanings 
could be regarded as ‘resistance’ is open to further examination, as how people 
engage with media is a much more complex issue. Chinese people are not 
homogeneous, so the use of ‘double coding’ is open to different kinds of symbolic 
and cultural capitals of viewers. Subversive readings are just one of many other 
possible interpretations. Weller (1994) argues that the potential for resistance remains 
in the midst of the kaleidoscopic array of possible readings. He notes:
Resistance is not everywhere. I will argue, however, that the indeterminate 
meaning that thrives in the absence of rigorous institutions of interpretive 
control typically indicates a strong potential for resistance.
(1994:26)
Weller claims that indefinite and multi-vocal meanings always existed, but that for 
them to be transformed into resistance requires a social organisation -  that is, the 
active working of agency in institutionalising an interpretation. Thus, such potentials 
are the germs of resistance movements, but alternative meanings alone are not that
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resistance, Weller further points out that one of the agents to produce a single and 
definitive interpretation is the intellectual. In this respect, ‘resistance’ is another level 
of articulation.
Another famous work on Chinese audience is Rofel (1994), on the television 
drama Aspirations in the context of post-Tiananmen China in the 1990s. She notes 
her intention to combine both textual analysis and audience research in her work, and 
to include different voices of people in different positions.108 Rofel suggests that the 
key understanding of the reception of Aspirations lies in the way it is suffused with 
re-imagined possibilities of national identity or what Anderson calls the ‘nation-ness’. 
Rofel notes:
Television’s simultaneity, ubiquity, and openness to state control have enabled 
it to supplement print media as the means through which “the national order of 
things” ... is consciously imagined.
(1994:702)
As mentioned in Chapter 2, Rofel discusses this point through the representation of 
Liu Huifang, the heroine of this series, as the quintessential embodiment of Chinese 
nation-ness. She argues that the kinds of crippling that Huifang finally experiences in 
the series indicates China’s future, so in the show, China/Huifang must be saved by 
Luo Gang, an intellectual male hero who represents a new kind of masculinity for 
post-reform China. In her view, the national identity is thus continuously recreated 
through popular culture, in this case a television series. Yet, questions still remain as 
to what extent the audience was actually concerned about national identity while 
watching Aspirations, and how viewers have articulated imagining of the “nation- 
ness”?
108 She looks at responses from factory workers and intellectuals in her work, though there is a 
tendency in her favouring the voices o f  the intellectuals.
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In fact, it was after Aspirations became really popular that it was incorporated 
into the state discursive practice. In this sense, the topic of national identity could 
well have been of no particular concern to the television professionals producing 
Aspirations. The ways in which viewers watched the programme might not have 
been so politically oriented, in a way Wudunn (1991) showed in her report on the 
reception of Aspirations. This is not to deny the political significance of this 
television series suggested by Rofel, however, as Weller pointed out, there are always 
indefinite and multi-vocal meanings in addition to political ones. Political discourse 
does not necessarily dictate the actual viewing practices on the micro-level.
The image of less politicised Chinese viewers than those in the above two 
works emerge in Zha’s studies on Aspirations. Zha comments that the success of 
Aspirations came because it offered “a recognizable slice of daily lives as mundane 
and banal as their own as well as the unpredictable ups and downs of political and 
social fate, such as they themselves had experienced over the past few 
decades”(1995:50). Here, one could observe more personalised subjects in Zha’s 
framing of Chinese viewers. Zha assumes that one of the keys to the success of 
Aspirations is its orientation towards the audience. She writes, “They [scriptwriters 
of Aspirations] decided, for example, that their show must be about the family and 
moral values which the majority of its audience could identify” (1995:38, the addition 
is mine). Here, again, identification is assumed as a key for winning the support of 
viewers.
In her analysis of Chinese viewers, Zha attempts to demonstrate different 
decodings determined by viewers with different social backgrounds, hence, different 
symbolic and cultural capitals. However, Zha mainly focuses on portraying the
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voices of those who belong to the literary avant-garde, and assumes that the ‘ordinary’ 
viewers are simply ‘cultural dopes’. As she notes:
After all, Yearning [Kewang] had been a great showcase for the state: the 
Chinese people may have followed the students and the elite intellectuals to 
Tiananmen Square, but now these same people were suddenly reunited with 
the government.
(1995:33, the addition is mine)
In this respect, even though the audience is constructed of personal and emotional 
subjects, they are still presupposed as a collective that is the target of Party 
propaganda.
In the above studies of reception in the Chinese context, viewers are framed to 
be politically conscious and committed subjects. Going against such a common 
presupposition about the Chinese audience, Barme writes:
It was no small irony that whereas socialism had made people cynical about 
official politics, the market had engendered a wariness of dissident writing and 
committed literature even among some of its avowed supporters.
(1999c:354)
Barme takes a critical view on the political commitment of viewers. In the late 90s in 
Beijing, this point was certainly to be taken into consideration, as people’s 
relationships with politics and political discourse seemed to be changing from the 
time of the early reform period when the Tiananmen incident took place. One of the 
key factors that contributed to such a sentiment was access to information. Previously 
much information was unavailable to the ordinary masses, but access to information 
has increased greatly in recent years through the expansion of the media and the 
development of technology. For instance, Barme mentions Bill Clinton’s lecture at 
Peking University on June 28, 1998, and notes that whether the topic was on the need 
to protect individual rights, media freedom, or democracy, Clinton had nothing much
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he could say that had not been prefigured in books and magazines freely available in 
the city in the months prior to his visit (1999c:355).109 With the opening up to the 
outside world and increasing opportunities due to the development of a market 
economy, people became increasingly busy with pursuing their interests outside the 
realm of politics. So, previously inaccessible information was not necessarily 
relevant in the way as it used to be for many people. As I discussed in previous 
chapters, people no longer have to be conceptualised as monotonous political subjects 
in the way imposed on them for many years.
In the above-cited works, Chinese audiences are also depicted as meaning- 
making subjects. Contrary to the image of such rational subjects, Wang Shuo,110 a 
famous writer as well as one of the creators of the popular television series 
Aspirations, comments that “Chinese always fall for anything labelled ‘the first’”
(Zha 1995:52). Here he claims that the audience enjoys novelty in television 
programmes, rather than particular meanings. Unlike most scholars and cultural 
officials discussed above and in previous chapters, Wang Shuo undermines the idea of 
the audience as meaning-making subjects. He brings up the important point that the 
viewing practice of a particular television programme further needs to be considered 
inter-textually in relation to other media texts, such as newspapers, television 
magazines and other programmes, as much of the ‘first’ is constructed in those texts. 
Wang Shuo opens up the possibility that what people find pleasurable about a
109 This lecture was broadcast on television, followed by a question and answers session. At the time,
I sat with my Chinese friends in front o f  the TV in my flat in Beijing with anticipation that this 
programme would generate a provocative debate; however, I experienced from my Chinese friends a 
response similar to what Barme describes here. They were disappointed by this lecture it contained 
nothing new to them. Wang Lei told me that, after all, the questions are all prepared well in advance. 
That was all the comment on this programme.
110 Wang Shuo is a writer, and popular cultural figure, is known for mocking the pretentiousness o f the 
intelligentsia and a tongue-in-cheek self-critical style. Because o f this style, it is hard to pinpoint what 
he is saying exactly, and to what extent he is serious about the claims he makes.
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particular television programme may lie in something outside of the immediate text or 
its political implications.
Here, though necessarily briefly, I have looked at how viewers are framed in 
different studies of television audience in contemporary China. It appears that despite 
some pioneering works in the study of television reception in the context of China, we 
know little about viewers and how they engage with television programmes in 
empirical terms. At this stage, much of the literature on the television audience 
remains at the level of theoretical speculation. In what follows, I will look at the 
articulatory practice of the televisual representation of heroes by viewers. In 
particular, I am interested in exploring what it is about heroes that viewers identify 
with and how viewers engage with the particular subjects represented as heroes. I 
will examine these points by looking at the conversations I had with viewers about 
particular representations of heroes. From this analysis I will further attempt to 
consider how such engagements inform us about the subjectivity of the viewers and 
about their lives in contemporary urban China. Lila Abu-Lughod writes,
reconstructions of people’s arguments about, justifications for, and 
interpretations for what they and others are doing would allow clearer 
understanding of how social life proceeds. It would show that, within the 
limited discourses (that may be contradictory and certainly are historically 
changing), people strategize, feel pain, contest interpretations of what is 
happening -  in short, live their lives.
(1993:14)
In a similar way, through a focus on viewers’ conversations and comments on the 
televisual representation of heroes, I seek to demonstrate how people live their lives in 
a particularly situated condition of contemporary urban China. In other words, I will 
attempt to situate audiences back into their lives. I argue that viewers are not simply
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>particular subjects called the ‘audience’ or ‘spectators,’ but also exist within multiple 
social relations. Television is a part of people’s complex lives. As Ang notes, we aim 
to arrive at “historicized and contextualised insights into the ways in which ‘audience 
activity’ is articulated within and by a complex set of social, political, economic and 
cultural forces” (Ang 1996:42). Along the way, I will explore the role the televisual 
representation of heroes plays in viewers’ appreciation of television programmes. In 
order to locate television in the social and cultural context, in the following section, I 
want to first portray the position of television in viewers’ lives.
Everyday Practices of Watching Television
How do people watch television in their everyday lives? In Chapter 1 ,1 
mentioned Tang Zhifang, a tailor who lived in my apartment compound, and how he 
watched television. He had a small black-and-white television set which received 
only six channels -  CCTV 1,2, and 3, BTV land 2, and the education channel. As he 
was receiving the signals terrestrially, the screen pictures and sound were far from 
clear. But he did not seem to particularly mind this. Tang lived on his own in a 
single-room brick shack. His television set was stored under a work desk and he took 
it out whenever he wanted to watch it. He watched television mostly on his own, and 
sometimes wrote in his diary comments about the programmes. Tang Zhifang 
described how he often watched programmes on the education channel with a view to 
learning, and apparently took pleasure in watching some historical programmes (I is hi 
plan ffr'lilft) and an occasional drama series (dianshiju
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In Wang Lei’s family, the television is on all evening from the time the first 
family member gets home. Readers must recognise that Wang Lei has repeatedly 
appeared throughout this thesis. At the time I was there, he was 28 years old; a 
university graduate who majored in economics, and a businessman working for a 
small foreign hading company. Wang Lei was single, and lived with his parents who 
were both engineers for the national railway in a two bedroom flat. His younger sister 
had just got married and lived nearby, and often visited home in the evening and at 
the weekend with her husband. Wang Lei regularly watched television with his 
family in the evening. They had a sizable Panasonic colour television set connected 
to a VCD machine in the living room. The signal was received by cable, so they had 
access to all the CCTV, BTV and provincial satellite channels.
At his household his mother seemed to be the one with the biggest voice in 
deciding what to watch. His parents both liked costume dramas {guzhucmgpian
i t ), and Wang Lei usually just watched whatever programmes his parents chose. I
was always impressed by Wang Lei’s very broad knowledge of the many programmes 
broadcast on different channels, which he gained from reading the media sections in 
the newspaper and zapping through different channels. He often took on the role of 
explaining the plot when his parents could not follow or understand the television 
series. Both Wang Lei and his sister, according to him, were judgemental viewers 
who often criticised programmes while they watched, and due to such interruptions, 
his parents would often lose track of the plot. By contrast, Wang Lei described his 
brother-in-law as a quiet viewer, except when there was a football match on.
In Wang Lei’s family, they often used the small window screen at the corner 
of the main screen which allows two programmes to be watched at once. In 
particular, the second screen was used regularly for watching football games and
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other sports events. For instance, Wang Lei’s brother-in-law was the only football fan 
(qiumi in the family. So, when a game was on he watched the game on the 
small screen. Also when Wang Lei wanted to watch a particular programme, he 
watched it on the small screen while his parents were watching something else on the 
main screen. When there was any dispute about what to watch, they took a vote and 
the majority watched on the main screen and the minority watched on the small 
window. Then, as soon as a commercial break came on the main screen, the small 
screen was switched to the main one till the commercial ended. Such use of two 
screens was not unique to Wang Lei’s family; other families had and used this 
function.
The following conversation may illustrate some insights into Wang Lei’s 
everyday practice of watching television. One summer day in 1999,1 was talking to 
Wang Lei and Su Xiuping, a mutual friend who owns his own business in Shanghai. 
At the time, the second series of Princess Pearl (Hitanzhu Gege was being
broadcast on television, and many people I knew were watching it. It was one of the 
big topics in daily conversation, so I asked Su Xiuping whether he watched the series. 
He responded that he did not. I commented to Wang Lei that I was surprised. Wang 
Lei said he had no choice but to watch the programme (wo ye meibanfa kan eryi $5til 
W EL) because there was nothing else on (meiyou bie de kan 
Su Xiuping responded that that was an answer typical of the Mainlander (dianxing de 
dahtren de hinda H-H flti frfc A  fi'J 1 h | w h o  thinks that he must watch one 
programme out of ten channels or so. Su Xiuping, to the contrary, rarely watched 
television and instead surfed the Internet when he had time in the evening. Wang Lei 
was quite annoyed by Su’s response. Su Xiuping told him that if there was nothing
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worth watching, then he did not have to watch television. He commented further that 
he could not understand the mentality of people who thought they had to watch 
television. Wang Lei said he did not have any choice because that was the time after 
dinner when he was feeling too warm and the only air-conditioned room in the house 
was the one with the television set. So, Wang Lei watched Princess Pearl as his 
mother enjoyed watching it, as did the rest of the family. Su Xiuping was in his 40s, 
divorced, lived alone and worked long hours since he owned a business, so he did not 
share Wang Lei's kind of family ‘pressure’. This conversation illustrates that Wang 
Lei did not necessarily choose to watch a particular programme, but watching 
television was more a part of the routine of everyday life at home. He did not spend 
the whole evening watching television either; he also read, surfed the Internet, and 
watched VCDs on his own on his computer in his room.
According to Cai Weifeng, like Wang Lei’s family, her family had a television 
set in the living room. Again like Wang Lei’s family, the television was switched on 
as soon as someone got home, though often no one came home till late. Cai Weifeng 
was a colleague of Wang Lei, though after working for a year in the same company, 
she left her job to study accounting. She was 24 years old and had just graduated 
from the university with a major in French. Cai Weifeng lived with her parents and 
her younger brother in the military compound where she had always lived, since her 
father was an officer of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). He worked most of the 
time in Tianjin, a big port city located southeast of Beijing, and came back once or 
twice a month for the weekend. After having been laid-off from her previous job, Cai 
Weifeng’s mother worked at a state-owned department store, and every other evening 
worked the evening shift. When her father was away from home, Cai Weifeng got to 
watch whatever she wanted to watch, especially since her mother frequently was
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away from home for the night shift. Cai Weifeng got to choose what to watch since 
her brother was younger and seldom watched television, as he was studying law at the 
People's University and had a lot of work to do. During his spare time, he usually 
surfed the Internet or went out with his friends.
Cai Weifeng liked watching family and relationship dramas, particularly the 
ones with her favourite actors and actresses. When her mother was at home, she and 
Cai Weifeng would talk about their day while they watched the programme. When 
her father came home over the weekend from Tianjin, the nature of family television 
viewing changed. Cai Weifeng’s father had absolute power to decide what to watch 
in the family. She complained that he only watched politically oriented programmes, 
and that she was not allowed to watch the drama series she normally watched as they 
sometimes contained love scenes or scenes of adultery of which her father did not 
approve. Sometimes during commercial breaks she got to watch a series she normally 
followed, but he would switch the channel back at the end of the commercial. 
According to Cai, her father liked news, historical and some special programmes 
which she did not consider at all interesting. Yet, she sat and watched the 
programmes with her father because he came home only a few days a month. Cai 
Weifeng claimed that they did not even talk much while they watched, so she was 
often amused by hearing Wang Lei talking about his family watching television.
Cai Weifeng normally watched the television with her mother. One afternoon 
in early April 1999,1 was watching a talk show Tell As It Is (Shihua Shishuo 
M) on television with them. No one else was in the house. Her mother kept telling 
me to eat some fruit. The topic of the show was arranged marriage. It started off by 
introducing the three sisters whose mother has arranged a marriage for each of them. 
Cai Weifeng was quite critical of the practice. As the three sisters were talking about
213
their own experiences, she said that it is only in China that you need permission from 
your work imit to get married, or even to get pregnant. Cai Weifeng asked her mother 
what if she got married to a foreigner? Cai Weifeng’s mother simply brushed aside 
the question telling her to ask her father. As mentioned above, her father is a high- 
ranking military cadre, so it seems that everything she did seemed to require approval 
from her father’s work unit which is the military, or at least from her father.
On the television screen, the host was interviewing a woman whose work unit 
had set her up with a man lot older than her. Cai Weifeng asked her mother what if I 
got married to an older man? Her mother said that should not be a problem. So, Cai 
Weifeng asked again what if this old man has been divorced before? Her mother 
responded that then it will be not appropriate; because the fact that he got divorced 
means that someone else did not want this person. Cai Weifeng said what if he had a 
child? Her mother said that only means a trouble; other people’s children are 
different from your own. Cai Weifeng commented that if two people are happy then 
it should be OK -  why do we need other people’s permission? She then kept 
watching the programme, and so did her mother. This is a typical way in which Cai 
Weifeng and her mother watch television together. Often they use a television 
programme they are watching as a way of generating conversations. Most of the time 
these conversations revolve around whatever comes to their mind. Yet, it appears that 
this seemingly mindless conversation about marriage, or any other topic, creates a 
bond between the mother and daughter.
Li Xiaoping’s family presents an example of the viewing practices of a 
working class family in Beijing. Li Xiaoping lived with her husband and 15-year-old 
son in a single room apartment. Li Xiaoping was in her 40s and worked at a state- 
owned department store. Like Cai Weifeng’s mother, she also alternated day and
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evening shifts. Her husband worked long hours at a salt factory in Beijing. Their son 
was preparing for the university entrance exam in a few years time, so in order not to 
distract him from his study, they only watched the seven o’clock news and sport 
news, which her son and husband both enjoyed. Li Xiaoping herself did not much 
care which programmes she watched. She commented that boys were not like girls 
and did not like watching television dramas while girls at his age would love watching 
a programme like Princess Pearl. So in their family they rarely watched television 
dramas. Sometimes they liked to watch entertainment programmes such as Kitaile 
Zongdongyuan ^  JZ!.111 Apart from those programmes, they seldom watched
television. Li Xiaoping also commented that sometimes she and her husband liked 
watching old revolutionary films and old Japanese television dramas, but most of the 
time she did not care much about watching television. She explained that because she 
had to work the evening shift every other day, she could not follow a series, and 
besides, when she was at home she had too many other things to do.
Another friend of mine had adjusted her viewing habits and the kind of 
programmes she watched as her social position changed. Before Cui Zhen112 got 
married, she used to have a sizeable Panda colour television set in her bedroom. The 
television was on all the time when she was at home -  which was most of the time 
since she was a seamstress working at home, and she used to watch anything (shenme 
dou kan I remember that when I used to visit her, her television set was
on in the background all the time that we chatted. We used to comment on a variety
111 Kuaile Zongdongyuan is a BTV entertainment programme with an audience and
invited guests stars playing games. It is similar to the Kuaile Dabenying (The Fun Base),
ail entertainment programme from Hunan Satellite television which is known to have set the trend o f  
the game- show style entertainment programme in Mainland China.
112 Cui Zhen is a fictional name. As the way to protect her privacy, I have invented a name.
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of television programmes.113 Then, Cui Zhen particularly liked watching television 
dramas.
When I went back to China in 1997 for my fieldwork, she had just got 
married. The big television set which used to be in her bedroom was now moved to 
the living room. She then proudly told me that she no longer watched television all 
the time, and only watched meaningful programmes and historical dramas.
According to Cui Zhen, her husband, who was an academic at the Beijing 
Geographical Institute, told her that many of the programmes she watched were 
‘meaningless’ (mei you yiyi and that she should use her time more
sensibly rather than watching television. In their household, the television set was 
only turned on just before the seven o’clock news to catch the weather forecast and 
turned off after Focus (Jiao Dian Fangtan a current affairs programme -
all on CCTV 1. On Sunday afternoons, they watched original- voice foreign films 
with subtitles on CCTV 6. When I visited Cui Zhen while her husband was away to 
the south for a few weeks for his research, however, the television set was on all the 
time as it had been before until we went to bed. Like old times, she flipped through 
different channels looking for something worth watching as we chatted.
Now Cui Zhen and her husband have her niece and nephew living with them. 
She told me that because the children want to watch television dramas, the whole 
family watches those programmes which her husband previously disapproved of -  
such as Princess Pearl— although their television set is still turned on at the same time 
for the weather forecast and left on for the seven o’clock news then Focus. Her 
husband retreats to his room to work after Focus, and the children are allowed to 
watch one or two more programmes, then the television set gets turned off. Cui Zhen
113 Unfortunately this was long before I started my fieldwork.
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described that nowadays she has no time for watching television, as she is very busy 
cleaning up after the meal, washing her clothes, and taking a shower to be ready for 
the next day.
What I have presented here is only a partial picture of how people watch 
television in their everyday lives in the context of contemporary urban China. It is 
clear from this account that watching television is a part of daily routine. The above 
illustration also demonstrates a range of viewing practices. Perhaps such a variety of 
viewing practices indicates different kinds of lives coexisting in contemporary urban 
China, and opposes the homogenised view of ‘the Chinese audience’. In the above, I 
have attempted to demonstrate, albeit in a limited way, that the way in which different 
people watch television is closely related to a complex set of social, political, 
economic and cultural forces, and they all meet in the domestic setting. So close 
examination of what viewers articulate and how they engage with the televisual 
representation depicts how individuals interact with this complex set of forces at the 
level of everyday life.
Methodology Used for Studying the Audience in a Context of Contemporary 
Urban China
For the purpose of a closer portrayal of how viewers have engaged with the 
televisual representation of heroes at the level of the individual, and to locate the 
audience in their lives, my examination below focuses on a very small scale. From 
the people with whom I worked, the main focus of the study is the familiar figure of
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Wang Lei, and the only other subject is Cai Weifeng. The main reason for such a 
small focus is that I wanted to prioritise people’s lives when examining their 
articulation of the televisual representation of heroes. Many scholars have already 
argued that the Chinese audience is ‘active’ and ‘plural’ (e.g. Lull 1991, Ma 2000, 
Keane 1998a, Pei 1994), and yet in what way viewers are ‘active’ or ‘multiple’, and 
the ways in which they engage with television programmes in the context of their 
everyday life, are still less clear. I felt that there is a need for a detailed study of 
reception in empirical terms and I could only do that here on a small scale. In the 
following, I will examine the articulation of the televisual representation of heroes 
through conversations I had with two viewers.
To further explain my research background, the extracts of conversation below 
are from a series of discussions on particular televisual representations of heroes I had 
with Wang Lei and Cai Weifeng on an almost daily basis while programme in 
question was being broadcast. Apart from a few occasions, we did not watch the 
television drama series together, however all of us were following the series and 
talked about it on the next day at Wang Lei’s office, sometimes at the local restaurant 
over lunch or dinner. Their boss often being away, there were only Wang Lei and Cai 
Weifeng in their small office, and they had quite a relaxed working style, so this 
arrangement suited them best -  instead of me visiting them at home everyday during 
the weekdays, where every member of the family comes back after a long day at 
work. As portrayed in the above, watching television was embedded in family life -  
it was important to consider the effect of my presence as a researcher on the intimate 
family situation at home.114 Also by having a conversation without the presence of
1,4 Particularly Wang Lei’s parents would not feel comfortable about having someone doing research 
about them in their home. I find that this is not surprising, especially considering that they had lived 
through the period when one could be accused o f being a spy for just speaking to a foreigner. In this 
respect, I think for me to meet them as a friend o f Wang Lei or as a researcher were completely
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their family, it appeared that they are freer to express their opinions. Then, in a big 
city where people tend to lead more individually oriented, busy lives, it seemed to me 
the form of research I adopted here was the most appropriate option available. The 
extracts of conversation below are from my fieldwork notes. They were not recorded 
in audio form for the reasons I have discussed in Chapter 1 -  so there is no need to 
repeat myself here.
In dealing with people’s comments about the televisual representation of 
heroes, a problem emerged in that conversations were not necessarily complete or 
fully elaborated. Drawing on her research on women’s magazines based on 75 
lengthy interviews, Hermes notes,
Everyday talk is not self-reflective. It is pragmatic, it is used to explain and to 
justify and therefore is no easy way to come to understand how women’s 
magazines (or other media) are made sense of.
(1991:504)
In my fieldwork I also encountered the same problem of fragmentation that which 
Hermes found in her research. The main issue I faced was how to deal with viewers’ 
comments. In dealing with the comments viewers made about television 
programmes, Ang notes:
What people say cannot be taken entirely at face value, for in the routine daily 
life they do not demand rational consciousness. We must search for 
presuppositions and accepted attitudes concealed within what people say.
(1982:11)
Following this view, then, instead of being caught up with and reacting to their 
immediate responses to my questions, I have attempted to consider what had been
different matters for them. As for Cai W eifeng’s case, it would have been difficult to even enter their 
house as entry to military compounds are restricted to those who have military connections.
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taken for granted in particular comments they articulated and to question the kind of 
subjects produced in their responses.
Contexts for Heroes
Quite often, viewers’ articulations seem not to be focused strictly 011 the 
particular televisual representation of heroes. This made me wonder how to 
understand their ideas about heroes. In Chapter 2 ,1 discussed the fact that the idea of 
hero is determined by its context. Dilly (1999) writes on ‘context’ as sets of 
connections constructed as relevant to someone, to something or to a particular 
problem. So, in order to appreciate to viewers’ articulation of the televisual 
representation of heroes, we must consider its contexts -  how viewers frame a 
particular representation of heroes and understand it. In the following section, I want 
to draw on my fieldwork experiences and explore different contexts for heroes.
I will start by looking at Cui Zhen’s engagement with the televisual 
representation of Zhou Enlai. As I mentioned above, Cui Zhen is married to an 
academic husband who regulates her viewing habits. Cui Zhen was in her mid-thirties 
at the time of my fieldwork. She came to Beijing in 1988 from her native home 
Henan province to go to the design school. Her marriage has not been an easy one as 
she married into an intellectual family who think she is an uneducated peasant and is 
not good enough for their Beijing graduate son who is the pride of the family.
Below is from my fieldwork notes from one day on the mid September in
1999.
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Cui Zhen told me that her husband is away on business trip down to the Three 
Gorges Dam for work, so why do I not come over to stay over night. As the 
cat is away the mouse plays -  like old times, after dinner we turned on a 
television set and watched various programmes rather randomly, from BTV 
news to a dating programme, as we chat. Cui Zheng complained that there is 
nothing interesting to watch as she zapped the channels. Then she stopped at 
Zhou Enlai’s film on CCTV 8. The screen showing old Zhou Enlai looking ill 
and lying weakly on his bed -  getting worse and worse. Nurses and doctors 
were paying respects and affection for a dying leader. Everything in the room 
is white. As Zhou Enlai gets closer to the moment of death, suddenly, the 
light pours on to his body and then he passes away. The curtain gets drawn 
and everything becomes dark all of sudden. Nurses and doctors are crying as 
they leave the room. Zhou Enlai’s wife is by the side of his body crying. All 
of sudden I’ve realized that there are sobbing noises coming from next to me. 
Cui Zhen was ciying -  as she wiped her eyes, she said ‘I really cannot bear 
this.’ I did not know how to react to this. Then Cui Zhen said T feel really 
sorry for him.’ Cui Zhen commented that if he were alive then China could 
have been a different place. She apparently thinks that Zhou Enlai is more 
capable than Mao, especially in terms of his skills for international relations. 
Besides, she likes Zhou better than Mao. Cui Zhen finds it really sad for Zhou 
Enlai that he and Mao strived for the revolution together, but in the end Mao 
got confused and messed things up with Gang of Four. As a result, Cui Zhng 
said, such a selfless man got nothing and died in the end.
Cui Zheng’s reaction has surprised me. I have known her for the last 5 years 
and she has never talked about politics or history like that. Normally when we 
watch the news she will be pointing out that Zhang Zemin’s wife appears in 
tasteless clothes, or she is overweight etc. Just before watching this film, she 
was complaining that there were too many coverage of Falungong and that she 
was really fed up watching the face of Li Hongzhi.
Watching the scene of Zhou Enlai’s dead body taken out in a car, and a line of 
cars passed in front of Tianan men, Cui Zheng said that particular scene is the 
original recording. I have asked her whether she remembers what was it like 
when it happened. Cui Zheng was bom in 1964 so at the time Zhou Enlai died 
in 1974 she was 10 years old. She said she could only remember it vaguely.
At the time she was in her home village in Henan -  there was no TV and her 
school was too poor to have a radio. She went to the school one day, and the 
teacher came in to the classroom in tears and announced that Premier Zhou 
has deceased. With the news everyone started crying. She remembers clearly 
that she cried to as the teacher read the poem and passages to praise Premier 
Zhou. Then teacher told all the students to write a poem for Zhou Enlai.
Cui Zheng never liked talking about her childhood. She is from a poor region of
Henan and her family was poor. She hated being poor and tried as much as possible
to dissociate herself from poor countryside people. So her comments took me by a
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surprise. I had known that Cui Zhen had a high regard for Zhou Enlai, but never 
knew that her feeling was so strong. Is it her strong feeling for Zhou Enlai that has 
been expressed through her tears, or is it the framework through which Cui Zhen has 
interpreted the televisual representation of Zhou Enlai? This incident highlights the 
point that the representation of the hero Zhou Enlai is supplemented by Cui Zhen’s 
memory. It was in the context of her childhood memory that she understood this 
particular representation of Zhou Enlai. The televisual representation evoked her 
strong emotional bond with and great admiration for the premier Zhou when she was 
a child. This is the discoursive framework of the hero Zhou Enlai for Cui Zhen.
In a similar way, memory plays an important role for understanding Li 
Xiaoing’s engagement with the televisual representation of heroes. As described 
above, Li Xiaoping is in her mid forties, and works as a sales clerk at the department 
store.
One day in mid- July 1999,1 was talking to Li Xiaoping about the television 
programmes she likes watching. She told me that she is not very much 
interested in new television dramas. She and her husband like watching old 
revolutionary films shown on the television and Japanese television dramas. I 
asked her what is it about those programmes she enjoys watching? Li 
Xiaoping told me that when she was young and before had a child, she and her 
husband used to watch those films together. She enjoys sitting on the couch 
with her husband, watching those old revolutionary films and talking about the 
past, having the sound really low, after their son has gone to bed. I asked her 
which one she liked in particular? She said she likes any old revolutionary 
films. Li Xiaoping then told me that she likes Gaocang Jian (Ken
Takakura). Apparently she used to be his secret admirer. Li Xiaoping finds 
him cool, edgy, and attractive. She liked his masculinity and understatedness 
at the time. Li Xiaoping also really liked Shankou Baihui ill P  (Momoe 
Yamaguchi). She finds her really beautiful -  pure and clean, gentle, and 
humble. Li Xiaoping said all contemporary stars are too noisy too chaotic. Of 
course she watches new television programmes, but thinks that they are 
neither good nor bad. It appears that she does not form any close bond with 
contemporary television dramas or films to the extent which she has for those 
previous ones.
(From my field notes)
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Similar comments were made in some other conversations I had with Li Xiaoping. I 
found that she liked talking about the time when she was younger and had lots of 
excitement about life. In Li Xiaoping’s case, old Japanese television dramas and 
revolutionary films are framed by her memory. In fact they appear to serve as 
medium to connect her with the time she treasured. From Li Xiaoping comments, it 
appears that it was not so much with the revolutionary heroes from the film 
themselves that Li Xiaoping was engaging, but that these figures remind her of 
Gaocang Jian or Shankou Baihui who seem to be quite different kinds of subjects. It 
appears that what they mean to her is that these characters are symbols of the values 
from the time of her youth - purity, passion and devotion, understated secret 
admiration, being cool, intensity, thrills and so on. There was a sense of nostalgia for 
those values. Gao Cangjian 01* other revolutionary heroes are framed by those times 
and values.
It appears that there are some elements in the representation that triggers the 
viewer’s engagement with heroes. I want to consider this point by looking at the way 
in which Wang Lei’s father did not engage with the televisual representation of 
famous hero Huang Feihong. Wang Lei’s father was in his late fifties, and at the time 
was still working. He also worked for the railway unit. Wang Lei’s father has a 
disabled left leg and limps. Apparently it was caused by his illness some years ago. 
Normally Wang Lei is not keen on introducing his father to other people, or to talk 
about his disability, so I did not ask in detail how it happened. In relation to the rest 
of family, he is a quiet person and, like Wang Lei, very direct and practical.
The new television series Huang Feihong has been widely advertised recently.
This is a version directed by Xu Ke #J^Lwith broad uses of special effects -
slow motion in the martial art scenes, special sounds for beating, use of rock
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music, and the all cut short and edited rather fast. I was really looking forward 
to watching it with Wang Lei’s family. Wang Lei’s father really likes martial 
art television dramas, so I was interested in how he views the new version of 
Huang Feihong, a famous hero.
One day in mid-April, as we were watching one episode of Huang Feihong, 
Wang Lei’s father commented that the programme did not look good. He 
mentioned that it looks like a comic book or something, while in the past he 
used to be able to see really good martial arts scenes. He commented that 
martial art skills in those scenes were beautiful. Wang Lei’s father thinks that 
these new actors do not know how to do proper martial arts neither have they 
been trained properly. Apparently the way he sees it is that this is why they 
have to rely on special effects and all kinds of nonsense.
(From my field notes)
It was what appears to be the disengagement with heroes that struck me at first. In 
fact, in his engagement with the televisual representation of Huang Feihong, Wang 
Lei’s father expects to see ‘proper’ martial arts. It is a part of what constitutes his 
idea of the hero, Huang Feihong. None of the special effects would compensate for 
such elements nor were they relevant to him. What constitutes the idea of hero, 
therefore, does not necessarily lie within the narrative. Because of the absence of 
what he calls ‘proper’ martial art element in the televisual representation of Iiuang 
Feihong, it was difficult for Wang Lei’s father to engage with the televisual hero any 
further.
Such a disengagement with heroes seems to occur rather frequently, 
particularly among the older generation. Not only did they lose the plot of television 
dramas, but they also seem to found it hard to understand the way the characters are 
constructed. Here I will draw on the example of Wang Lei’s mother. Wang Lei’s 
mother had just retired in the middle of my fieldwork in 1998. She was 56 years old 
then. The moment I met her, I knew where Wang Lei got his twisted sharp tongue 
from. She was a lady who had very little patience to answer my anthropological
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questions. She was also an exceptional cook -  Wang Lei’s household dinner was 
always abundant with delicious homemade food and they all loved eating.
Wang Lei’s family watches the television drama Princess Pearl every evening, 
as his mother loves the show. He does not want to watch the programme, nor 
does his sister -  when his mother turn the channel for Princess Peal, Wang Lei 
and his sister comment ‘oh we are watching it again’ with the sarcastic tone. 
That does not affect their mother. She just tells them to shut up, sits in front of 
the television and enjoys the show. We all wonder what it is about the Princess 
Pearl she enjoys so much.
One evening in mid-July 1999,1 was watching Princess Peal with Wang Lei’s 
family. Wang Lei’s mother commented that she likes Xiao Yanzi and finds 
her cute. At the same time, she does not seem to be particularly following the 
story or different characters in this drama. Along the way, she commented on 
Xiao Yanzi’s big expressive eyes, how silly but cute Xiao Yanzi was, how evil 
the empress can be. As we watched the programme, Wang Lei commented 
that the programme is really unreal. His sister told Wang Lei to calm down. 
This encourage Wang Lei to criticize even more by saying this drama is really 
stupid etc. His sister told Wang Lei to be quiet. After a while their mother 
shut two of them up and continued watching the drama till the end.
Once the show is finished, that is all there to it -  she does not bring the drama 
into her life. She does not even comment about it at all. I have tried to engage 
in the conversation with her about her view on the Princess Pearl and Xiao 
Yanzi. She told me ‘they are nothing to talk about.’ I countered that surely 
you must love the drama. Wang Lei’s mother then told me ‘Oh you silly 
child, television is something you have a good laugh -  then that’s it. Not that 
serious. ’ Then she went on to say that I am too old to be running around like a 
lunatic, if I were like that no one would marry me. She managed to shut me 
up too.
(From my field note)
This seems to have been the way in which Wang Lei’s mother watched television 
most of the time. On another occasion, she was playing a game in the corner of the 
living room as she watched The Deer and the Cauldron (Lndingji jftUfjiS), which is
another television drama she claimed to love watching. Occasionally she would look 
up from the game screen, and ask ‘what is happening?’ or ‘who is this person?’ It 
was not that she was slow and lacked comprehension ability. Wang Lei’s mother is a
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smart woman. In my interviews with television professionals, the main audience of 
many prime time television dramas is inclined towards younger viewers. It may go 
up to middle age consumers, however, people like Wang Lei’s parents seem in the age 
group beyond the target audience. In this respect, it does not come as huge surprise 
that they often cannot relate with the programme and are often all not able to follow 
the story. I was never been successful talking to her about the television programmes 
she watched. It seems to suggest that Wang Lei’s mother did not engage with the 
discursive frameworks for heroes. For her, such frameworks are not important part of 
watching television.
Yet, there are occasions when viewers engage with the televisual 
representations of heroes, and discursive frameworks of heroes work at the personal 
level. Below, I will examine in detail two different types of heroes from two 
television programmes to explore viewers’ articulation of and engagement with 
televisual heroes.
Two Stories and Two Heroes
I have chosen to discuss two particular televisual representations of heroes 
from two different television programmes: Xiao Feng from “Tianlong Babu AAiAwP 
” {Demi-God Demi-Devil) and Wang Zili from “Renzi A  A ” {The Son). I do not 
intend to claim that either is a ‘representative’ of Chinese television heroes or 
programmes, rather I have chosen these two heroes for the following reasons. I chose 
Xiao Feng from Demi-God Demi-Devil because of the excitement and passion over 
this programme, and its hero Xiao Feng, expressed by Wang Lei. One day over
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dinner, Wang Lei asked me if I had watched Demi-God Demi-Devil. At the time, I 
didn’t even know about the programme. He asked me how I dare study heroes and 
not follow this programme. With great enthusiasm he said that I must watch it 
because Xiao Feng was a great tragic hero (beijn yingxiong He described
Xiao Feng as a heroic character -  despite his greatness the situation he is in is not 
good, and yet the ill fate which is always against him makes Xiao Feng look even 
more tragic and heroic. This programme was extremely popular in Beijing around 
February and March 1999. At one point it was broadcast everyday by 11 different 
television stations, with some overlapping in time. On the eve of Chinese New Year, 
it was broadcast at the same time as The New Year Eve Extravaganza (Chimjie 
lianhuan wanhid ~JP lljfe ^ ) . Several people mentioned that Demi-God Demi- 
Devil had a higher viewing rate figures in Beijing than The New Year Eve 
Extravaganza that is one of the key state-promoted programmes.115
The Son was chosen because Wang Zili, the hero of this television drama, is 
created based on a real person who had been praised in the newspapers as an 
emulation model. He bears a strong resemblance to other Party-promoted communist 
heroes discussed in Chapter 2, though the character was updated to suit present-day 
conditions. The storyline of the drama also followed a set narrative (taohua for 
representing heroes on television as mentioned in Chapter 3. Wang Zili therefore 
seemed like a good choice to discuss how viewers interact with the state discursive 
practice for the televisual representation of heroes. I must mention that although this 
programme had been widely discussed and commented on by various newspapers and
1151 heard about this point from several friends. One newspaper reported that one billion people 
watched the programme, though it does not state when this measure was taken or how. {Beijing Youth 
D aily  1999/2/26, p. 18) Whether true or not, I consider such a rumour in itself illustrates how popular 
Demi-God D em i-Devil was, and also undermines the popularity and self-claimed importance o f the 
state- promoted Chinese New Year’s Eve Extravaganza.
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magazines, not many of the people I talked to had watched it, and if they had, they 
had not paid much attention.
Demi-God Demi-Devil and The Son both are television serials in which 
characters live in continuous time, and grow and change to varying degrees and in 
various ways. Both heroes ‘live’ in something similar to a real time scale -  in the 
sense that they have a past, a present and a future, even though is the two programmes 
are set in quite different times and environments (Fiskel987:150). Below, I will 
briefly introduce each story to provide some context for each hero. In doing this, it is 
important to point out that the introducing of the content of a television series 
necessarily involves a textual analysis, for presenting a story necessarily implies my 
interpretation of the plot. Hermeneutics have dealt with this issue in particular for a 
long time, and this is not the place to discuss the complicated issue of ‘interpretation’. 
The main concern I see here lies in that, as an outsider to Chinese society, I will risk 
the possibility of highlighting and articulating totally different concerns from those of 
the local people. Such an exercise could add further confusion between the 
articulatory practices of the viewer and those of the researcher. Though it cannot be 
completely resolved, in order to help me to deal with such issues, I have used some 
local newspaper and television magazine articles for pulling stories together. Having 
mentioned this issue, I will look at how heroes are set and revealed in each television 
drama series.
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Figure 6.01
Screenshot: Mother and Son 
from <Renzi>
(From Beijing Qingnian Bao, 
1/12/1998. p. 1)
Figure 6.02
Screenshot: Three heroes - Xiao Feng (center), Duan Yu (on right) and Xu Zhu (on left), 
from <Tianlong Babu> (From Beijing TV Weekly, 15-21/3/1999. p.25)
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Figure 6.03
Image o f W u Saijun , the original 
m odel for W ang Zili 
(From Beijing Oingnian Bao , 
3/12/1998. p. 2)
Figure 6.04
S c r e e n s h o t :  T h e  f i n a l  s c e n e  o f  < R e n z i > .  W a n g  Z i l i  in  f r o n t  o f  t h e  d o n a t i o n  b o x  
(From Beijing Guangbo Dianshi Bao , 7/7/1998. p. 8)
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The Son (Renzi A"?)
The Son is modelled on the story of Wu Saijun, a student at the Beijing 
University Physics Department, who has been praised in newspapers as a model 
student {mofang daxuesheng A ^ i t i ) .116 Likewise, the hero of this drama, Wang 
Zili, is a university student and the series is set in present-day Beijing. Wang Zili 
comes from a very poor family from a poor province. He has won a scholarship for 
his good moral character and academic achievement. He is enjoying his university 
life and even is romantically involved with one of his classmates. One day, however, 
he discovers that his mother suffers from a serious kidney disease. At the same time, 
he also finds out that his father has lost his job, so there is no money in the family to 
pay for his mother’s treatment. His father, however, claims that everything is under 
control. Wang Zili, then, leams that his father was temporarily coping with the 
medical costs by selling his blood. He and his father brought his mother to Beijing to 
get better treatment. To pay for the medical bills, Wang Zili works night and day, 
with only four hours of sleep each night. One of his jobs is as a cleaner for the 
woman’s toilets in the dormitory, which caused him much humiliation from his 
classmates. Yet, Wang Zili maintains his focus on curing his mother’s illness. 
Meanwhile he is trying to keep up with his studies at the university. Wang Zili, 
however, fails badly in an important competition in which he was representing his 
class and university. The lack of sleep had taken a toll on him. For all his efforts, the 
medical cost in Beijing still exceeded the money he could raise. His devotion for his
116 Beijing Youth D aily, 1998/1/12, P .l
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mother and spirit of never giving up, however, moved the doctors and nurses so much 
they ended up hying to help Wang Zili as well.
His mother’s illness, however, only got worse, and the only way to save her 
life is to get a kidney transplant, which costs two hundred thousand yuan.117 He 
decides to give his own kidney to his mother, but his kidney was not a right match. 
Wang Zili’s family simply cannot afford the cost of kidney transplant, so Wang Zili 
decides to leave university, and in exchange for covering his mother’s medical 
expenses, offers 16 years of his free labour to a small IT company. Having heard the 
news about Wang Zili leaving the university, his classmates, who have gradually 
become deeply moved and influenced by his spirit of never giving up hope of saving 
his mother over the course of time, gather to help Wang Zili in raising money so that 
he can remain at university. In the end, they manage to raise the two hundred 
thousand yuan. The series ends with Wang Zili kneeling down in front of the 
donation box to express his indescribable gratitude to the people who helped him in 
saving his mother.
The narrative of The Son fits very well into what Mr Chu portrayed as a set 
narrative for the televisual representation of heroes in Chapter 3. Wang Zili was set 
as an ordinary student from countryside. He was portrayed from the different angles 
of his academic background, family setting and different social relations with 
different kinds of people. The drama even incorporates his relationship with his 
girlfriend. Each episode stresses his devoted, sincere and diligent character. This 
devotion, sincerity and diligence move people around him to make what seem 
impossible to happen. Wang Zili demonstrates the spirit of never giving up. At the
117 Approximately US$25,000.
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same time, Wang Zili is not a perfect hero, and is set with human feelings as well as 
some weaknesses. For instance, in one episode, we see an overwhelmed Wang Zili 
get very upset, disappear from the dormitory, get drunk, and worry everyone who then 
go out to search for him in the middle of the night. In another episode, he loses his 
temper with his girlfriend who has told his mother about his plan to give his own 
kidney to his mother. Through such incidences, by portraying his humanly emotions, 
there is an attempt to make Wang Zili a more familiar character.
His heroic acts are revealed through various interactions with the people 
surrounding him, such as his family, his classmates, doctors and so on which locate 
these acts in a wider social context. There is an overall emphasis on Wang Zili’s acts 
that influence people around him and ultimately the viewers. Yet, this series differs 
from the conventional narrative of communist heroes, which centres on the dominant 
relationship between heroes and the state or ‘the people’. The Son, instead, focus on 
themes related to the everyday lives of ordinary people, such as family ties, 
friendships, and some aspects of romance, all of which can also be commonly 
observed in popular television dramas from Hong Kong, Taiwan, Korea or Japan. In 
this narrative, Wang Zili’s emotions and feelings dominate throughout the series, and 
most of his actions are led by strong emotions and feelings he experiences, rather than 
the lofty ideals for achieving the collective goals of ‘the people’ that were commonly 
seen in this type of drama in the past. One may perhaps argue that filial piety is also a 
lofty ideal. However, the difference between the two is that the lofty ideal of Lei 
Feng type Maoist heroes is oriented by collective interests, while Wang Zili’s filial 
piety is for a personal cause.
Then in what way, Wang Zili is different from heroes from Greek myth and 
European literature? By looking at the narrative, it seems that the televisual
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representation of Wang Zili shares only a few of Rorty’s characterizations of the 
heroic mentioned in Chapter 2. Like Rorty’s description, his acts of heroism are 
revealed in the face of fate as courage, endurance and devotion. Wang Zili also takes 
on what seems to be impossible tasks, however, they are all very human, rather than 
superhuman. The main difference to Rorty’s analysis seems to be that the journey is 
set off by his own choice rather than destiny.
This television programme was well- advertised and also it was known that the 
drama was based on a real story. The Son follows the style of social realist drama. 
Drawing on Williams’s idea, Fiske defines social realist drama as: “ It has a 
contemporary setting, concerns itself with secular action -  that is, human action 
described in exclusively human terms, and it is 'socially extended'” (Fiske 1987:22). 
The Son fits such a description well. The point I want to draw attention to here is the 
‘closed’ narrative which Fiske notes as one of the characteristics of social realist 
drama. As Fiske writes, “Realism, with its narrative closure and stress on the unity of 
the self, works to deny contradictions in both text and the reading subject”
(1987:154). The effect of such narrative structure appears to be the capacity to limit 
the way in which viewers engage with the drama, and to make them ascribe to a 
certain fixed ‘reading’. Bakhtin may call this process “monologisation”. It is a form 
of engagement which turns a dialogue to an end in itself -  in this case, making the 
ways in which viewers engage with television programmes into a lifeless interaction 
with no room for viewers to create meanings out of the media text (Emerson & 
Morson 1990:56-59). In other words, by achieving closure and stressing unity, the 
drama presents a particular outlook on reality and exerts control over the ways in 
which it is engaged with by people who are potentially diverse viewers. Within such
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a framework, The Son sets out certain fixed ‘readings’ of the drama, which define the 
actual reality and hence serve an ideological function.
What then could such a ‘preferred reading’ be? One of the ‘readings’ 
suggested by a magazine article is that Wang Zili’s love of his mother represents the 
Chinese people’s love of their mother country. Then The Son could be ‘read’ as a 
patriotic drama which promotes and encourages the spirit of never giving up on 
saving the country, which is suffering from serious ‘illness’. Such an interpretation 
echoes Rofel’s analysis of Aspirations, that Liu Huifang represents a crippled China 
that needs to be saved by Luo Gang, a male hero with intellectual qualities. Wang 
Zili’s mother also represents China suffering and dying from serious illness needing 
to be saved by Wang Zili, again a male hero with intellectual qualities. In this 
respect, one could draw certain parallels between Aspirations and The Son.
Anther possible message I could draw from this programme is the end of 
utopia and a help -yourself ideology -  which I discussed in Chapter 3. Wang Zili is 
set out as an ordinary person in an extremely difficult situation. Yet, he never 
complains about the social system which does not help to cover his mother's medical 
costs, nor does he blame the socio-political condition which causes his father to be 
laid off. Not only that, Wang Zili never gives up trying to help his mother, and does 
everything to save her from the illness. Although ultimately he gets help from his 
classmates to raise the money, he is the initiator for such help -  it was his devotion to 
help his mother that had influenced others. The representation of Wang Zili, 
therefore, echoes Zhang Damin, eponymous hero of Garrulous Zhang Damin’s 
Happy Life, which I also discussed in Chapter 3, although Wang Zili is less optimistic 
than Zhang Damin. Still Wang Zili, as a new hero, also embodies the new ideal 
subjectivity assumed by the Party, such as the spirit of never giving up, hard work,
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and filial piety. In this respect, Wang Zili presents a model for people in 
contemporary China to follow, and this drama makes such a message more explicit by 
portraying how he influenced the people around him, who could be any one of the 
viewers.
Then how have people engaged with The Sonl In order to further consider 
this point, let me turn to their comments about Wang Zili.
On April 14, 1999, in the afternoon, Cai Weifeng, Wang Lei and I were 
chatting at their office. Cai Weifeng helped me to "interrogate” Wang Lei to 
get him to explain to me why he hates the type of television series embodied 
by The Son and Wang Zili -type heroes. Wang Lei reluctantly fold us that 
there are mainly two reasons for his dislike. Firstly, it is because programmes 
of this kind appear so artificial or unreal (jia jlx). Before he watched the 
programme, Wang Lei read a newspaper article about The Son and knew 
exactly which part was supposed to move viewers and which part should make 
them cry. Wang Lei said that of course he also was human, so he was moved 
by and felt sorry for Wang Zili, but in real life there are many more people 
with more difficulties and in worse situations than Wang Zili's, who make you 
feel sorry and move you even more. So, Wang Lei claimed that he did not like 
the kind of stories or heroes which demand viewers' sympathies. They make 
you admire him for what he does, but in fact only appear artificial. Cai 
Weifeng took quite the opposite view. She argued that what made The Son 
different from other series of this kind was that Wang Zili did not demand that 
viewers feel sorry for him or give him any sympathy. She thought this 
programme and its characters were very realistic. She commented that the 
actor who played Wang Zili acted particularly well, and brought out the 
feeling of a young man from the countryside, especially in terms of his 
shyness and upright character. She claimed that this is why Cai Weifeng 
thinks that The Son is a good programme.
(From my own field notes)
The above notes suggest that there are two different kinds of articulation about 
what is ‘realistic’ in viewing of this drama. Cai Weifeng’s notion of ‘realistic’ seems 
concerned with how well ‘reality’ is re-constructed in the drama, and how well actors 
and actresses play their roles. Her latter point echoes one of the ways in which the
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audience appreciates Cantonese opera discussed by Latham (1996). He notes that one 
of the criteria for Cantonese opera audiences in assessing the performance of opera is 
through how well actors and actresses have acted the roles they play and how the 
roles are suited to them. A similar point was made by Li Fengying, a former Beijing 
opera actress who now acts for television and films. She once commented that one of 
the big problems of Chinese television dramas is the tendency of actors and actresses 
to over-act, and thereby appear unnatural. Li Fengying explained that many actors 
and actresses, especially those like her, who are now above middle-age, were often 
first trained for the Beijing opera that has very stylised and articulate ways of acting. 
Li states that after the Beijing Opera industry grew so small in the reform period, 
many of actors and actresses switched to acting for television and film, but they did 
not understand how to act naturally in an ordinary setting. As a result, she considers 
much television acting in China to be often exaggerated and out of ordinary, so the 
television drama appears to be ‘unrealistic’. Li Fengying’s view of what is ‘realistic’ 
echoes Cai Weifeng's assessment of what is ‘realistic’, being based on how well 
actors and actresses play their roles to reproduce a given ‘reality’ in a television 
drama series.
Wang Lei was concerned with how truthful the story was to his view of 
‘reality’. He further objected that the way in which reality is constructed in The Son 
is ‘artificial’ (jia j$t). On the pleasure of watching television drama, Fiske notes,
The pleasure depends not on agreement with the sense that is made, but on the 
agreement with the way that it is made, with the adequacy of our discourses 
and their cultural categories as a means of ordering our perception of both text 
and world.
(1987:178)
In a similar way, I argue, Wang’s Lei’s idea of ‘realistic’ depends on the adequacy of
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the discursive structure of the constructed reality in the drama to the way in which 
Wang Lei experiences everyday life. He did not find The Son pleasing because these 
two realities did not agree with one another. For Wang Lei, the criterion for what is 
‘realistic’ becomes an ideological concern.
I want to further draw attention to Wang Lei’s comments above about 
newspaper articles about this drama. He claimed that the reason he found the drama 
artificial, or unreal (jia -fix), is because the newspaper articles he read about The Son
told him exactly which part was supposed to move viewers and which would make 
them cry before he actually watched the programme. This comment suggests that 
Wang Lei was not only engaging with the bounded television text of The Son in his 
viewing of this programme, but also that his opinions were formed on the basis of 
what he read about the series in newspaper and television magazine articles. In this 
case, I suspect what Wang Lei opposed was not necessarily the way reality was 
constructed in this television drama alone. Rather, he objected to the ways in which 
the narrative and commentaries about the series drew the ‘closure* for restricting his 
engagement with The Son, by presenting the particular message and intention of this 
drama. In order to further consider this point, then, I will go on to look further at his 
comments.
The second reason Wang Lei raised was that he (Wang Lei himself) was a 
“has-been” (wandcin 7U§t). He explained that, as Wang Shuo described in his 
earlier work, when he sees anything which everyone is saying is good, then he 
always wants to find a reason for it for not being good. Cai Weifeng asked 
Wang Lei whether he actually meant that if everyone said it was good and 
liked it, then he did not like it? With a big grin on his face, Wang Lei 
admitted that this was the case. So, according to Wang Lei, the reason he did 
not like a television series like The Son or heroes like Wang Zili ( Wang Zili 
neiyang de renwu 5E 1=1 A#J)was, in fact, because they were praised
in newspapers and TV magazines everywhere for being good drama. That just 
made him want to disagree and criticize. Dming over two years of friendship
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prior to this, I actually noticed this tendency with Wang Lei -  that if you took 
any extreme position then he would take the opposite and challenge your 
opinion.
(From my own field notes)
Wang Shuo, a contemporary Chinese writer known for his sarcastic writing 
and use of Beijing slang, was enormously popular with the people of Beijing, 
particularly the youth, around 1992 to 1994. Zha calls Wang Shuo a Beijing 
‘hooligan writer,’ and ‘a controversial figure,’ as she notes,
Posing as a writer for common folks, he uses his homegrown, sardonic wit, to 
mock both the communist ideologues and the elite intellectuals. .. .one of 
Wang’s highs is to let his cynical, smartass, hooligan antiheroes poke fun at 
everything holy and serious. “I can’t stand people with a sense of mission,” he 
declares.
(1995:110)
Wang Lei claimed that he was like Wang Shuo. From this Wang Shuo stance, one 
could suggest that there are two grounds on which Wang Lei had expressed his dislike 
for Wang Zili. First, it was Wang Zili’s seriousness and moral virtue. Wang Lei was 
sarcastic about this overly ‘good’ character as if there was a fine line between pure 
goodness and stupidity. Second, it lies in that, as mentioned above, available 
commentaries on the television series, including those given by Cai Weifeng and 
myself, all praise Wang Zili for his good moral virtue. Here it became more explicit 
that Wang Lei’s comment was not based simply on his ‘reading’ of media text, but 
something outside of television drama itself. In fact, Wang Lei’s inclination to 
oppose the mainstream opinion was not necessarily limited to matters related to Party 
discourse, but also applied to any odd daily conversation about the topics related to 
life.
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At the time, there were some TV magazines and newspaper articles describing 
Wang Zili as a contemporary hero {dangdai yingxiong I asked
Wang Lei whether he thought Wang Zili had the character, morals and 
potential to be a hero (yingxiong Wang Lei admitted that he had,
despite all the objections he made against Wang Zili. I pointed out to him that 
I thought he had told me before that Wang Zili could not be considered as a 
hero. He said, “Yeah, he is not a hero Cta bushi yingxiong I
was completely lost - why if Wang Lei said that Wang Zili had the qualities to 
be a hero (yingxiong and did all the required good deeds, did he still 
claim he was not a hero? Wang Lei laughed at me and said that Wang Zili’s 
morals, character and thought were all heroic, but he was not like Xiao Feng, 
who helped the state. Wang Zili was an ordinary student who suddenly faced 
the crisis of his mother becoming ill. Had he not been faced by this problem, 
Wang Zili would have continued studying and then started to work. Wang Lei 
thinks if he existed in real life then he would be the type of person who goes to 
fight against floods, like Li Xiangqun,118 a hero of the flood rescue campaign. 
Cai Weifeng agreed on this point. Despite their disagreement of opinion about 
the programme, both seemed to agree that even though Wang Zili had a sense 
of responsibility and the potential to be a hero (yingxiong he could not
be regarded as one. They both argued that this was because, in China, people 
say the nature of man is good, so it was simply an occasion when an ordinary 
university student just happened to have the opportunity to express his 
goodness through facing the crisis of his mother’s illness.
(From my own field notes)
The narrative of this drama constructs Wang Zili as a hero. Viewers’ 
decodings do not necessarily the follow the same logic assumed in the ‘preferred 
readings’. At the beginning I was puzzled because both Wang Lei, and by and large 
Cai Weifeng, follow the imposed outlook on reality in the drama, and yet arrived at 
quite a different conclusion about the televisual representation of Wang Zili. As 
discussed in previous chapters, there are many debates on the quality and character of 
heroes in contemporary China, so as to make them easier for viewers to relate with. 
And yet, heroic qualities are seen to be only the potential to become a hero, but these 
alone cannot transform an individual into a hero. Wang Lei, and by and large Cai
118 Li Xiangqun was bom in 1978 into a veiy  wealthy entrepreneur family in Hainan Province. He had 
always wanted to join the PLA, and did so in 1996. In 1998, he joined the Party to fight against 
flooding at the frontier o f Hubei Province. Unfortunately, due to an excessive workload in the 
hardships, he died in 1999. Following his death, the central government chose him as a “heroic fighter 
o f the new generation” (“xin shidoi de yingxiong zhanshi 0 f U'J’f ^  |j'J ^ T ; ”)} and launched a
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Weifeng, described here that criteria for heroes are not based on the heroic qualities of 
subjects, but lie in heroic deeds performed by individuals. Such a remark emphasises 
the importance of what heroes do rather than who they are, that is central to the idea 
of heroes in China as discussed in Chapter 2. Here, both Wang Lei and Cai Weifeng 
assume that everyone has an inborn potential to become a hero, yet the transcendence 
to hero status depends on how the person actualises such potentials in his or her life. 
Wang Lei further distinguished fulfilling one’s duty from heroic deeds, which I shall 
discuss in more detail below, but it is clear in Wang Lei’s comment that Wang Zili is 
only fulfilling his role. The above comment suggests that even though the social 
realist drama has a ‘closed’ narrative structure, viewers do not simply assume the 
fixed meaning of the programme.
I further discussed the difference between heroic deeds and fulfilling one’s 
duty irenwu with Wang Lei. On the afternoon of February 8, 1999,1
was chatting alone with him and said that I had read an article in a Beijing 
television magazine commenting that Wang Zili’s love for his mother 
expressed the Chinese people’s love for their motherland.119 I suspected that 
this article was an attempt to extend what may have appeared to be Wang 
Zili's ‘individualistic’ and ‘personal’ concern, which was focused on his 
immediate family, to the wider social environment so as to transcend to the 
concern of ‘the people’. Wang Lei responded in English that this article was 
“bullshit”. He commented that he considered all such newspaper patriotism as 
superficial and despicable. He argued that Wang Zili had just tried to save his 
mother, though it could be said that his was an extreme case, but what else 
was he supposed to do? Wang Lei argued that Wang Zili could not even be 
considered as a model, because he was just fulfilling his task like everyone 
else. In this sense, Wang Lei regarded the act of Wang Zili as merely the 
fulfilment of duty rather than a heroic deed {yingxiong de xictoxicin 
£ ! ) .
(From my own field notes)
campaign to encourage people to study and leam from him.
119 Based on the article in Beijing TV Weekly 1998/7-13/12, issue no. 23, P.31
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Wang Lei rejects a ‘preferred reading’ of the drama which sets up Wang Zili 
as a national hero. I have already discussed the reading where Wang Zili’s love for 
his mother represents the Chinese people’s love for the mother country, which 
parallels Rofel’s analysis of Aspirations. Wang Lei was not interested in engaging 
with television drama series at the political level. Not only that, Wang Lei was upset 
by it. It seems that by claiming “the Chinese people’s love for their motherland”, 
Wang Lei as a Chinese person was reminded of his assumed subjectivity as a political 
subject. Whether Wang Lei liked it or not, such a claim contained him as a part of the 
state discursive practice of producing modern subjects, yet Wang Lei as a self 
identified Wang Shuo inspired character was not interested in taking a part in state 
politics. Perhaps, his view may remind us of Barme’s portrayal of people in 
contemporary China who are cynical about official politics quoted above. Wang Lei 
brushed off the above commentary by claiming that Wang Zili’s attempt to save his 
mother was simply the fulfilment of a duty which everyone else would do, rather than 
a heroic deed. Wang Lei’s comment presents an alternative to the ‘preferred reading,’ 
and in this respect, this kind of reading poses a challenge to the success of the Party’s 
discourse of producing particular subjects through the televisual representation of 
heroes which continues to exist in contemporary China -  even though it alone cannot 
overthrow the hegemonic power of the Party. Then, the above conversation 
highlights the way in which Wang Lei has interacted with the discursive power of the 
state and negotiated his own interest.
We further discussed how Wang Lei felt about emulating heroes who appear 
on Chinese television. I asked him how he felt when he watched Wang Zili - 
type programmes or the broadcasting of the PLA fight against the flood? Did 
he feel like emulating them? Wang Lei responded that he did not want to 
emulate or even feel like emulating them, because they had their ‘duty’ (as he
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said in English)120 and he had his own. Wang Lei also commented that they 
did good deeds because those were their duties, so why should he need to 
emulate this or donate a huge amount of money? Wang Lei said he was a 
practical man, so he focused on doing his job and ihlfilling his obligations 
well, and he believed that he did so very well. If Wang Zili were a hero, then 
Wang Lei was also a hero. I asked him if he felt nothing at all while watching 
people like Wang Zili on television. He said that, of course he felt like doing 
good things, not bad things, but then, again, he said he did not particularly feel 
like helping those people who were in need of help.
On the other occasions, I discussed with Wang Lei Wang Zili’s influence on 
others, and to what extent he could change others. I remembered, in a 
previous conversation, Wang Lei mentioned that one of the criteria forjudging 
a hero is his ability to change people around him. Wang Lei commented that 
he could see that Wang Zili might be great (weida a good person
(haoren iff* A), sympathetic (tongqing iFJipf) etc., but what was the use of 
those feelings? Wang Lei said Wang Zili changed people by emotions; 
however, Wang Lei thought that in real life emotions cannot change people.
He further commented that 20 years ago, when the countiy was changing, 
television could have influenced the way people were in many ways. But now 
it is impossible, as in the present climate people are going their own ways, 
they have their own concerns in life and television can no longer change that.
(From my own field notes)
The above conversation also says something about the changing notion of 
‘duty’. In the state discursive practice for heroes, it was presupposed that the ‘duty’ 
of heroes extends to the ‘duty’ of the people. It was not any odd ‘duty’ but a morally 
and socially good deed which was not simply that of an individual. It was meant to 
influence others in sharing a sense of ‘duty’ like Wang Zili’s classmates who helped 
him to raise money for his mother to have a kidney transplant. Wang Lei, however, 
dismisses such discourse and concentrates on his own duty and gets on with his own 
life. It does not influence him to follow the example of these state promoted heroes. 
Previously, Wang Lei told me that China has many people who live in poverty and 
hardship. He pointed out that not everyone was like Wang Zili, who found the means 
of solving his problems; in reality there are vast numbers of people who suffer from
120 Wang Lei speaks English well, but our conversations had been in Chinese. Occasionally he
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injustice and unfairness of life, misery and poverty. Wang Lei is therefore 
disenchanted by the televisual representation of state promoted contemporary heroes 
like Wang Zili, or Li Xiangqun.
Moreover, Wang Lei’s comment here could be understood as his negotiation 
with the discursive practice of heroes and his attempts to undermine the role of 
televisual representation of heroes. While the Party continues the discourse of the 
televisual representation of heroes as a means to achieve social engineering, Wang 
Lei argued it cannot change the way in which people live their lives in contemporary 
China. His comment suggests modem subjects whose lives are oriented by individual 
interests and concerns, and who can no longer be moulded by the televisual 
representation of heroes, whether they are identifiable or not. Wang Lei sees the 
changing role of television in people’s lives, and argues that under the new socio­
political conditions it can no longer change people or impose particular subjects on 
viewers to emulate.
Up to this point, much of the focus of my discussion has been based on the 
way in which Wang Lei engaged with The Son and the representation of its hero, 
Wang Zili. Here, I want to look at how Cai Weifeng engaged with those same things. 
Unlike Wang Lei, she enjoyed the series, and was entertained by the performance of 
Wang Zili, although she did not comment much in the above-sited conversation. This 
was probably because Wang Lei is an articulate and opinionated person who usually 
did the talking, while Cai Weifeng is very shy and a quieter person who could not 
bring herself to interrupt Wang Lei in order to express her opinions. Besides, since 
Wang Lei was older and had been in the company longer, it put him in the more 
dominant position.
dropped English words into his speech.
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Cai Weifeng considered Wang Zili to be a good person trying to do good 
deeds, and in this respect, expressed no criticism against either him or the series. 
Perhaps such a reaction is related to the conditions under which she was brought up. 
Her father, a high-ranking military officer, brought Cai Weifeng up to admire and 
respect people who did good deeds for others and she was much more exposed to 
ideologically oriented television programmes than Wang Lei, as her father liked 
watching them. She watched The Son with her father. As such, it seemed that she 
could accept discursive elements of the television programme The Son or its hero 
Wang Zili without much objection
Another important factor for Cai Weifeng was that Wang Zili was someone 
who lived in a reality totally different from her own, so there was not much to haunt 
her own life in watching this programme. She was young, beautiful, a university 
graduate who spoke foreign languages, and had a Beijing household registration 
{hukou )~l P ). Her father's position could provide her with a variety of privileges.
She also had a younger brother who was studying law at the People’s University, who 
would probably have a successful career and become capable of taking responsibility 
for their parents -  at least in financial terms.121 In this respect, the difficulties, 
pressure, and suffering of Wang Zili portrayed in The Son were something so 
unfamiliar to her that she could probably not identify with him.
As the eldest and the only son in his family, Wang Lei had all the expectation 
of responsibilities for them on his shoulders. In this sense, perhaps the televisual 
representation of Wang Zili evoked very complex feelings for Wang Lei. Particularly 
at the time this drama was broadcast, Wang Lei was under a lot of pressure related to 
his family responsibilities. His sister and her husband owned a small restaurant, but it
121 Both Wang Lei and Cai Weifeng simply assumed that it is the obligation o f  the son, rather than a
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did not work out, and as a result, it had to close down. So, his parents put a lot of 
pressure on Wang Lei to find jobs for them while he was also looking after the young 
couple financially. At the time, he was also in love with someone who lived far away 
from Beijing, though it was not working well as she was not interested in Wang Lei as 
a future husband. In the meantime he got a lot of pressure from his parents to 
married. Therefore, even though the problems Wang Zili and Wang Lei were facing 
were quite different, as each was a son facing issues of filial piety, there were 
moments in the drama and the representation of Wang Zili which reminded Wang Lei 
of his own life. Moreover, Wang Zili was constructed as an ordinary person with 
both strengths and weaknesses, existing among different sets of social relations, so 
whether Wang Lei liked it or not, there were moments when Wang Lei identified with 
Wang Zili and his social circumstances. In addition, my ‘interrogation’ in the 
preceding conversation probably made Wang Lei more conscious about his own 
subjectivity as being defined by the state. Perhaps, then, one could argue that what 
Wang Lei found frustrating was the power of this drama to define ordinary people and 
their reality, including his own.
One of the crucial points about social realist drama is that, even though most 
of the time in their ordinary lives viewers do not face up to the subjectivity 
presupposed for the people by the state, there are occasions when something in the 
drama catches and forces viewers to recognise themselves as a part of such discursive 
practice. Certainly these explanations are partly my assumption based on my 
knowledge about their daily lives, concerns, and feelings. Yet, from the above 
examination on The Son, it is evident that then viewing practices and articulation
daughter who marries out, to take care o f his parents in their old age.
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about the televisual representation of heroes are related to viewers’ lives beyond the 
television screen.
Demi-God, Demi-Devil {Tianlong Babu A
Demi-GodDemi-Devil is a Hong Kong- made martial arts television drama 
based on the novel of the same name by famous martial arts (wuxici xiaoshno
writer Jin Yong. This story is set in the Song Dynasty, when China was divided 
into small kingdoms and as a result was in a state of chaos due to conflicts among 
them. Xiao Feng, the hero of this story, is a martial arts master originally of the 
Qidan nation. However, his parents were killed when he was a baby and he was 
raised by people of the Han nationality, growing up without knowing the secret of his 
birth. One day Xiao Feng discovers this secret and goes out in search of his real 
parents and birth place. Unfortunately, when he eventually discovers his real 
nationality and gets to the land of his birth, Qidan decides to invade the Han nation. 
Xiao Feng, being a martial arts master, is asked by the king of Qidan to help them in 
the invasion of Han. Xiao Feng is torn between the two nations -  the Han nation 
which had raised him and taught him martial arts, and the Qidan nation which is the 
country of his ancestors. Unable to choose between them, Xiao Feng in the end kills 
himself.
How does Xiao Feng compare with heroes from Greek myths and European 
literature? By looking at the narrative, it seems that Xiao Feng resembles some of 
Rorty’s characterizations of the hero. First of all, it was his parentage, his dead 
parents who hold the key to the secret of his birth, which set him off to the heroic
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journey. Xiao Feng also takes on superhuman tasks and in the end engages in an 
ultimate act that demonstrates his extraordinary character. Not only that Xiao Feng 
possesses superhuman martial art skills. His acts of heroism are revealed in the face 
of fate and chance as courage and endurance.
Wang Lei was much keener to talk about Demi-God, Demi-Devil than about 
The Son. What was it about the representation of Xiao Feng which made Wang Lei 
so excited and willing to discuss it with me? One reason probably lies in the narrative 
structure of the drama. Demi-God, Demi-Devil was set in a completely ‘unrealistic’ 
time and space, so Xiao Feng was set in an unfamiliar environment where everything 
appeared exotic to contemporary viewers. In this sense, the reality of the drama did 
not present viewers with their own reality while they watched it; hence, it might have 
been easier for Wang Lei to engage with Xiao Feng as a fictional character and Demi- 
God, Demi-Devil as a form of entertainment.
Interestingly, the fact that Demi-God, Demi-Devil is a Hong Kong production 
has not been much of a subject of discussion among the people I talked to, even 
though they are aware of it. With its success in terms of ratings, there were some 
debates on the need to make Chinese television serials out of Jing Yong’s martial arts 
novels on the grounds that Chinese producers will understand the literature and 
history better than their Hong Kong counterparts. However, this debate was mild in 
comparison to some other programmes, like the Taiwanese production involvement in 
Princess Pearl. That series was a hotly debated issue in the media and I heard several 
viewers commenting that they do not like the Taiwanese representation of the 
emperor in particular, which, they say, tends to be simplistic, cute and kind, and far 
away from historical reality. In general, when people talked about television 
programmes as a Hong Kong production, as opposed to a mainland production, they
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tend to discuss the issue of how close the televisual representation is to reality. This 
usually gets brought up when the person does not like the televised version.
The point about Hong Kong productions is an important issue to consider. 
However, to do this, we need to look at some other complicated aspects, such as the 
complex dynamics of greater China television production as well as a big debate on 
the greater China identity.122 China’s relatively cheap production costs lead many 
Hong Kong and Taiwanese productions to be partly made in China. As for mainland 
television productions, its sponsorship and capital are limited which necessitates the 
mainland producers to work with Hong Kong and Taiwanese investors. So what are 
seen as Hong Kong productions in fact involves some complicated issues, one among 
which will be the debate on greater China identity. While this is an important and 
complex topic which requires further research, I will leave this point as being beyond 
the scope of this thesis.
The narrative structure of Demi-God, Demi-Devil is what Fiske calls open 
narrative, that is:
texts that do not attempt to close off alternative meanings and narrow their 
focus to one, easily attainable meaning, but rather ones that are open to 
richness and complexity of readings that can never be singular.
(Fiske 1987:94)
Bakhtin may call this kind of narrative style ‘heteroglossia,’ referring to the 
engagement of multiple voices arising from a vast array of social and psychological 
experiences (Emerson &Morson 1990:309-316). ‘Heteroglossia’ does not simply 
result from multiple voices, but from the diversity derived from different social 
positions which are maintained throughout the drama. This is to say there is no
122 For further reference on this topic, Thomas 2003 and Donalds&Keane 2002 deal with the issue o f  
intra-China television production and also disucuss the Greater China identity.
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explicit message or fixed meaning imposed on viewers, Demi-God, Demi-Devil is 
made up of three parts,123 and each story has a different hero, Xiao Feng being one of 
them. This structure allows the story to be presented from different voices -  one hero 
is a prince, another one is a monk and the third is Xiao Feng, a martial arts master. 
This eliminates a fixed reading for the narrative. Thus, unlike other social realist 
dramas in China, the narrative of Demi-God, Demi-Devil does not present a single 
authoritative voice of the state that defines any reality. In this sense, Wang Lei was 
less restricted in engaging with Demi-God, Demi-Devil, as there was no explicit 
ideological interpretation of the state imposed on him while he watched the series.
Wang Lei was not the only one gripped by the show. Demi-God, Demi-Devil 
enjoyed enormous popularity, at least in Beijing in 1998, and Xiao Feng was the most 
popular television drama character at the time it was broadcast. Through the 
televisual representation of Xiao Feng, viewers seemed to have experienced the 
romanticism of the knight errant in facing their unromantic reality of post-reform 
urban life -  where the promise of a socialist utopia ceased to exist and a market 
economy was penetrating into every fibre of society. Moreover, as Li Xiangnan, the 
hero of New Star discussed by Lull (1991) above, had fought against a corrupt 
government in his drama, Xiao Feng brought justice to good people who were 
suffering, just as the heroes of classical Chinese novels, such as Huang Feihong or 
Zhuge Liang, Liu Bei, Guang Yu, had done. All these martial arts heroes have been 
continuously favoured, enjoyed and talked about by people.124 In this respect, Xiao 
Feng embodied the desire of viewers.
Moreover, the narrative of Demi-God, Demi-Devil resembles classical Chinese 
novels, for instance The Water Margin or The Romance o f the Three Kingdoms. The
123 The three stories are o f  Xiao Feng, Xuzhu, and Duanyu, and are interconnected.
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story of Demi-God, Demi-Devil is dominated by Xiao Feng’s relationship with 
righteousness, the spirit of xia meaning the chivalrous spirit. It also informed his 
actions, which were guided by lofty ideas and motivations for the good of the people 
-  as in popular classical novels. Fabian claims that popular culture is a production of 
popular history and a re-imagining of the past (1998:66). From this point of view, it 
could be argued that, through engaging with the televisual representation of heroes 
like Xiao Feng, viewers can imagine an alternative history to the reality defined by 
the state that can bring justice to their lives. In this respect, then, perhaps one could 
draw an implicit potential for resistance in watching Demi-God, Demi-Devil.
At the same time, in considering the popularity of Demi-God, Demi-Devil, it is 
important to not forget its entertainment value. As Ang writes in her study of the 
reception of the famous American television series Dallas, “For we must accept one 
thing: Dallas is popular because a lot of people enjoy watching it” (1982: 4). As with 
Dallas, it is important to bear in mind that people enjoyed watching Demi-God, Demi- 
Devil not merely for the meaning it presents. It sounds like a statement of the 
obvious, yet somehow in the process of media studies, with scholars focusing on 
codes and contents, this point often slips our minds. So what was it about the 
representation of Xiao Feng and Demi-God, Demi-Devil that viewers foimd so 
pleasing to watch? I will discuss this question below by looking at how Wang Lei 
engaged with, and what he had articulated about, the televisual representation of Xiao 
Feng. I will consider this point specifically in relation to Wang Lei’s life beyond the 
television screen as I did above when examining his engagement with The Son.
124 This is based on my fieldwork experience. The grassroots popularity o f  Guan Yu is discussed in 
Hodge and Louie (1998).
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On March 19, 1999, around lunchtime, Cai Weifeng, Wang Lei, and I were 
chatting at Wang Lei’s office. In discussing the episode from previous 
evening, Wang Lei was praising Xiao Feng’s great strength and how it was 
impossible for ordinary people to get to that realm. So I asked Wang Lei 
where Xiao Feng’s strength lay. He first thought that I meant the physical 
strength. So he responded that Qidan nationals are talented in martial arts, and 
also many martial arts masters took pity 011 Xiao Feng and taught him well, so 
he became a master of discipline. I then asked him about Xiao Feng’s 
spiritual strength? Wang Lei replied that the spiritual strength is Godly 
(tianshen de X t'l1 6'j).125 He cited as an example Xiao Feng taking unceasing 
care of Aci, his sister-in-law, even though she gets him into a lot of trouble. 
According to Wang Lei, Xiao Feng did so because Azhu, his wife, whom he 
killed by mistake, told him to do so as she died. Wang Lei described that as 
an indication of Xiao Feng’s strong sense of commitment, to the extent that he 
no longer cared about himself and consequently continuously sacrificed 
himself to help others.
(From my own field notes)
From this conversation, we get a glimpse of Wang Lei’s idea of heroes, which 
is quite different from the one assumed by the Party which I discussed in Chapter 2. 
Unlike communist heroes who earned extra-ordinariness through hard working 
efforts, Wang Lei regarded Xiao Feng as a chosen one who was given heroic qualities 
and potentials by a higher agency, which he describes as tianshen de St). The
notion of tianshen (tian dt meaning heaven and shen meaning God -  without
being specifically tied to any religious tradition and located beyond the state power) 
suggests that Xiao Feng was someone above and beyond ordinary human capacity. 
Such a description of Xiao Feng’s extraordinary qualities resembles what is called 
charisma. Feuchtwang and Wang Mingming note that the English word charisma is 
translated in the Chinese description as, ‘extraordinary enchantment or glamour’ 
{chaofan tneili M JTM.^)), or ‘capability or power received from God’ (shenshou
nengii (2001:10) which works well to depict Xiao Feng’s compelling
125 I confused tianshen X-H' with the word tiansheng X T ,  meaning innate, at first. Godly is the 
English translation which Wang Lei gave me. It may sound a bit awkward in English, but I thought it
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charm and Godly character. These terms have a religious connotation derived 
originally from Christian ideas; however, Feuchtwang and Wang Mingming suggest, 
in modern usage charisma as a specifically religious tradition has diminished. 
Feuchtwang and Wang Mingming note,
Charisma is the expectation of the extraordinary. It is the expectation of 
finding an agency through which a turn of fortune towards utopia will be 
brought about in historical time. .. .The proof, the bearing, and the conduct of 
an admired charismatic leader all confirm followers’ confidence in an 
expected power of transformation, modest or grand.
(2001:172)
Modem charisma captures the hope of people for change to be wrought in the 
currently established social order. It is beyond state power or human agency. The 
following conversation further highlights Xiao Feng’s charismatic character.
At the same time, when I heard Wang Lei talking about Xiao Feng, I found a 
striking resemblance to how Lei Feng has been officially described in various 
media. So, I asked Wang Lei how Xiao Feng differed from Lei Feng. He told 
me that you could say that they were the same to some extent. Then, Wang 
Lei put up his little finger and said that Lei Feng was like that, he was a small, 
insignificant person (xiao renwu A  A '$}) and was an ordinary person (yiban 
de ren ^  fix fit) A ) who became a hero (yingxiong A ^t)- Lei Feng sacrificed 
himself to help other people, but Xiao Feng was a Godly hero {tianshen de 
yingxiong who was not at the level of cleaning the floor for
others and doing communal work. According to Wang Lei, tianshen A #  is 
not something at the individual level, but at the level where it helps the nation 
and changes its history. I questioned Wang Lei whether he meant that Xiao 
Feng and Lei Feng differed in scale {guimo ^J®). He replied that that was, 
indeed, what he meant. Then, he added with cheeky tone that what Lei Feng 
did was also great, and we should not talk about him in such an evil manner, 
because Wang Lei himself could not do such tilings as Lei Feng did.
(From my own field notes)
depicts his enthusiasm and admiration for Xiao Feng, so I have translated literally.
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Wang Lei pointed out that the critical difference between the representation of 
Lei Feng and of Xiao Feng was that Lei Feng belonged to this world while Xiao Feng 
was beyond this world. Lei Feng lacked the charismatic power of Xiao Feng. 
Charismatic character cannot be earned through efforts or performing of good deeds.
It is an extraordinary quality granted by God for the mission of changing the destiny 
of the nation. There was a sense of romanticism in attached to it.
Wang Lei expressed excitement and admiration for Xiao Feng’s ‘greatness’ -  
yet why Xiao Feng was great, or what it was about him that is great, was never 
explained clearly. On many occasions, Wang Lei cited particular sections of the story 
which appealed to him and simply commented “Such greatness!” (duo weida 
!) with a sense of satisfaction and intoxication. What I could draw from his 
engagement with the televisual representation of Xiao Feng was, instead of a 
particular message of the drama or meaning of the representation of Xiao Feng, Wang 
Lei was entertained by the great heroic subject produced through the televisual 
representation of Xiao Feng. Those heroic qualities such as individual greatness, 
honour, glory, and romanticism are, under normal circumstances, repressed -  and all 
undermined in the representation of Lei Feng who is a ‘nameless hero’ and a good 
child of Mao Zedong.126 The way in which Wang Lei talked about Lei Feng by 
comparing him to a little finger in the above conversation might imply a sense of 
mockery and irony towards the value system defined by the state embodied in the 
representation of Lei Feng. Wang Lei’s pleasure seemed to lie in the liberation from 
the mundane order of the world whereby he was caught up in a variety of duties and 
pressures -  some of which I have highlighted above.127
1261 discussed this point in Chapter 2.
127 Zhong Xueping (2000) makes a similar kind o f  argument when discussing the liwnang  anti-heroes 
o f  Wang Shuo’s novels as an expression o f  Bakhtinian camivalistic sense, She argues that Uttmang is a
254
A similar kind of pleasure is noted by Wang Shuo writing about the process of 
creating characters for the television series Aspirations. As he puts it:
It means that we torture all these characters, making everyone suffer. We 
made sure all the good guys had a heart of gold, but we made them unlucky as 
possible; and the bad guys are as bad as you can imagine -  that’s the sure way 
to a good drama.
(quoted inZha 1995:39)
In other words, Wang Shuo’s comment suggests here that viewers enjoy, whether 
good, bad or tragic, exaggerated sensations, beyond what people commonly 
experience in their daily lives. So, ‘excess’ is taken to be something pleasurable and 
playful, and therefore as the spectacle. While such a claim is not necessarily always 
true for viewers watching television, it could be relevant at least in the way in which 
Wang Lei engaged with the televisual representation of Xiao Feng.
As mentioned above, because Demi-God, Demi-Devil is set in an unrealistic 
time and space, Wang Lei could thoroughly let himself go into the fantasy time and 
space divorced from any specific time and space or real history. Moreover, the 
representation of Xiao Feng as a lone hero deprived of various webs of social ties 
further helped Wang Lei to be temporarily liberated from different kinds of 
constraints that are shaped by his social relations. In the case of The Son, however, 
because it attempts to reproduce the social reality of contemporary Beijing, various 
subjective positions and values of the series haunted Wang Lei’s own social reality 
from time to time while watching the programme.128
socially marginalized subject, often male, who replaced previous larger-than-life heroes o f  Maoist 
literature. Hence, she argues, the depiction and celebration o f  them as new heroes (or anti-heroes) in 
Wang Shuo’s novels is a return o f the repressed and is intended to pose a challenge to the norms o f  the 
CCP’s dominant ideology.
128 Similarly, Gillespie (1995) makes a point in discussing how Indian films, particularly romantic 
fantasy, have provided a ‘moment o f escape from reality’ for their viewers.
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Following Demi-God, Demi-Devil, another television series based 011 Jin 
Yong’s martial arts novel The Deer and the Cauldron (Lading}i was
broadcast on the same channel in the same time slot. Even though it was based on a 
martial arts novel by the same author, and Wang Lei had taken great pleasure in 
reading it, he did not enjoy watching The Deer and the Cauldron at all. He was very 
critical of the way in which Wei Xiaobao, the hero, was acted and represented in the 
series.129 Wang Lei was greatly disturbed by this series, especially with the fact that 
Wei Xiaobao had seven beautiful wives, whereas Wang Lei could not even find one. 
This issue was raised quite frequently when I talked to Wang Lei about The Deer and 
the Cauldron. While there were probably other reasons for Wang Lei's not being so 
enthusiastic about the televisual representation of Wei Xiaobao, this particular remark 
about the hero’s wives is worth considering further in relation to Wang Lei’s concern 
at the time.
When The Deer and the Cauldron was broadcast, Wang Lei was under great 
pressure from his parents to get married. During the Chinese New Year, one of his 
younger cousins got married and at her wedding, his relatives asked both him and his 
parents when Wang Lei, being the eldest among all the cousins, was getting married. 
His parents were upset for having lost face because their son could not find a wife. So 
they put pressure on Wang Lei to look for someone, and at the same time arranged for 
him to meet several young women as possible wives. Wang Lei complained to me 
that when he got home his parents pressured him to call a woman to whom they had 
been introduced by their friends. If Wang Lei was not keen on calling or was 
unsuccessful in arranging a date, they would criticise him for not trying hard enough.
129 Wang Lei was not the only one who thought The D eer and the Cauldron was poorly made, 
particularly in comparison to Demi-God, Demi-Devil. This point was also made in various newspapers 
and TV magazines.
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Yet, after dating several women, Wang Lei still found no one. This upset his parents 
even more. Meanwhile, Wang Lei leamt that the woman with whom he was secretly 
in love had married a man who lived in her hometown. As Wang Lei had not told his 
parents about her, he had to keep all his suffering to himself. So the topic of a wife 
was a sensitive issue for Wang Lei, particularly since he watched the programme with 
his parents after dinner. In this sense, one may say that Wang Lei had identified with 
the lone existence of Xiao Feng. Wang Lei further discussed his views on the solitary 
existence of heroes:
On April 8, 1999, Wang Lei and I were chatting at his office about the episode 
of Demi-God Demi-Devil from the previous evening. We were discussing 
Xiao Feng’s solitary existence. I asked him whether it was possible to say that 
Xiao Feng was alone. Wang Lei responded by saying, “All heroes {yingxiong 
^/4£) lead a solitary existence, don’t they?” I asked him to expand on this 
point. Wang Lei told me that the hero had higher ideals and thoughts than 
most people. But even though he had these ideas or thoughts, a hero had no 
one who could understand him. People might not follow him because they 
could not understand him. Wang Lei described Xiao Feng as being alone 
forever. I asked him about his family, companions in sworn brotherhood and 
friends? Wang Lei thought that in this respect Xiao Feng was also alone, 
since he had no family. He thought Xiao Feng’s friends and brothers were no 
use because they were so far from being heroes themselves, that none of them 
could understand Xiao Feng. As a hero at a higher level, he had nobody with 
whom he could share his thoughts. Wang Lei commented further that it could 
be said that the reason Xiao Feng’s life was so tragic was because he was a 
hero. Wang Lei said if it were Duanyu, Xiao Feng’s sworn brother, he could 
have been satisfied with a life with a beautiful woman, a beautiful marriage, 
and no more; however, Xiao Feng had higher ideals and could not be content 
with such a life, so in the end he had to commit suicide.
(From my own field notes)
Wang Lei commented that the very concept of hero implies loneliness, 
because heroes are not of this mundane world but are beyond and above ordinary
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people.130 In this respect, we could say that heroes are displaced people. On this 
point, Barme also made a similar remark as he notes:
Knights-errant —youxia, xiake, or xiashi — wandering chivalrous fighters for 
justice and sometimes simply self-righteous toughs, formed a special and 
usually admired group in traditional China. ... The ideals of the knight-errant 
are generally enunciated as altruism, justice, individual freedom, personal 
loyalty, courage, truthfulness and mutual faith, honour and fame, generosity, 
and contempt for wealth. The range of qualities of the knight-errant from 
positive through to negative is not unlike those said to be possessed by the 
modern urban liumang ... In contemporary China, the Uurncmg were a 
different order of displaced persons...
(1999d:82)
Although knights-errant and liumang yjiU'-Ri are quite different subjects, as the former
is often portrayed in a positive light while the latter implies a bad connotation, as 
Barme assumes here, they are both displaced subjects of a different order. Likewise, 
the televisual representation of Xiao Feng also assumes a displaced subject -  not 
simply because of his drifting mode of existence or his birth background as a Qidan 
national brought up in the nation of Han, but also because of his high ideals. It seems 
that the lone existence of displaced subjects appealed to Wang Lei’s sense of 
alienation, and a sense of displacement, despite his relatively ordinary social life -  of 
work, family and friends. I have already discussed how Wang Lei was feeling various 
pressures and had no one to share them with, but had to bear them by himself. In fact, 
going back, in an earlier comment on The Son, Wang Lei had said that he considered 
himself to be a has -been who followed the style of speech of Wang Shuo, known for 
writing about modern urban liumang WM, Not only in this context but also from my 
everyday conversation with Wang Lei, I had noticed that he often liked to play up his
130 In this sense, Xiao Feng also resembles heroes o f  chivalric romance in the European literary 
tradition (Emerson & Morson 1990:398-401).
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liumang MuR self. This identification with liumang '//iLl'Fi may fiirther indicate Wang 
Lei’s sense of displacement.131 He rarely complained about his personal life but 
mocked whatever unpleasantness he experienced.
An important point about the solitary existence of Xiao Feng is that he was 
displaced from the people around him because of his higher qualities and thoughts 
that could not be shared by common folk. Wang Lei was a capable, intelligent and 
honest person, yet at the same time, not too good at manipulating opportunities. 
Hence, in the current social circumstances, his talents are not appreciated as much as 
they could be. In this respect, he seemed to identify himself with the lonely existence 
of Xiao Feng, even though he was simply like any common person existing in the 
society. It seems that the thought of sharing the solitude of a great hero like Xiao 
Feng, who lived up to, and sacrificed himself for, his high ideals and thoughts, 
touched the alienated heart of Wang Lei.
On March 11, 1999,1 was still eager to know what made Xiao Feng so heroic, 
because this was the first time that Wang Lei came up to me so 
enthusiastically on his own initiative and told me that a character in a 
television drama was so heroic. Wang Lei told me that this was something 
impossible to explain without reading the book. What caught my attention 
throughout this conversation about Demi-God, Demi-Devil was Wang Lei’s 
constant reference to the original book. He told me on several occasions that 
the night before, when he watched Demi-God, Demi-Devil, he had his book 
out and compared the drama with how things were described in the book. 
Every time he claimed that the television drama was not as good as the book, 
and he often complained that the programme did not follow the book 
faithfully. It was not just Wang Lei who was reading the book while the
131 On the displacement o f  the Chinese male in contemporary China, Zhong Xueping (2000) writes that 
the male “marginality complex” is generated by the loss o f the male position o f  power in the traditional 
patriarchy in relation to the high-handed control o f  the CCP’s power machine. She argues that what 
new marginalized heroes ultimately desire is to reclaim a strong powerful male identity (2000:118). 
Zhong claims that what is at stake is the powerful male identity supported by the male position o f  
power in the traditional patriarchy. From this point o f  view, one could argue that the televisual 
representation o f Xiao Feng restores a strong powerful male identity to which Wang Lei aspired. The 
representation o f Xiao Feng represents the image o f  haohan, the term used for describing a manly 
male, though it is not entirely clear from his comment that Wang Lei feels marginalized due to the loss 
o f  such strong powerful male identity in the sense discussed by Zhong Xueping.
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programme was broadcast. Even Cai Weifeng, who claimed that she was no 
great fan of Jin Yong, was reading the book at that time - though probably not 
while she watched the programme. Around that time, the press reported that 
many of bookstalls in Beijing had sold out of Demi-God, Demi-Devil.
(From my own field notes)
From this comment, one could depict quite different natures of ‘watching’ 
television. Most people knew the story of Demi-God, Demi-Devil very well. There 
had been many different versions of it in films and television dramas in the past. In 
this sense, part of the pleasure in watching Demi-God, Demi-Devil was to see how 
well the story with which viewers were so familial' would be acted out. So, the plot - 
oriented way of watching, with anticipation and surprises, which one gets from not 
knowing the development of the story, and which viewers are often invited to 
experience in their viewing practices, was a less central concern here. As discussed 
for the idea of ‘realistic’ in appreciating the television programme above, the kind of 
engagement with a television drama also suggests some similarities to the ways in 
which Cantonese operas are appreciated by the audience discussed by Latham 
(1996).132
I came across to a similar kind of experience when I watched the second story 
of the Lion King with three other Chinese friends. One person had already seen the 
film and she told us the whole story at the very beginning. From my point of view, 
she spoiled the whole enjoyment of watching this video. But the other two did not 
seem to mind at all and carried on watching happily while they pointed out how 
cutely Shnba133 behaved, or how he had changed compared to the first story, and so
132 Perhaps, such a way o f  appreciating the television series could be further compared with the ways 
in which plays by Shakespeare, the stories o f which are familiar to their viewers, are appreciated. I 
have also noticed that when new films are released and become popular, many people read the original 
book on the tube in London. Examples could be cited for the case o f Bridget Jones ’ D ia ty , Harry 
Potter, or The Lord o f  the Rings.
133 Simba is the main character o f Lion King. In the first film he was a child but in the second one, he
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on. Such an experience made me realise how much my own watching experience is 
oriented towards following the narrative in a particular linear direction which often 
implies the building-up of suspense, climax and relief.
Here Wang Lei’s comments about the representation of Xiao Feng suggest 
that the heroic element lies in the performance, rather than in terms of particular 
criteria or given concepts. For instance, Wang Lei repeatedly admired Xiao Feng as 
heroic and great. So I asked him what it was about the representation of Xiao Feng 
that made him so great and heroic. Wang Lei responded in great detail about what 
happened in the drama, rather than with a set of elements and values which made 
Xiao Feng great and heroic. Fabian (1998) has commented on this point about 
performance in discussing what it is about popular culture that attracts people. He 
argues that by identifying and listing elements, what actually attracts people is lost, as 
all those elements lie in the performative nature of culture. Fabian puts it,
..much of cultural knowledge is not available as information but needs to be 
enacted in performances. ... performance -  a trait, or rather a mode, of 
existence of all culture -  is a vital characteristic of popular culture. .. .there 
are no fixed canons, no set standards (this may go for language itself); its 
production may be commodified, but there is no fixed pattern of exchange and 
consumption.
(1998:99)
The same point could be made about the consumption of the televisual representation 
of heroes. In this respect, what both Cai Weifeng and Wang Lei found pleasing about 
Demi-God, Demi-Devil alongside the representation of Xiao Feng seems to lie in 
enactment. My conversation with Wang Lei has illustrated that the audience are not 
simply objects of observation, but are subjects of history existing in particular time 
and space. So, Wang Lei’s grounds for what it was about the representation of Xiao
had grown up to be taking over the role o f  Lion King after his father.
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Feng which made him so great and heroic were not available as a set, fixed concept, 
as there are no fixed patterns of consuming the televisual representation of heroes 
taken out of a particular time and space. So the crucial point is how Wang Lei has 
interacted with the representation of Xiao Feng within the particular circumstances of 
his life.
Once, Wang Lei was explaining to a foreign friend of mine, who was a French 
man and spoke very good Chinese, about how one is supposed to enjoy the well- 
known Chinese classic of The Romance o f the Three Kingdoms. He asked my friend 
who had left the deepest impression on him. My friend responded that he was not 
sure whether his Chinese was good enough to get the story right. Wang Lei explained 
that my friend did not have to understand the story or the meaning behind it, because 
if one focussed on the story of novels of this type, it was simply a repetition of the 
same things -  they meet, drink and fight. What was important was the feeling (ganjue 
one got from the characters of the story. In this example, Wang Lei was
describing the appreciation of literature; however, his analysis could also be extended 
to watching television. Because the story could be created into different kinds of 
televisual representations, the same narrative does not necessarily invite the same 
responses from viewers. Each performance provokes different kinds o f ‘feelings’ for 
different viewers. Then, ‘feelings’ are the language viewers use for depicting the 
negotiation of different interests and forces in engaging with the televisual 
representation.
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Conclusion
Up to this point in this chapter, I have examined the ways in which Chinese 
audiences have engaged with the reception of television at different levels. From an 
anthropological point of view of doing research on television viewing in late- 90s 
urban China, where the situation of television is complex and going through rapid 
changes, what I have attempted to do in this chapter was offer an alternative way to 
approach reception by addressing ‘audience activities’, locating them within the wider 
framework of the social lives of viewers. In previous studies of television audience in 
the Chinese context, viewers are often Ifamed as political subjects. In that analytical 
framework, Chinese viewers as a collective were often engaging with the discursive 
practice of the state in watching television programmes. While such a level of 
analysis is still relevant, it seemed that there is a need to contextualise the audience 
within their everyday lives. In late- 90s urban China the everyday life of people was 
not so politicised and there was great diversity in terms of individual interests and 
circumstances. In this chapter, although only in a limited way, I have looked at how 
people watch television in then daily lives. Through this examination, differences 
within viewing practices within the so-called ‘Chinese audience’ have emerged. The 
ways in which people watch television were influenced by their socio-economical 
conditions and social status, including their academic background, family 
relationships, as well as their personal interests and desires.
Then, based on that approach, in particular I have looked at the articulation of 
the televisual representation of two particular heroes from different television drama 
series. To do this I have paid close attention to the conversations about these
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programmes I had with two viewers, Wang Lei and Cai Weifeng, though more 
emphasis was placed on Wang Lei’s viewing practice. They expressed different 
views on the televisual representation of heroes which suggested their different life 
experiences. In this sense, my analysis of the ways in which Cai Weifeng and Wang 
Lei had engaged with the televisual representation of Xiao Feng and Wang Zili 
became a jumping-off point for depicting what it is like to live in contemporary urban 
China and for illustrating some of the issues they, Wang Lei in particular, are facing 
in the present-day society.
Moreover, my research on viewers has further indicated that viewers do not 
necessarily engage with a particular television programme merely when they actually 
watch it, but also draw on what they have read and watched previously beyond the 
immediate programme. The importance of intertextuality in the appreciation of the 
representation of heroes was noted by Hodge and Louie in discussing the 
representation of Guan Yu, a hero of The Romance o f The Three Kingdoms, in 
comics. They wrote:
In this different discursive system, popular forms like comics operate with 
complex forms of intertextuality. Exactly how these intertextual linkages are 
activated in a variety of specific reading strategies for different categories of 
reader ...is still a matter of conjecture.
(1998:134)
In this regard, the television programme is neither fixed nor exists on its own right, 
and in the same way, the televisual representations of heroes are in fact not 
constructed by the immediate programme alone.
As discussed in the previous chapters, there is the state’s discursive practice to 
be considering in the televisual representation of heroes. Government officials and 
scholars have debated at great length about how heroes should be represented on
264
television in contemporary society. It was assumed that viewers would identify with 
the televisual representation of ordinary people, who are similar to themselves, as 
heroes, and the key here is described as the portrayal of genuine feelings that are 
familiar to them. However, in my discussion aove, viewers seem to relate with the 
televisual representation of heroes rather differently than was anticipated. However, 
as discussed above by quoting Weller (1994), such viewers’ articulations on the 
televisual representation of heroes alone cannot be taken as ‘resistance’ to the state. 
The crucial point for studies on reception, which Abu-Lughod describes as the 
thorniest problem in the ethnography of media, is that we will never be able to know 
fully and completely how viewers engage with televisual representation.
Then, even though Wang Lei and Cai Weifeng’s comments alone cannot be 
taken as resistance, they constitute a part of indeterminable multiplicity. Perhaps 
what could be a potential antagonistic force to the hegemonic power of the state lies 
in such multiple responses. Ortner argues that the inexhaustible variety of practices in 
reality poses a challenge to the ‘the hegemonic order’. She argues this point through 
the potential power of multiple gender relations as follows:
.. .whatever the hegemonic order of gender relations may be .. .it never 
exhausts what is going on. There are always sites, and sometimes larger sites, 
of alternative practices and perspectives available, and these may become the 
bases of resistance and transformation”
(1996:18)
One could draw the same point for viewing practices. From this point of view, the 
significance of viewing practices at the micro-level lies in then implications for the 
wider hegemonic power. Moreover, because their viewing practices simply produce 
alternative practices and views in their everyday lives, the state cannot control and 
force viewers to adhere to the official interpretation. So, if we return to my opening
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story about the Chinese New Year Extravaganza, perhaps Wang Lei was 
demonstrating the dialogic nature of television viewing.
266
Chapter Six
Jackie Chan Fights Lei Feng?: Conclusion
I originally chose this title “Jackie Chan fights Lei Feng?” to indicate an 
intention to address the question of how the internal cultural politics of the state- 
controlled media are articulated in contested visions of modern subjects. My 
implication was that the key issue is the conflict in post-reform China between 
commercially produced heroes, symbolised by Jackie Chan, and Lei Feng type 
communist heroes. I wanted to consider the clash of two seemingly polar ideologies - 
‘socialism’ represented by Lei Feng, and ‘the market’ symbolised by Jackie Chan. 
However, my examination of the televisual representation of heroes soon led me to 
the conclusion that Jackie Chan and Lei Feng do not necessarily fight, and are not in 
fact opposed to each other. They are instead representations indicative of the 
multiplicity of modern subjects in contemporary China. As discussed in Chapter 2, 
current literature on popular culture in the context of contemporary China suggests the 
emerging multiplicity of subjects as one characteristic of post-reform society. At the 
same time, I have argued that the idea of multiplicity assumed for modem subjects by 
the state is multiple in a particular way, generating a “correlation between an 
increasing individualisation and the reinforcement of totality”. This is suggestive of 
the changing socio-political condition of post-reform China, where there is a 
significant shift in the operation of state power.
In this thesis, then, starting with a look at the legacy of the state discursive 
practice of heroes, I have examined possible subjects articulated by the televisual 
representations of heroes, and how human beings are framed as subjects by different 
forms and plays of power in contemporary urban China. In this conclusion I will
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draw together the arguments in the previous chapters to further consider how human 
beings are framed into subjects in this way. As I write up this thesis, new heroes 
continue to emerge. Also, my position has moved from that of an academic 
researcher to being a commercial researcher working in the Chinese television 
industry. I consider the relevance of my ethnographic account against these changes, 
and relate these thoughts to the efficacy and partiality of ethnography. It is worth 
beginning by briefly restating the main discussions and conclusions of my previous 
chapters.
Summary of Chapters
In Chapter 2 ,1 examined the idea of heroes in contemporary China, in an 
attempt to define my understanding of the term ‘hero’, or ‘heroes’ and how I would 
use those terms in this thesis. I have argued that we must understand the idea of 
heroes and its discursive practice as assumed by the Party, because that retains to this 
day a special importance in a still nominally communist China. In particular, I looked 
at materials from the 1960s, as it was the period when the institutionalizing uses of 
heroes were first seen, and so epitomises the communist idea of heroes. These 
communist heroes, best exemplified by Lei Feng, were constructed as monotonous 
subjects characterised by their selfless labour and total subjection to the Party. They 
further facilitated the positing of a transcendence of ordinary reality by the common 
people as a part of the grand task for the cause of socialism. Building on this 
examination, I then discussed how these heroes were promoted as models to be
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emulated for the purpose of social engineering aimed at turning the masses into the 
‘docile bodies’ the Party needed to build and develop China at the time.
Alongside this communist idea of heroes, I have also looked at the idea of 
heroes used in the actual context of contemporary China. In this examination, I 
discussed how the actual usages of the idea of heroes are varied, and sometimes even 
contradict that assumed by the Party. These understandings of heroes have suggested 
that the idea of heroes is neither fixed nor unified in contemporary China. Defining 
the idea of heroes was further complicated by the way in which sinologists have used 
different representations of heroes in their works. Different subjects were articulated 
as heroes of contemporary Chinese people as a means of appreciating and 
understanding the society and people. Then, through these examinations of the idea 
of heroes, I have concluded that, despite a variation in the ways in which the idea of 
heroes has been articulated, the key to the Chinese concept of heroes is the emphasis 
on behaviour -  what heroes do, rather than who they are as an individual. They all 
serve heroic functions, for instance, inspiring people, being models which people 
should strive to emulate, figures to be admired, embodiments of what is to be desired 
and social values, helping others, uniting people, and changing history -  all the noble, 
courageous, and outstanding things said to be what heroes do. Hero as an idea is 
irreducible to an actual individual, or a set of individuals. By drawing Foucault’s 
‘author functions’ (1977c), I have argued that the function of hero to characterize the 
existence, circulation, and operation of certain discourse within a society. In the light 
of the above, I concluded that I would use the term ‘heroes’ to refer to subjects who 
displayed some aspects of these heroic functions.
In Chapter 3, by examining the televisual representation of heroes on 
contemporary Chinese television, I have demonstrated the changing representation of
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heroes from the previous Lei Feng- type communist subjects to ordinary people in the 
post -reform period. As the social reality has changed, the previous Lei Feng type 
communist heroes are said to be increasingly anachronistic, and heroes faced the 
challenge of winning popular support in the face of increasing market competition in 
the post- reform period. The new representations of heroes were constructed as 
ordinary subjects with mundane lives, with whom viewers could communicate and 
identify in terms of feelings, thoughts, and the issues they face.
At the same time, I have argued that the changing televisual representation of 
heroes in the reform period was not simply aimed at making heroes more appealing to 
viewers, but was the result of change in wider ideological implications. In the post - 
reform period, the previous ideology of a communist utopia was replaced by the new 
affirmation of everyday life, whereby people were left without any further expectation 
of salvation. Now the utopia is this world. Under such circumstances, the televisual 
representation of ordinary people {Iciobaixing dealing with various
difficulties and miseries was used to promote a self-help ideology by which people 
were encouraged to solve their own problems in life and to cope with the anxiety of 
secular life. In this respect, these new heroes assume a similar role to previous Lei 
Feng type communist heroes from the 1960s, in that they offer models to emulate.
Following on from the above, in Chapter 4 ,1 further examined the changing 
operation of state power in relation to the new televisual representation of ordinary 
people. My argument in this chapter was that the ordinary people depicted on 
television are not just any common person, but are rather particular subjects produced 
for the purpose o f ‘equipping’ audiences with knowledge, and ‘guiding,’ ‘moulding,’ 
and ‘encouraging’ them. Modern subjects are portrayed as being familiar with 
science and technology, socially responsible, consumers, emotional, and existing
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within the framework of the law. I have also suggested that the new categorisation of 
types of modern subjects in the post-refonn period is as ‘advanced’ or ‘backward.’
So, the various images of ordinary people portrayed on television define what 
‘advanced’ and ‘backward’ subjects look like in contemporary society.
In this respect, the new televisual representation of heroes serves the operation 
of state power. These modern subjects, represented as ordinary people, on one hand 
categorise the individual in such a way that an individual creates particular kinds of 
self-knowledge and experience of the world that support the operation of state power; 
on the other hand, through the exposure of these subjects, individuals are brought 
under and incorporated into ‘the reach of the State.’ Subjects which threaten the 
operation of state power are left out of the representations. Therefore, the televisual 
representation of ordinary people is a correlation between an increasing 
individualisation and the reinforcement of totality, and the multiplicity of the ordinary 
people is multiple in a particular way.
I have concluded this chapter by saying the new televisual representation of 
ordinary people marks a change in the state technology to govern people, a move 
away from the previous form of repressive domination to control through more 
positive means, though the former continues to exist to an extent. One of the trends 
within the new government rationality is the increasing institutionalisation of society, 
whereby ordinary people are assumed to be the subjects of law, while in the past 
people were considered to be the ‘object’ of propaganda activities. Thus, the 
discursive practice of the televisual representation of heroes by the state has become 
less in your face, and harder to recognise in contemporary China.
Then in Chapter 5 ,1 have examined the articulation of the televisual 
representation of heroes at the level of audience. In an attempt to consider an
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anthropological approach to research on television viewing in late- 90s urban China 
where the circumstance for television is complex and going through rapid changes, I 
began by looking at existing academic literature on television audience in the context 
of China. Through this analysis, I suggested that there are two main different types of 
presupposed subjects for Chinese audience; firstly, viewers are framed as political 
subjects, and often portrayed as a collective in opposition to the state. Secondly, 
viewers are often framed to be meaning-making subjects engaging with the television 
programme as ‘text’ at a rational level. Though recognising the significance of these 
works, I have argued the need for putting viewers back into the context of their actual 
lives as a valid anthropological approach to the study of television audience.
Watching television is closely embedded in people’s everyday lives.
In this chapter, I discussed televisual representations of two different heroes. 
The first was the representation of Wang Zili, a contemporary version of the 
communist hero to some extent resembling Lei Feng, from the television series The 
Son, a social realist drama. The narrative structure of The Son sets up Wang Zili as a 
hero embracing certain elements which allow viewers to identify with and be 
influenced by him. However, viewers have engaged with this representation of Wang 
Zili is ways different from what was anticipated. The other example given was the 
representation of Xiao Feng, a tragic martial aits master reminiscent of the heroes of 
classical Chinese novels, in the series Demi-God Demi-Devil. Through an 
engagement with the televisual representation of Xiao Feng, a viewer has articulated a 
charismatic hero who transcends ordinary, which is an alternative subject from the 
one assumed for communist heroes.
In this examination, I demonstrated that the televisual representation of heroes 
became a key means of depicting what it is like to live in contemporary urban China
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and illuminating some of the issues faced in the present-day society. Thus the 
televisual representation of heroes is situated in viewer’s personal lives beyond the 
television screen. Viewers may further draw on what they have read and watched 
previously beyond the immediate programme. I have argued that even though none of 
these articulations can be taken as ‘resistance’, their significance lies in their 
implications for the hegemonic power in its broad application. They constitute a part 
of indeterminable multiplicity, which ultimately poses a challenge to the success of 
state power.
Cultural Politics of the Televisual Representation of Heroes
As I write this thesis, new heroes continue to emerge, from the NBA 
basketball player Yao Ming to China’s first astronaut Yang Liwei, though the point of 
my research has been to examine their socio-cultural significance, rather than 
capturing each one of them. In the above summary of each chapter, it is evident that 
the discursive practice of heroes is an important agenda for the state. Many years have 
passed since the 1960s, however, the communist idea of heroes still seems important, 
and is quite central to the operation of power.
At the same time, in the reform period, the televisual representation of heroes 
changed on two levels. One is that previous Lei-Feng type communist heroes are 
brought down to ‘this world’ from the world of ‘utopic master narrative’ envisioned 
by the Party. They no longer sacrifice then lives for the Party, and are portrayed with 
some personal feelings and interests, and through some common themes of love, 
family and friends that are familiar to viewers. Through such modification, it was
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anticipated that a greater appeal to viewers could be affected. On another level, there 
is a change in the televisual representation of heroes from previous communist heroes 
to ordinary people. The secularisation of heroes is a part of this transformation. 
Ordinary people are portrayed with feelings, interests and issues that are similar to 
those of viewers. In effect, it was expected that viewers would identify with these 
heroes and ultimately be influenced by them. I have also discussed how these 
ordinary people are particular subjects that reify the idea of modern subjects assumed 
by the state. Thus, a certain social engineering outcome is anticipated from the 
televisual representation of ordinary people.
This change in the televisual representation of heroes thus suggests a 
transformation of the government rationale. With the ideological shift from utopia to 
this world, the new subjectivity assumed for people departs from the ‘docile body’ 
embodied by the image of selfless worker Lei Feng to self-regulating obedient 
Foucauldian subjects. Foucault assumed that in the modern era the legitimate 
political power of the modern state resided in the obedience of subjects, and the 
government aims to produce and reproduce self-regulating obedient subjects. The 
televisual representation of ordinary people embodies such self-regulating obedient 
subjects, who help themselves to overcome issues and the anxiety of their everyday 
lives. From this point of view, therefore, despite the changing televisual 
representation of heroes, they are all subjects within the reach of the power of the 
state.
The televisual representation of heroes as the discursive practice of the state 
works at the level of the individual body. The televisual representation of heroes 
concerns personal desires, expectations, values and beliefs, and people neither submit 
to power nor resist it in any simpler sense, but work through it and turn it to their
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purposes. This process was articulated as viewers’ enthusiasm for the greatness of a 
charismatic television hero for instance. I have demonstrated that viewers, who are 
assumed to be the objects of the discursive practice of heroes, are particular 
individuals existing within multiple social relations and in a particular time and space. 
So this examination brings us back to the debate in anthropology o f ‘structure’ versus 
‘agency.’
My examination of the televisual representation of heroes demonstrates that 
society does not simply transform from one type to another. It is quite common to 
take the implementation of the Open Door Policy in 1978 to be the demarcation line, 
or as Cohen calls it, the “academic Great Wall of China,” for the transformation from 
the oppressed and monotonous China to the global and pluralistic one. That is the 
shift depicted not only by the two images of Lei Feng and Jackie Chan at the outset of 
this thesis, but also suggested by much of academic literature. The actual condition 
seems to be far less clear-cut, and often more complex. Then, in order to consider the 
significance of this thesis, in what follows I will discuss my research in relation to 
anthropological knowledge, particularly the efficacy and partiality of ethnography.
Recent Literature on Chinese Media Studies
As I finish this thesis, an increasing volume of literature on Chinese media is 
being published by Western academia. Before I carry on, then, I want to briefly look 
at some of that new literature. One of the trends is work on Chinese media in relation 
to media practices within different Asian countries which share similar and yet 
different experiences of media ‘globalization’, and whereby varied media content has
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been increasingly exchanged in recent years (Moran, Keane & Hong 2004, French & 
Richards 2000, Curran and Park 2000). Moran, Keane& Hong (2004) look at the 
development, translation, and exchange of television ideas across Asia through 
examining the indigenous application of programme formats. Through this work, the 
authors challenge the view that the Western media over-detennine the global media 
system by highlighting the uniqueness and richness of indigenous application. Such a 
framing of Chinese media indicates a new positioning that is no longer a particular 
and peculiar market dictated by Party propaganda, and further suggests the increasing 
importance of the Chinese media market for international media companies.
Among the recently published literature on Chinese media, Chin Chuan Lee 
(2003) and Donalds and Keane (2002) suggest key approaches to the study of media 
in China which depart from the analysis of a simple portrayal of China’s media as 
technologies of power, which formerly dominated the literature published in the 
Western hemisphere. Chin Chuan Lee focuses on various views of contemporary 
Chinese media with an emphasis on media and democracy. In particular, this work 
examines the uncertain but vital democratic challenge new media technologies and 
policies will set against traditional modes of state control on national, regional, and 
global levels. Overall, Chin Chuan Lee takes a political economic approach, which 
has been the most dominant and popular approach to the study of Chinese media, as 
discussed in Chapter 1, however, this work is crucial in that it bridges media studies 
and Chinese studies, disciplines previously seen to exist quite separately.
Contributors to this work suggest a variety of ways in which one can study Chinese 
media across several disciplines which will further enrich Chinese media studies 
theoretically and empirically.
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Among these contributors, Fung (2003) suggests that the marketing of the 
Hong Kong pop icon Andy Lau in Mainland China is predicated on avoidance of 
ideological clashes with the state. Not only that, he has suggested that Andy Lau was 
fashioned with nationalistic packaging to encourage market success. As I have 
discussed in this thesis, concerning the televisual representation of heroes in China, 
Fung also suggests that the representation of pop icons does not simply enhances 
market value and is not simply a matter of departure from previous communist heroes.
Donalds and Keane (2002) focus on various media practices at different levels 
of the current Chinese media industry. There are contributions from a wider cross- 
section of the industry, not just limited to academia but also covering research, 
advertising agencies and media suppliers. They explore evolving audience 
demographics, new patterns of media reception in regional centres and the gradual 
internationalisation of media content as well as foreign investments in China’s 
broadcasting industries. Donalds and Keane argue that the media in China are heavily 
regulated in theory, but due to the sheer size of the media market, guidelines and 
policies are difficult to implement and enforce. Their work looks at such gaps 
through case studies, and discusses their socio-political significance. Similar to some 
of the works here, then, I believe the theoretical contribution of this thesis is that it has 
provided a micro-study of Chinese media in relation to the televisual representation of 
heroes.
These works portray the Chinese media to be in a state of rapid change due to 
a variety of influences, ranging from global events, political processes, and 
multilateral trade agreements to technological transformation. In relation to these 
works, then, the period during which I undertook my fieldwork was a transitional time 
for Chinese television. One of the main themes in debates in this new literature on
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Chinese media is whether ‘authentic’ Chinese culture is in danger of being eroded by 
content cloned from foreign ‘mass culture’ formats propagated through the mass 
media of television. In fact, this debate is not new. As discussed in this thesis in 
terms of the televisual representation of heroes, there are changes but they are not 
necessarily a linear transformation from ‘authentically’ Chinese to foreign ‘mass 
culture’ formats. At the macro-level, it is undeniable that the Chinese media industry 
is changing towards more globalised forms, however, what is ‘authentically’ Chinese 
and what is foreign ‘mass culture’ are not so clear cut and fixed phenomena.
Positionality and Knowledge
As I finish writing up this thesis, my personal circumstances and position have 
changed. Previously, I was a PhD student doing research on the televisual 
representation of heroes in China, and most of the research on which this thesis is 
based was conducted from that particular position. While I was writing up this thesis, 
between 2002 and 2003 I was working for China’s biggest television audience 
measurement provider based in Beijing. I was not only a part of the Chinese 
television industry, but also have suddenly become a part of constructing the Chinese 
television ‘audience’. Over the year, this new position has granted me access to an 
enormous amount of information related to Chinese television. Then, the question 
which I now ask myself is whether to reconsider my analysis on the televisual 
representation of heroes in the light of my new experiences as a commercial 
researcher for Chinese television. Since the time of my fieldwork, I have gained 
more knowledge about the operation of the Chinese television industry within a larger
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framework-such as the ways in which television stations source their budgets, the 
ways in which programme schedules are decided and rearranged, the various kinds of 
pressures and issues different TV stations are facing, which time of year the political 
control becomes tight, and so on. In fact, I found that bridging these two different 
positions for doing research on practices related to Chinese television is not easy. In 
some way, it seems as if academia and industry exist as independent entities. 
Television audience measurement seemed to be another completely new set of 
articulatory practices of television viewers.
Discourse o f Television Audience Measurement (TAM)
At this media research company, I have engaged in quite a different kind of 
research of the television audience in contemporary China. The main medium used in 
this type of research is called TAM or what is more commonly called television 
ratings. As Ang (1991) describes it, ratings discourse simply treats viewers as 
numbers, as units having equal value, so watching television is reduced to the 
observable behaviour of having the set on. The viewing behaviour of the audience is 
analysed on the basis of the basic data of how many TV sets are on and how many 
people have been recorded to be watching a particular channel at the time being 
measured. At the television audience measurement provider for which I worked, 
differences between audiences are simply reduced to categories of sex, age, income, 
educational background, and cable/ non-cable household. Other aspects of life, which 
I have showed as being drawn into the way in which viewers engage with televisual 
representation in my writing above, are ignored.
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The current Chinese television market is seen predominantly through the lens 
of quantitative research. Other kinds of research, for example qualitative research 
which is related to anthropology al least in terms of research methodology, is used on 
a much smaller scale. The whole purpose of undertaking research is solely to achieve 
an increase in ratings. Given the close institutional association between television and 
advertising industries in their operations, it is not surprising that such an approach to 
the television audience dominated the field of television research in the industry. 
Television ratings are a kind of knowledge which quantifies and provides regularities 
to the audience ‘out there,’ to be brought under the discourse of television audience 
measurement so as to be marketable to both broadcasters and advertisers.
At the beginning, as an anthropologist, I had been rather uncomfortable with 
such an approach to the viewing practices of people which did not take into account 
their complexity. Yet, as I learned more about the discourse of TAM, I came to think 
that this is simply another, and probably quite an important, way of looking at the 
television audience and their viewing practices. My newly acquired position has 
produced different order knowledge about cultural production in Chinese television 
from that which I have discussed in this thesis. The key for producing the knowledge 
could be described in relation to what the British philosopher Collingwood calls the 
“logic of question and answer,” as he notes,
You cannot find out what a man means by simply studying his spoken or 
written statements, even though he has spoken or written with perfect 
command of language and perfectly truthful intention. In order to find out his 
meaning you must know what the question was (a question in his own mind, 
and presumed by him to be in yours) to which the thing he has said or written 
was meant as an answer. It must be understood that question and answer, as I 
conceived them, were strictly correlative.
(1939:31)
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Drawing on this point, the understanding of the television audience is 
produced in relation to the kinds of questions asked about the television audience.
My understanding of the televisual representation of heroes is established in relation 
to the kinds of questions I have asked about that representation. As my position 
changes, the land of questions I ask also shifts, and thus I get different kinds of 
answers that lead to different propositions about Chinese television. An 
anthropologist and TAM provider ask different questions, and thus make different 
articulations about television- related practices. The validity of the attained 
propositions can only be judged by the kind of question being asked. This is to say 
that it is not possible to claim that the anthropological knowledge about the television 
audience is better or worse than the knowledge produced by the discourse from TAM 
without looking at the questions being asked. This point can be illustrated by an 
encounter I had on one occasion.
When I was working for the media research company, there was a meeting 
about the publication on Chinese television. A variety of people -  ranging from 
scholars, industiy leaders, and CCTV staff, to some cultural officials from the 
provincial broadcasting and television bureau were in attendance. During this 
meeting, there was a major point of disagreement surrounding the figures for the 
national audience. At the TAM provider for which I worked, the audience was 
defined as people over the age of four who had access to at least one television set. 
Representatives of CCTV and the cultural officials did not agree with this definition 
and wanted to include people of all ages who had access to at least one television set. 
CCTV representatives further expressed concern that they would be publishing the 
same kind of report around the same time, and it would look bad if the two sets of 
figures did not match. Meanwhile, scholars from the BBI expressed their concern
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about the definition of the national audience in terms of different categories -  such as 
business, the state, or academics, and which category was most suitable to use. I, as 
an anthropologist, was busily noting that this was a moment in which the idea of 
audience as the constructed category was articulated.
Going back to Collingwood5s ‘logic of question and answer,’ then, none of the 
assumptions made about the television audience was ‘correct,’ for there were different 
interests and concerns which produced different kinds of questions about the 
television audience. The most prominent interest for industry players, including 
CCTV and the cultural officials, was that favourable figures were produced -  which 
usually meant high ratings, reach and channel coverage; aspects of concern to 
advertisers. Moreover CCTV also expressed interest in maintaining its status as the 
authoritative voice of the industry. Academics, including myself, appeared to be 
working under quite different presuppositions about television and its audience.
While these academic and commercial researches work under different 
discourses, I found some similarities to my own previous research. In particular, the 
growing importance of ordinary people was prominent in the realm of TAM. In the 
Chinese television industry ratings were becoming increasingly the key language to 
communicate what ordinary viewers want to watch. Because of importance given to 
ratings, ordinary people’s viewing could even have a great influence on programme 
scheduling.
Ethnography as Partial Connections
Having examined the televisual representation of heroes from the perspective
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of different kinds and levels of cultural production in this thesis, there is still a sense 
of partiality running through this ethnography. Perhaps one may argue that the topic 
covers too broad an area to be addressed in one thesis and in the limited duration of 
my fieldwork. Moreover, discussed in Chapter 1, it is hard to determine the boundary 
for the televisual representation of heroes in terms of “where to begin and where to 
end the analysis” (Ang 1996:73), especially since articulations extend beyond 
immediate televisual representations. The same sense of partiality persists in my 
understanding even after gaining more experience and knowledge about televisual 
representation since the time of my fieldwork. This sense of partiality, then, leads to 
me to consider the efficacy and partiality of ethnography itself.
Writing of ethnography reminds me of the following story in which 
Collingwood noted:
A person asked to describe an elephant or a comet -  not an individual elephant 
or an individual comet, but the concept -  would aim at completeness: he 
would try to include in his exposition all the attributes properly included in the 
concept. ... There is no one attribute of a comet or an elephant from which we 
can deduce all the rest; we do not sufficiently understand the way in which 
their various attributes are interconnected; so, from our point of view, these 
attributes tend to form a mere aggregate in which certain elements are found 
together without any reason why they should be together. This tendency is no 
doubt opposed by another, tending to connect attributes into a logical whole; 
so that the description of an empirical concept is in general an ambiguous 
thing
(1933:98&99)
It appears to me that the writing of ethnography resembles describing an elephant or 
comet. Like a person who is asked to describe the concept of an elephant or a comet, 
the anthropological enquiry often aims toward completeness by properly including all 
the attributes of the anthropological object. However, despite our efforts, ‘unity’ or 
‘completeness’ is only attainable through the construction of an anthropologist. In 
fact, attributes are produced through a researcher’s act of attention. The attention here
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is a “practical and directive or selective act that ‘makes’ .. .the distinctions between 
what we attend to and what we attend from or ‘repress’” (Collingwood 1942:22). It is 
this act of attention that ‘cuts up’ reality in various ways to form attributes. In this 
sense, the writing of ethnography is an articulatory practice, and this thesis is my 
articulation of the televisual representation of heroes in contemporary urban China.
On the topic of ethnography, Strathem notes that we can shift in magnitude 
and domain, but our depiction of reality will always remain partially connected. She 
explains this point by drawing on Gleick’s account of the Cantor dust. Gleick writes:
They are properties that turn out to depend on the fractal quality of the bumps 
upon bumps upon bumps. One simple but powerfi.il consequence of fractal 
geometry of surfaces is that surfaces in contact do not touch each other. The 
bumpiness at all scales prevents th a t.. .It is why two pieces of a broken teacup 
can never be rejoined, even though they appear to fit together at some gross 
scale. At a smaller scale, irregular bumps are failing to coincide.
(Gleick 1988:106 in Strathem 1991:xxiv)
In this sense, the amount of realizable information does not itself increase or decrease 
regardless of the materials involved. It is the variation of information that increases 
and the intennittency and irregularity will persist in repeating. Similarly, Strathem 
argues that we can change the positions we analyse from, but ‘unity’ is always 
imagined as what is made up of jumps over gaps, juxtapositions, and leaps -  
unpredictable, irregular. Therefore, the closer we inspect monographs, paragraphs, 
and sentences, the more aware we are of internal discontinuities -  that is probably the 
sense of partiality I was feeling. To take this discussion further, drawing on 
Collingwood’s point on the ‘logic of question and answer’ mentioned above, one 
could argue that the ethnography is a conglomeration of these partial depictions of 
reality collected by the questions the researcher has asked.
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It is, then, worthwhile to consider what kind of questions anthropologists ask -  
what would be the anthropological approach. At the same time, I want to make it 
clear that there is no intention of claiming ‘the’ anthropological approach, assuming it 
to be a single commonly shared concept. Drawing on Collingwood, Hobart (1990:93) 
says that an anthropological approach is interested in understanding and 
differentiating degrees and kinds of situations and attributes, rather than making 
generalisations about them. Not only partiality seems to be fundamentally grounded 
in our approach, I believe that people’s construction of reality and their experiences 
are also partially connected. Then, through a focus on particularities of different 
situations, lives and experiences of people existing in particular place and time can 
emerge, which have been concealed beneath the researcher’s construction as ‘the 
people,’ or ‘the audience’. Partiality means that there will always be the possibility of 
another kind of understanding -  that is what I meant by the dialogic nature of 
fieldwork in Chapter 1. Then, what I have attempted to do in this thesis was not the 
discovery of ‘truth’ or the ‘essence,’ but to engage with different kinds articulatory 
practices for the televisual representation of heroes as a dynamic process. Therefore,
I could only draw a tentative closure to this thesis.
Moreover, people’s lives are richer and more vivid than the conclusion an 
anthropologist could arrive at, so there are always potential for the future 
engagements. A winner of the Pulitzer Prize, writer Jhumpa Lahiri, writes,
While the astronauts, heroes forever, spent mere hours on the moon, I have 
remained in this new world for nearly thirty years. I know that my 
achievement is quite ordinary. ...As ordinary as it all appears, there are times 
when it is beyond my imagination.
(1999:198)
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However much literature explaining different aspects of contemporary urban China 
there may be nowadays, people I encounter in my everyday life in China manage so 
often to make you surprised, puzzled and excited. In this respect, the heroes of this 
thesis are ordinary people. Such surprises are the inspiration and motive force that 
keep me carrying on research in contemporary urban China.
Then, in this thesis, instead of taking the televisual representation of heroes as 
fixed and unified, I have taken an approach of putting it back into various contexts of 
contemporary urban China at different levels of cultural production, where it is 
relevant. Each context has articulated a variety of modern subjects that are shaped by 
different kind of forms and plays of power. In particular, I have argued that the 
technology of power operates at the level of the individual body, and therefore the 
body becomes the site where personal, the state, socio-political, economical, 
commercial forces and interests are negotiated. Such concluding remarks may be 
rather banal, however, the significance of this thesis lies in that I have demonstrated 
how they are working and in what way the familiar issue of ‘subject’ and ‘power’ is 
articulated in the particular context of contemporary urban China.
Anthropologically, this thesis further assumes relevance in that it has demonstrated 
how popular culture intersects with the discursive practices of the state rather than 
opposition to it. The approach taken in this thesis, partial as it may seem, allows us to 
understand the complexity and fluidity, as well as contingency, of the relationship 
between them. In terms of media studies, I believe the anthropological approach to 
television production and viewing practices will be relevant in illuminating how these 
practices extend to people’s lives beyond television, as existing studies tend to be 
dominated by a political economic analysis. Overall, this anthropological
286
examination of the televisual representation of heroes is an attempt to understand an 
increasingly complex and fluid contemporary urban society.
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